COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED December 19, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3322
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN EX
REL.
ANDRE MOORE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JAMES P. MURPHY,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of
the circuit court for Dane County:
MICHAEL B. TORPHY, JR., Judge.
Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Vergeront and Roggensack, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Andre Moore appeals from an order dismissing his
petition for a writ of certiorari and affirming a prison disciplinary
committee's decision finding him guilty of making threats in violation of Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 303.16[1]
and attempted battery in violation of Wis.
Adm. Code § DOC 303.12-A.[2] Moore also appeals from an order denying
reconsideration. Because none of
Moore's appellate arguments are persuasive, we affirm.
Moore, an inmate at the
Green Bay Correctional Institution, received a conduct report that charged him
with making a threat, battery and disruptive conduct. The conduct report alleged that an officer asked Moore to
"keep his yelling down."
Moore responded, "get the fuck away from my cell or I will hurt
you." The officer began to leave
the area, but returned when Moore made further comments. The conduct report alleged that "Moore
then lunged at his cell door and slapped me through his cell door trap opening,
barely striking me with an open hand on the right side of my neck. Moore then attempted to punch me with a
clenched fist through his cell bars, but I was out of his arm's reach."
The disciplinary
committee found Moore guilty of making threats and attempted battery. The committee wrote:
We
listened to inmate Moore and his witnesses and we considered the written report
of Officer Cygan. We believe that the
incident occurred as described by Cygan and we believe Moore attempted to
injure Cygan therefore 303.12(A) [attempted battery]. We also believe he threatened Cygan .... We do not consider the witnesses to be
credible because the statements appeared more rehearsed than from memory.
Moore
received three days' adjustment segregation and 360 days' program
segregation. Moore appealed the
determination to the institution superintendent, who affirmed the committee's
decision.
Judicial review of a
prison disciplinary committee's decision is limited to: (1) whether the
committee remained within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted pursuant to
law; (3) whether its decision was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and
represented its will rather than its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was
such that it might reasonably make the decision it did. State ex rel. Whiting v. Kolb,
158 Wis.2d 226, 233, 461 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1990). The committee's finding of facts is
conclusive if supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, and a court may
not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the committee. Id.
Moore first argues that
he is "entitled to a judgment of reversal" because the
"respondent failed to refute ... [the] issues or legal theories
presented" to the trial court.
Moore is incorrect. On appeal of
a trial court order sustaining a prison disciplinary decision, we review the
decision of the disciplinary committee independently of the trial court. Id. The respondent's failure to respond to the issues as framed by
Moore in his trial court brief is immaterial to whether the action of the
disciplinary committee is upheld by this court.[3]
Moore next argues that
the trial court "abused its discretion when it failed to reverse" the
decision of the disciplinary committee.
Moore does not, however, challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support
the committee's decision nor does he posit any developed legal challenge to the
committee's decision. Rather, he
reiterates his belief that the respondent "failed to refute" his
arguments. As we noted above, that
"failure" does not mandate a reversal of the committee's decision.
Lastly, Moore claims that
the trial court was "bias[ed] and prejudice[d]" against him because
it upheld the committee's decision and rejected his "unrefuted"
arguments. This argument is little more
than a rephrasing of the same argument that we have already rejected. Bias cannot be shown simply by pointing to a
court's rejection of legal argument.
Moore has not shown that
the disciplinary committee acted outside its jurisdiction or not according to
law. He also failed to show that the
committee's decision was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented
its will rather than its judgment or that the evidence did not reasonably
support its decision. Therefore, the
court's orders upholding the disciplinary committee's decision must be
affirmed.
By the Court.—Orders
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Wisconsin Adm. Code § DOC 303.16 provides: "Any inmate who intentionally does any of the following is guilty of an offense: (1) Communicates to another an intent to physically harm or harass that person or another; (2) Communicates an intent to cause damage to or loss of that person's or another person's property; or (3) Communicates an intent to make an accusation he or she knows is false."
[2] Wisconsin Adm. Code § DOC 303.12 provides: "Any inmate who intentionally causes bodily injury to another is guilty of an offense." Under Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 303.06(1), an inmate is guilty of attempt if: "(a) The inmate intended to do something which would have been a rule violation; and (b) The inmate did acts which showed that he or she intended to violate the rule at that time." For recordkeeping purposes, an attempted offense is differentiated from a completed offense by the suffix A. Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 303.06(2).
[3] Moore relies on the familiar proposition that a respondent on appeal "`cannot complain if propositions of an appellant are taken as confessed which they do not undertake to refute.'" See e.g., State ex rel. Sahagian v. Young, 141 Wis.2d 495, 500, 415 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Charolais Breeding Ranches v. FPC Sec., 90 Wis.2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1979)). That proposition, however, does not require a court to accept the issues as framed by the parties nor does it require a court to accept groundless arguments.