COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED June
20, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3364
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DONALD
A. LeSAVAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: PATRICK J. FIEDLER, Judge.
Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
J. This is a single-judge appeal decided pursuant to
§ 752.31(2)(c), Stats. Donald A. LeSavage appeals from an order in
which the trial court found that he unlawfully refused to submit to a chemical
test in violation of § 343.305(9), Stats.,
after a police officer arrested him for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant (OMVWI), contrary to § 346.63(1), Stats.
LeSavage argues that the trial court erroneously received evidence that
his vehicle was in a parking lot "held open to the public" as
required by § 346.61, Stats.[1] We conclude that the trial court properly
found the lot was "held open to the public" and that there was
probable cause to arrest LeSavage for OMVWI.
BACKGROUND
On
August 3, 1995, Fitchburg Police Officer Denise Fisher was dispatched to
Quivey's Grove, a restaurant and bar, in regard to a traffic accident involving
Donald A. LeSavage's car. When Officer
Fisher arrived, she saw LeSavage leaning up against his car weaving back and
forth. Officer Fisher also noticed that
LeSavage's eyes were red and bloodshot and he noticed a strong odor of intoxicants. Officer Fisher requested that LeSavage take
a field sobriety test. LeSavage
agreed. Based on the officer's
observations both before and during the field tests, LeSavage's bloodshot eyes
and the odor of intoxicants on his breath, the officer concluded that LeSavage
had been driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and arrested him.
At
the Madison Police Department, Officer Fisher read LeSavage the Informing the
Accused form and asked him to submit to a chemical test of his breath. LeSavage refused.
At
the refusal hearing, Officer Fisher testified that in her opinion, the parking
lot where LeSavage was arrested was open to the public. LeSavage objected and the trial court found
that there was sufficient foundation for Officer's Fisher's opinion
testimony. Officer Fisher stated that
there was a party sponsored by the Isthmus Paper at the bar that evening. Officer Fisher also testified that there
were other vehicles in the parking lot besides LeSavage's. LeSavage presented no evidence.
Based on this testimony, the court concluded
that the parking lot at Quivey's Grove was "held open to the public"
and the requirements of § 343.305(9)(a)5, Stats., had been met.
The court revoked LeSavage's operating privilege. LeSavage appeals.
DISCUSSION
A
person can be convicted of OMVWI only if the person operated a motor vehicle on
premises that are "held out to the public for use of their motor
vehicles." Section 346.61, Stats.
A parking lot is "held out to the public" when the owner of
the premises intends to "permit the public as a whole to use the premises
for parking purposes." City
of Kenosha v. Phillips, 142 Wis.2d 549, 558, 419 N.W.2d 236, 239
(1988).
In
City of LaCrosse v. Richling, 178 Wis.2d 856, 859-60, 505 N.W.2d
448, 449 (Ct. App. 1993), we held that a parking lot is held out to the public
even when its use is restricted to its customers. We reasoned that "it is not necessary that a business
establishment's customers form a representative cross section of a city or town's
population for them to be considered `public' within § 346.61, Stats." Id. at 860, 505 N.W.2d at 449. Nor did we find it necessary that some
minimum percentage of the city's population patronize the business. Id. Instead, we held that the appropriate test is "whether, on
any given day, potentially any resident of the community with a driver's
license and access to a motor vehicle could use the parking lot in an
authorized manner." Id.
By
the parking lot's very nature as a lot for Quivey's Grove customers, it appears
to be open to the public. There was no
indication that use of this lot, or the restaurant and bar for that matter, was
limited to only a specified group of individuals.[2] Instead, it appears that potentially any
resident of the community with a car and a license could have used this lot in
an authorized manner on August 3, 1995, as a customer of Quivey's Grove.
Further,
the State's burden of showing that the owners intend to hold out their premises
for public use may be satisfied "by direct, demonstrative, testimonial, or
circumstantial proof, and even upon the basis of judicial notice, if properly
taken." Phillips,
142 Wis.2d at 558, 419 N.W.2d at 239.
Opinion testimony is admissible if it is "rationally based on the
perception of the witness and helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue." Section 907.01, Stats.
Here,
the fact in issue was whether the parking lot was held out to the public for
use of their motor vehicles. The
officer's opinion establishes that fact.
Thus, the trial court properly admitted opinion testimony on the
issue. Absent evidence to the contrary,
the court properly concluded that the premises were held open to the
public. Accordingly, we affirm.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports. See Rule 809.23 (1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] Section 346.61, Stats., provides:
"In addition to being applicable upon highways, ss. 346.62 to
346.64 are applicable upon all premises held out to the public for use of their
motor vehicles, whether such premises are publicly or privately owned and
whether or not a fee is charged for the use thereof."
[2] Although there was testimony that Quivey's
Grove was having a party sponsored by the Isthmus Paper, the officer was
entitled to infer that persons attending this party were not the only occupants
of Quivey's Grove, and that the restaurant had not limited the use of its
parking lot to only participants in the Isthmus party.