PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 95-3565
†Petition for
Review Filed
Complete Title
of Case:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM A. SPRING,
Defendant-Appellant.†
Submitted on Briefs: August 12, 1996
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: September 4, 1996
Opinion Filed: September
4, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Waukesha
(If
"Special", JUDGE: J. MAC DAVIS
so indicate)
JUDGES: Brown, Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Christopher A. Mutschler of The Law
Offices of Barry S. Cohen, S.C., of Elkhart Lake.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Ted S. Szczupakiewicz, assistant district
attorney, Waukesha.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED September
4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3565
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM
A. SPRING,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County: J. MAC DAVIS, Judge. Affirmed.
Brown,
Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
NETTESHEIM,
J. This is an implied consent revocation
case. William A. Spring appeals from an
order revoking his driving privileges for refusing to submit to a blood
test. Although Spring verbally agreed
to the test, he refused to sign a written consent form, required by the medical
facility, consenting to the test.
Spring argues that the implied consent law does not recognize or
authorize such a form. The trial court
determined that the use and content of the form did not violate the implied
consent law. We uphold the court's
ruling and affirm the revocation order.
FACTS
The
relevant facts are brief and undisputed.
On August 26, 1995, Waukesha County Deputy Sheriff Glenn Schilder
arrested Spring for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant. Spring was transported to
Memorial Hospital at Oconomowoc where Schilder informed Spring of the implied
consent law. Schilder then asked Spring
whether he would submit to a blood test.
Spring agreed.
Schilder
then presented Spring with a printed form which the hospital requires as part
of the chemical test procedure. We set
out the form in full in the accompanying footnote.[1] The form consists of two pages. The first page, signed by the officer
requesting the test, commands the medical facility or medical personnel to
perform the chemical test on the suspect.
The concluding paragraph of this page recites the following:
pursuant to section 895.53(2) and (3), Wisconsin
Statutes, any person withdrawing blood, any employer of the person withdrawing
blood or any hospital where there is blood withdrawn by that person, at the request
of a traffic officer, law enforcement officer or conservation warden ¼ is immune from any
civil or criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for
negligence in the performance of the act.
The
second page of the form is the actual consent portion of the form. It confirms in writing the suspect's consent
to the test and the suspect's understanding that the test sample will be turned
over to the authorities for analysis.
Spring
construed the form as a waiver of liability on the part of the hospital and its
medical personnel. For this reason, he
refused to sign the consent portion of the form. Schilder considered this a refusal under the implied consent law,
and, in due course, Spring was charged with illegally refusing to submit to a
chemical test.
At
the revocation hearing, Spring argued that the implied consent law does not
recognize or authorize the consent form which he was requested to sign. Since he otherwise had agreed to submit to the
chemical test, Spring argued that he had not illegally refused the test. The trial court disagreed.[2] The court held that the consent form merely
implemented the implied consent law as written.
DISCUSSION[3]
Section
343.305(9)(a)5.a-c, Stats., sets
out the issues which are addressed at a revocation hearing under the implied
consent law: (1) whether the officer
had probable cause to arrest the defendant, (2) whether the officer correctly
informed the defendant under the implied consent law, and (3) whether the
suspect refused the test.
We
concede Spring's threshold argument that the implied consent law does not
expressly authorize a law enforcement officer or a medical facility to require
an OWI suspect to sign a written consent before a chemical test may be
administered. However, we disagree with
Spring that this concession governs this appeal. Instead, we conclude that the proper inquiry is whether the
content of the form misinforms or misleads the suspect as to the implied
consent law or related sections. This
implicates the second of the issues litigated at a revocation hearing as noted
above—whether Spring was correctly informed under the implied consent law.[4] We now conduct this inquiry.
