COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED April
25, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3487
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
CITY
OF MIDDLETON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES
H. PARKIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: PATRICK J.
FIEDLER, Judge. Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
J. This is a single-judge appeal
decided pursuant to § 752.31(2)(c), Stats. James H. Parkin appeals from an order
dismissing his appeal from a municipal court's judgment of conviction as
untimely under § 800.14(1), Stats.[1] Parkin argues that his appeal to the trial
court is not untimely because the municipal court did not enter a judgment
against him. We conclude that the time
in which Parkin must file an appeal from a municipal court judgment starts to
run on the date when the court grants a judgment in favor of a party. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On
February 10, 1994, James H. Parkin was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to § 346.63(1)(a), Stats.
At a municipal court hearing on May 8, 1995, the court found him guilty
and notified him that he had twenty days to file an appeal. Parkin asked the court to delay entering the
judgment until the end of the week, or May 12, because he is an out-of-state
driver and wanted more time. The City
of Middleton did not object and the court agreed. The court, however, never entered a formal judgment against him.
On
August 17, 1995, Parkin filed a notice of appeal in the trial court.[2] He wrote that he was appealing "from
the whole of the final judgment and sentence entered" in the municipal
court. The City moved to dismiss the
appeal, arguing that it was untimely under § 800.14(1), Stats.
The trial court dismissed the appeal, relying on a transcript of the
municipal court proceedings, a printout of the City's "citation screen
listing," and a copy of the citation.
It found that the municipal court granted the judgment on May 8, 1995, that
it rendered it on May 12, 1995, and that Parkin's appeal was untimely. Parkin appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether
Parkin's appeal is untimely requires us to construe § 800.14(1), Stats.
Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo. State ex rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry,
173 Wis.2d 222, 225, 496 N.W.2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1992). In construing a statute, our purpose is to
determine the legislature's intent and give it effect. Id. The first step is to examine the statute's language, and, absent
ambiguity, we give the language its ordinary meaning. Id. at 225-26, 496 N.W.2d at 179. If the language is unclear we determine
legislative intent by examining the scope, history, context, subject matter and
purpose of the statute. Id.
at 226, 496 N.W.2d at 179.
DISCUSSION
Section 800.14(1), Stats., limits the time in which a
defendant convicted in municipal court may appeal to the trial court for
review. It provides that a defendant
"shall appeal by giving the municipal judge written notice of appeal within
20 days after judgment." Id. Parkin argues that because the municipal
court never entered a judgment against him, his appeal is not untimely. We disagree.
The
plain language of § 800.14(1), Stats.,
provides that an appeal must be taken within twenty days after judgment. The issue is whether the judgment must be
entered before the time in which an appeal may be taken starts to run. We note that in most other sections of the
Wisconsin Statutes, when the legislature refers to the entry of a judgment, it
uses the term "entry" or "entered." See, e.g., § 799.445, Stats. ("An appeal in an eviction
action shall be initiated within 15 days of the entry of judgment or order
...."); § 805.17(3), Stats.
("Upon its own motion or the motion of a party made not later than 20 days
after entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings or conclusions
...."); § 808.04(1), Stats.
("An appeal to the court of appeals must be initiated within 45 days of
entry of judgment or order appealed from ...."). In this case, it did not.
From this, we can draw only one conclusion: the legislature intended that the time in which an appeal may be
taken starts to run when the judgment is granted and not when it was entered.
As
Parkin notes, the granting, rendering and entering of a judgment are different
steps in the process of judgment in a municipal court. Section 800.14(1), Stats., however, is silent as to what action must be taken
with regard to the judgment before the twenty-day time period for an appeal
begins to run. Under
§ 800.11(1)(g), Stats., the
municipal judge is charged with maintaining a docket in which he or she shall
enter the judgment he or she has rendered.
But the failure of the municipal judge to properly keep a docket does
not affect the court's jurisdiction or render the judgment void. Section 800.11(2).
We
conclude that had the legislature intended that the twenty-day time period for
an appeal begins to run when a judgment is entered by the municipal court, it
would have used that language.
Consequently, we conclude that the twenty-day time period begins to run
when the municipal court grants a judgment.
Parkin
also points to the procedural rules governing judgments in the trial court set
forth in ch. 806, Stats., in
support of his argument. But that
chapter and chs. 801 to 847, Stats.,
are only applicable in the trial courts.
Section 801.01(2), Stats. The procedure in municipal courts is
governed by ch. 800, Stats. City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184
Wis.2d 91, 94, 516 N.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Ct. App. 1994) (a municipal court must follow
ch. 800 to determine civil actions before it, while a trial court faced with a
civil action follows the procedures found in chs. 801 to 847). There is no definition of judgment set forth
in ch. 800.
Therefore,
the facts demonstrate that while the municipal court never formally entered a
judgment of conviction against Parkin, it did find on May 8, 1995, that Parkin
was guilty of operating of motor vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant. For the purposes of
§ 800.14(1), Stats., an
appeal had to be taken within twenty days from that date. Because an appeal was not taken within that
time, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed this appeal as
untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports. See Rule
809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.