COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 30, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 95-2777-CR
95-3396-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JERRY L. CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County: MICHAEL J. MULROY, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.
Before
Gartzke, P.J., Sundby and Vergeront, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Jerry Carter appeals from a judgment convicting him on
two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. He also appeals from an order denying
postconviction relief. He contends that
it was a violation of double jeopardy to convict on both counts because they
were identical in law and fact. We
agree and therefore reverse. On remand,
the trial court should enter judgment on one count only and resentence Carter
accordingly.
The jury heard evidence
that Carter entered a room with a fourteen-year-old, Rosie L.D., and briefly
rubbed her buttocks. She told him to
stop and tried to leave the room.
Carter blocked her way and briefly touched her breast. She then pushed him away and left. Rosie testified that after Carter touched
her buttocks but before touching her breast he kissed her on the cheek. A school counselor testified that Rosie
initially described the kiss as occurring before the first touch. The whole incident occurred within a couple
of minutes.
The State charged Carter
in count one with violating § 948.02(2), Stats.,
by touching the victim's buttocks.
Count two charged a violation of § 948.02(2) by touching the
victim's breast. The jury returned
guilty verdicts on both counts and the court imposed two sentences. That, according to Carter, violated his
state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
The prohibition against
double jeopardy prevents arbitrarily dividing a single offense into multiple
offenses with multiple punishments. State
v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis.2d 504, 510, 489 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Ct. App.
1992). A single and indivisible offense
is one that is identical in law, as in this case, and not significantly
different in fact. See State
v. Eisch, 96 Wis.2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1980). An offense is not significantly different in
fact unless the defendant's acts are separated in time, or of a significantly
different nature, or require a separate volitional act. State v. Hirsch, 140 Wis.2d
468, 473, 410 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Ct. App. 1987).
Carter's two contacts
with Rosie constituted one offense.
Both were brief touchings of the victim's clothed intimate parts,
virtually identical in character. Both
occurred within a few seconds of one another.
Although Rosie objected after the first touch, and Carter may have
kissed her before the second touch, one cannot reasonably infer that separate
volitional acts prompted each touching.
"A defendant ought not be charged, tried, or convicted for offenses
that are substantially alike when they are a part of the same general
transaction or episode." Eisch,
96 Wis.2d at 34, 291 N.W.2d at 805. The
double jeopardy protection requires conviction on only one count in this
case. The judgment shall be amended and
Carter resentenced accordingly.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.