Section
343.305(2), Stats., of the
implied consent law declares that an OWI suspect is deemed to have consented to
a chemical test. Subsection (2) goes on
to state, “Any such tests shall be administered upon the request of a
law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis
added.) Subsection (5)(b) of the
statute provides that blood tests may be performed “only by a physician,
registered nurse, medical technologist, physician assistant or person acting
under the direction of a physician.” In
addition, § 895.53(2), Stats.,
provides:
Any
person withdrawing blood at the request of a traffic officer, law enforcement
officer or conservation warden for the purpose of determining the presence or
quantity of alcohol, controlled substances or both is immune from any civil or
criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in
the performance of the act.
Subsection (3) of this statute extends the immunity to
any employer of the medical person identified in subsec. (2).
In
summary, these statutory provisions stand for the following: (1) a law enforcement officer may order
medical personnel to administer a chemical test, (2) a blood test may be
administered only by medical personnel, and (3) except for civil liability for
negligence, the medical personnel are immunized from any other civil or
criminal liability resulting from the test.
The first page of the consent form used in this case accurately recites
the foregoing.[5] As such, it memorializes in writing exactly
what the implied consent law and § 895.53(2), Stats., envision.
Therefore, Spring was not entitled to refuse the test on the basis of
this information.[6]
We
turn now to the second page of the form.
This is the consent portion which Spring was asked to sign. This page documents the suspect's consent to
the test and the suspect's understanding that the test sample will be submitted
for analysis. While the implied consent
law does not expressly require that the suspect's consent and understanding be
reduced to writing, we see nothing in such a procedure which violates the
spirit or intent of the law. The
purpose of the implied consent law is to facilitate the taking of tests for
intoxication not to inhibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers
from the highway. Scales v. State,
64 Wis.2d 485, 494, 219 N.W.2d 286, 292 (1974). In light of that purpose, the law is to be liberally construed to
effectuate its policies. Id. Since this page of the form simply
memorializes in writing what the suspect is otherwise required to do under the
implied consent law, we hold that Spring was not entitled to refuse the test on
the basis of this form.
In
summary, we hold that the content and use of the form, whether viewed in its
separate parts or collectively, did not misinform Spring under the implied
consent law. We affirm the revocation
order.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
The
undersigned, a duly authorized law enforcement officer of Waukesha Sheriff Police Department, hereby certifies
that
(Name of
Department)
the subject identified as William A. Spring has been
(Name of Person)
arrested based upon probable cause to believe the subject
has committed a violation or crime that is either related to driving while
under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination
of an intoxicant and a controlled substance or under the influence of any other
drug; or, is related to alcohol and/or controlled substances and there is a
clear indication that any blood/urine collected will produce evidence of that
crime or violation. If necessary, the
subject has been orally informed by this law enforcement officer of his/her
rights under Wisconsin's implied consent law, pursuant to Section 343.305(4),
Wisconsin Statutes.
I hereby command that a physician, registered nurse,
medical technologist, physician's assistant or person acting under the
direction of a physician at Memorial Hospital at Oconomowoc obtain a
blood/urine sample from said person in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances for the purpose of determining the X alcohol
and/or drug content thereof (specify by checking
appropriate items).
I further certify that said blood/urine collected has
been commanded by the Waukesha
Sheriff Department Police
(Name of Department)
Department and advise that, pursuant to section 946.40, Wisconsin Statutes,
whoever, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails, upon command, to aid any
person known to be a peace officer is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. This section does not apply if under the
circumstances the officer was not authorized to command such assistance.
In addition, pursuant to section 895.53(2) and (3),
Wisconsin Statutes, any person withdrawing blood, any employer of the person
withdrawing blood or any hospital where there is blood withdrawn by that
person, at the request of a traffic officer, law enforcement officer or
conservation warden, for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of
alcohol, controlled substances or both, is immune from any civil or criminal
liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in the
performance of the act.
Date: 08-26-95
Name: Deputy
Schilder
Deputy
Schilder U198775-3
(OFFICER'S SIGNATURE) (ARREST CITATION NUMBER)
This form is not to be used when the officer presents a
search warrant for the collection of the sample.
