������ COURT OF APPEALS ��������������� DECISION �� DATED AND RELEASED ��������������� May 2, 1996 |
����������������� NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals.� See � 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing.� If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No.� 95-3496-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN�������������� IN COURT OF
APPEALS
�� � DISTRICT IV�����������
�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
MARVIN ZUELKE and
BETTY ZUELKE,
����������������������� ����������������������� ����������� Plaintiffs-Respondents,
����������� ����������� v.
RUSSELL WOITULA and
BILLIE JO WOITULA,
����������������������� ����������������������� ����������� Defendants-Appellants.
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
����������������������� APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Marquette County:�
DONN H. DAHLKE, Judge.� Affirmed.
����������������������� Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman and Sundby, JJ.�
����������������������� PER
CURIAM. Russell Woitula and Billie Jo Woitula appeal from a
judgment in favor of Marvin Zuelke and Betty Zuelke.� We affirm.[1]
����������������������� The trial court decided
the case on the basis of the Zuelkes' summary judgment motion.� Summary judgment methodology is well
established and need not be repeated here.�
See Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis.2d 332, 338-39, 294
N.W.2d 473, 476-77 (1980).� The Zuelkes
alleged that they are owners of a property identified on the relevant survey
map as Lot 2, and that the Woitulas are owners of the adjoining Lot 1.� They alleged that the Woitulas were
maintaining and using a shed and gas tank on the Zuelkes' property.� The Zuelkes sought a judgment ordering
removal of the improvements and damages for trespass.� The complaint states a claim for trespass.
����������������������� The Woitulas denied the
material allegations of the complaint.�
They also counterclaimed that they owned a portion of Lot 2 by adverse
possession.� They further claimed that a
row of pine trees north of the lot line had been established as the boundary by
"acquiescence."
����������������������� The Zuelkes moved for
summary judgment.� Their affidavit
stated the history of the two properties, supported by most of the relevant
deeds.� Before 1959, Marvin Zuelke owned
both lots.� In 1959, Zuelke sold Lot 1
to Lyndon and Felicia McFaul.� In 1963,
the McFauls conveyed Lot 1 to their son Robert McFaul, while reserving a life
estate to themselves.� In 1966, Lyndon
and Felicia McFaul purchased Lot 2 from the Zuelkes.� In 1990, the McFauls conveyed Lot 2 back to the Zuelkes.� Also in 1990, Lyndon McFaul died and his
wife terminated her life estate in Lot 1.�
In 1993, Robert McFaul sold Lot 1 to the Woitulas.� Therefore, between 1966 and 1990, Lyndon and
Felicia McFaul had control of both properties:�
Lot 1 as holders of a life estate and Lot 2 as owners in fee simple.
����������������������� The Zuelkes' affidavit
states a defense to the Woitulas' claim of adverse possession.� Real estate is adversely possessed only if
the person possessing it, in connection with his or predecessors in interest,
is in actual continued occupation for twenty years.� Section 893.25, Stats.� The Woitulas have not been in possession of
Lot 1 for twenty years, and therefore their claim of adverse possession must be
founded on the actions of their predecessors in interest.� The twenty-year period would have to include
part of the period from 1966 to 1990 in which Lyndon and Felicia McFaul were in
control of both lots.� We conclude that
nothing that could have happened during that time could be adverse
possession.� To find adverse possession
here we would have to conclude, essentially, that Lyndon and Felicia McFaul
adversely possessed against themselves.�
However, they had a legal right to be in occupation of both lots.� It takes two adverse parties to make
possible a claim of adverse possession.
����������������������� The Woitulas submitted
an affidavit in opposition to the Zuelkes' motion for summary judgment.� The affidavit adds some additional details
about the history of the properties, but contains nothing showing that there is
a material issue of fact.� We conclude
the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
����������������������� �The Woitulas also pleaded, as their second
counterclaim, that a row of pine trees planted on Lot 2 is the boundary because
the parties and their predecessors in title have established this boundary by
"acquiescence."� The Woitulas
argue the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motion because the
court did not address this issue.�
However, our review of a summary judgment decision is independent of the
trial court's analysis.� See In
re Cherokee Park Plat, 113 Wis.2d 112, 115-16, 334 N.W.2d 580, 582-83
(Ct. App. 1983).� Therefore, we may
determine whether the judgment was properly granted as to this issue, in spite
of the trial court's omission.� However,
the Woitulas' discussion of the theory of acquiescence is inadequate, and we
decline to address the issue.� See
State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct.
App. 1992).
����������������������� The Woitulas also ask that
we use our discretionary power of reversal under � 752.35, Stats.�
They argue that justice has miscarried because it would be inequitable
to ruin their property in the way they claim this decision will.� However, the fact that a proper application
of the law causes an inequitable result does not mean we may say "justice
has miscarried" and disregard the law.�
Our authority under the statute is not so broad.� The Woitulas also argue the real controversy
was not fully tried.� However, the issue
presented to the trial court, which was whether the Woitulas had an ownership
interest in part of Lot 2, was tried to the fullest extent necessary.
����������������������� By the Court.�Judgment
affirmed.
����������������������� This opinion will not be
published.� See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.