COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED AUGUST 20, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 95-3610-CR
95-3611-CR
95-3612-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKY A. DUCOMMUN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEALS from judgments
of the circuit court for Eau Claire County:
THOMAS H. BARLAND, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Ricky Ducommun appeals sentences imposed on his
convictions for felony substantial battery, misdemeanor battery, bail jumping,
obstructing an officer, and two counts of disorderly conduct, having pled
guilty to the charges. The substantial
battery charge resulted from a five-man attack on two victims. The other charges resulted from acts
Ducommun committed while released on bail on the substantial battery charge and
other subsequently dismissed charges.
The trial court imposed maximum, consecutive sentences on each charge
for a total of nine years in prison. On
appeal, Ducommun argues that the sentences were excessive. We reject this argument and affirm his
sentences.
We first agree with the
State's argument that Ducommun has not preserved the sentence issue for
appellate review. Under State v.
Meyer, 150 Wis.2d 603, 442 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1989), defendants waive
such matters on appeal whenever they fail to file a motion to modify
sentence. Here, Ducommun did not file a
trial court motion to modify sentence.
Rather, he proceeded directly to this court. We therefore uphold his sentence on the basis of waiver under Meyer. Nonetheless, we also uphold the substantive
merits of the trial court's decision to impose maximum consecutive sentences on
each charge.
The trial court's sentencing decision was
discretionary. State v. Macemon,
113 Wis.2d 662, 667-68, 335 N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (1983). Sentencing courts have discretion to
determine the weight to give to each of the relevant factors, Ocanas v.
State, 70 Wis.2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975), and may base
their sentences on any of the factors after all have been reviewed. Anderson v. State, 76 Wis.2d
361, 366-67, 251 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1977).
Relevant sentencing factors include the gravity of the offense, the
protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the
interests of deterrence. State v.
Sarabia, 118 Wis.2d 655, 673-74, 348 N.W.2d 527, 537 (1984).
Other relevant factors
are the defendant's age, character, personality, social traits, remorse,
repentance, cooperativeness, educational level, employment background, degree
of culpability, demeanor at trial, his need for close rehabilitative control,
the rights of the public, and the vicious or aggravated nature of his
crime. State v. Killory,
73 Wis.2d 400, 408, 243 N.W.2d 475, 481 (1976). Like other discretionary matters, sentencing decisions must have
a reasonable basis in the record and demonstrate a logical process of reasoning
applying proper legal standards to the facts of record. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d
263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519-20 (1971).
Here, the facts of record and applicable legal standards permitted the
trial court to impose maximum consecutive sentences.
In the substantial
felony battery incident, Ducommun and four others attacked and severely
battered two persons. One victim went
into a coma and suffered an internal head injury of a kind one physician had
seen before only in car accidents.
After reviewing the incident, the trial court characterized the
perpetrators as hoodlums, calling the attack one of the worst in the area in
many years. It held Ducommun
responsible not only for his own acts, but also for his accomplices', citing
both Ducommun's specific failure to stop the attack and general legal
principles making the acts of those who aid and abet relevant to
sentencing. After reviewing Ducommun's
record, the trial court ruled that he posed a danger to the public and could
not control his criminal behavior.
The trial court ruled
that Ducommun had also demonstrated his inability to control his behavior by
the way he had committed five additional crimes while released on bail on the
felony substantial battery charge. These
five crimes took place on two dates within five months of the substantial
felony battery incident. In the court's
view, Ducommun's crimes made the public's protection the paramount concern in
Ducommun's sentencing and the public's right to expect appropriate punishment
the second one. The trial court found
that anything less than maximum consecutive sentences would depreciate the
seriousness of Ducommun's crimes and increase the danger to the public. The trial court told Ducommun that the
public had a right to protection from someone like him.
These findings represent
a proper analysis of the relevant factors and reasonable application of the
pertinent legal standards. The trial
court's findings gave appropriate weight to Ducommun's crimes, character, and
dangerousness. As the trial court
noted, Ducommun committed the felony substantial battery with a group of
hoodlums, and the battery had caused severe injuries to the victims with
potential lifelong effects. Ducommun
had also committed the six crimes at three separate times and places in what
amounted to a five-month crime spree.
He committed the last five crimes while released on bail on the felony
substantial battery charge. This
sequence of events demonstrated that restrictions short of incarceration, such
as bail, had not succeeded in deterring him from criminal activity.
Under these
circumstances, the trial court could duly give the public's need for protection
the paramount role in Ducommun's sentencing.
It could view the crimes from the community's perspective and impose a
level of punishment sufficient to meet the substantial risk Ducommun posed to
the public over the long term. Taken
together, the maximum, consecutive sentences bore a close connection to
Ducommun's crimes, character, and dangerousness. The trial court had no duty to give significant weight to the
remorse Ducommun professed at the sentencing hearing. It could rationally give Ducommun's deeds more weight than his
words. It could also reasonably
conclude that a shorter sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crimes
and expose the public to greater danger.
In short, the trial court properly exercised its sentencing
discretion.
By the Court.—Judgments
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.