_______________________________________________________________________________
BLOOD/URINE
ANALYSIS REQUEST BY
LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
PAGE 1 OF 2
Page
Two:
Pursuant to section 343.305 of the Wisconsin Statutes, I,
the undersigned, do hereby consent to the collection of a blood or urine sample
from my body by a physician, registered nurse, or person acting under the
direction of a physician at Memorial Hospital at Oconomowoc. I understand that the purpose of obtaining
this blood or urine sample is to determine the intoxicant content therof. I understand that this sample will be turned
over to the above-named police officer for the purpose of having it analyzed. I understand that the purpose of obtaining
this specimen is to determine the X
alcohol and/or drug content thereof (specify by checking appropriate items). I consent to and authorize the hospital to
release the sample of the blood or urine analysis to the Waukesha Sheriff
(Name of Law
Enforcement Body)
for the purpose of determining if I was under the
influence of an intoxicant. I
understand that this consent is revocable except to the extent that action has
been taken in reliance thereon, and that this consent will remain in force for
a reasonable time in order to effectuate the purpose for which it is given.
Date: 08-26-95 Time: 3:25 P
Name of Test Subject: William A Spring (SIGNATURE OF TEST
SUBJECT)
(WITNESS) (ADDRESS)
OR: The above-named subject is
unconscious or lacking the capacity
to withdraw consent at this time.
(SIGNATURE OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE) (SIGNATURE OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
PHYSICIAN)
OR: The above-named subject is
conscious but refuses to consent to testing and the law enforcement officer
continues to request that the test be
performed.
(SIGNATURE OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE) (SIGNATURE
OF POLICE OFFICER)
Disposition of samples: ( ) Taken by police
officer
I acknowledge that I have received the sample requested
above.
Date: 08-26-95
(SIGNATURE
OF POLICE OFFICER)
CONSENT
TO BLOOD/URINE ANALYSIS
PAGE 2 OF 2
[2] In the trial
court, the State argued that Spring's refusal was not based solely on the
consent form. The State renews this
argument on appeal. However, the trial
court's bench decision did not address this argument. Instead, the court spoke directly and only to the issue of
whether the implied consent law permitted the use of the form. We assume therefore that the court adopted
Spring's contention that his ultimate refusal to take the test was based on the
form. Thus, we do not address the
State's argument that Spring's refusal was based on factors other than the
consent form.
[3] We note that
unpublished decisions of the court of appeals are in disagreement on the issue
before us. See State v.
Sammer, No. 85-0006, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 12,
1985); State v. Sporle, No. 92-1667-FT, unpublished slip op.
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1992); State v. Sweetman, No. 93-0395-FT,
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 23, 1993); State v. Karch,
No. 95-1638-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1995).
The same is true
in cases from other jurisdictions. See
Maffei v. Commonwealth, 416 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1980); Commonwealth v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 938-39 (Pa. 1996); Zerbe
v. Commonwealth, 676 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Butler
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 171 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526-27 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981); Carrey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 705, 708-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Carpenter,
467 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. 1971); Lynch v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety,
498 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Wofford v. Director of Revenue,
868 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
[4] Thus, we reject
Spring's argument that the use of a consent form introduces a new and improper
level of inquiry at a revocation hearing under the implied consent law contrary
to State v. Nordness, 128 Wis.2d 15, 19, 381 N.W.2d 300, 302
(1986). (The issues at a revocation
hearing are limited to those set out in the implied consent law.)
[5] Since the first
page of the form relates only to the relationship between the officer
commanding the test and the medical facility, we question whether it was even
necessary to provide Spring with the form.
This, however, is of no consequence since we have concluded that this
page of the form did not mislead or misinform Spring of the implied consent
law.
[6] The immunity
provision on this page of the form does not constitute a complete waiver of
liability to the hospital. Rather, this
provision grants immunity only to the extent allowed by § 895.53(2) and
(3), Stats., which does not grant
immunity for civil liability for negligence.
We stress that this decision does not apply to a situation where the
form recites a complete waiver of liability.