COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED AUGUST 6, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3464
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
MARTIN A. EVANS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BUTLER MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
DOUGLAS COUNTY
WELFARE DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Nominal-Defendant,
v.
DAVE EVANS TRANSPORTS,
INC.,
Third Party Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Douglas County:
JOSEPH A. MC DONALD, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Butler Manufacturing Company appeals a summary
judgment dismissing its third-party action against Dave Evans Transports, Inc.
(the company). The trial court
concluded that the company was immune from suit under the worker's compensation
law for injuries suffered by its employee, Martin Evans, the owner's
brother. Butler contends that Martin
was an independent contractor rather than an employee. It argues that outstanding issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment and that the company either waived or
should be estopped from raising the exclusive remedy defense. We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
Uncontradicted
evidence establishes that Martin Evans was a statutory employee of the company
rather than an independent contractor.
Under § 102.07(8)(b), Stats.,
a person who is an independent contractor for other purposes is still
considered an employee for purposes of the worker's compensation act unless he
meets nine specified criteria.[1] Because Evans is considered an employee if
he fails to meet any of the statutory conditions, issues of fact regarding some
of these conditions are immaterial if there is no issue of fact regarding any
condition that makes Martin an employee.
Martin is an employee
for worker's compensation purposes because he fails to meet at least three of
the conditions required to make him an independent contractor. Martin never maintained a separate business
office or location. He owned the truck
in question, but leased it to the company and all servicing and repairs were
done by company employees. He never
drove for any hauler other than the company.
Uncontradicted evidence establishes that Martin Evans did not maintain a
separate business with his own office, equipment, materials or other
facilities.
There is also no
evidence that Martin Evans had a federal employer identification number or had
ever applied for one. Dave Evans
testified that "to the best of [his] knowledge," Martin did not have
a federal employer identification number.
While this evidence is somewhat equivocal, as Martin's employer and his
brother, Dave's testimony creates prima facie evidence that Martin did not hold
a federal identification number. In the
absence of any contradictory evidence, Dave's testimony is sufficient to
support the judgment.
Uncontroverted evidence
also establishes that the company controlled Martin's day-to-day tasks in a
manner that is inconsistent with his being an independent contractor. He was directed when and where to pick up
and deliver loads, what route to take and how the job was to be done. He was required to adhere to the company's
driver's manual which prohibited passengers, regulated weekend work, installed
a call-in policy, regulated log book entries, regulated cleanliness, mandated
tools and safety equipment, regulated paperwork, regulated the use of blowers,
blow-down valves, dolly downing, and accident procedure, established driver
performance and safety standards and rules of conduct, and regulated
maintenance and seat belt use. Butler
argues that, as the owner of the tractor, Martin controlled the means of
performing his work. Any control that
Martin had over the tractor was lost when he leased it to the company. Ownership of the tractor gave Martin no
control over his day-to-day duties to the company.
The company did not
waive and is not estopped from raising the exclusive remedy defense. An employer may forego the exclusive remedy
defense by express contract. See
Young v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis.2d 36, 54, 168 N.W.2d
112, 122 (1969). There is no such
contract in this case. Butler has not
established any basis for equitable estoppel because it has identified no
detrimental reliance. See M
& I Bank v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 75 Wis.2d 168, 176, 248 N.W.2d
475, 480 (1970).
Butler notes that both
the company and Martin Evans previously took the position that Evans was an
independent contractor. Section
102.07(8)(b), Stats., applies its
own definition of "employee" regardless of whether the employee is an
independent contractor for other purposes.
Their belief that he was an independent contractor, even if they had §
102.07(8)(b) in mind, is irrelevant.
The legislature, not the parties, has determined the factors that create
an "employee" for worker's compensation purposes.
Butler argues that the
worker's compensation act should not be construed to permit an employer who has
failed to provide worker's compensation benefits to avoid all liability by
invoking the exclusive remedy defense.
The exclusive remedy provision bars an action against an employer for
contribution regardless of whether the employee ever requested compensation
from his employer. Because an employee
cannot maintain a tort action against his employer, there is no tort liability
between the employer and a third party.
See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis.2d 173,
177, 290 N.W.2d 276, 278 (1980).
Section 102.03(2), Stats.,
excludes all other actions against the employer.
Finally, Butler argues
that the company did not raise the exclusive remedy defense in a timely
manner. The trial court's scheduling
order of August 26, 1994 required that the pleadings be amended by February 15,
1995. The company's amended answer
raising the exclusive remedy defense was timely filed and served.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Section 102.07(8)(b),
Stats., provides:
An independent contractor is not
an employe of an employer for whom the independent contractor performs work or
services if the independent contractor meets all of the following conditions:
1. Maintains
a separate business with his or her own office, equipment materials and other
facilities.
2. Holds
or has applied for a federal employer identification number.
3. Operates
under contracts to perform specific services or work for specific amounts of
money and under which the independent contractor controls the means of
performing the services or work.
4. Incurs
the main expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs under
contract.
5. Is
responsible for the satisfactory completion of work or services that he or she
contracts to perform and is liable for a failure to complete the work or
service.
6. Receives
compensation for work or services performed under a contract on a commission or
per job or competitive bid basis and not on any other basis.
7. May
realize a profit or suffer a loss under contracts to perform work or service.
8. Has
continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations.
9. The success or failure of the independent contractor's business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures.