|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED May
23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3309
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
In the
Interest of Michael J.P.,
a
Person Under the Age of 18:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL
J.P.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County: PETER G. PAPPAS, Judge. Affirmed.
EICH,
C.J.[1] Michael J.P., a minor, appeals from a
dispositional order in a juvenile delinquency case finding him guilty of
obstructing an officer, contrary to § 946.41(1), Stats. He claims that
the trial court erred in two respects: first, by precluding him from offering
evidence on the circumstances leading up to the issuance of a capias--an error
he claims violated his constitutional rights to present a defense and to
confront witnesses against him; and, second, by improperly excluding
"impeachment" evidence relating to the conduct of the officer
executing the capias.
We
reject his arguments and affirm the order.
Michael
J.P., a fifteen-year-old, was initially charged with two counts of
intentionally discharging a firearm from a vehicle (as a party to the
offense). The charges grew out of an
incident occurring on February 24, 1995, when shots were fired through the
window of a home in West Salem, Wisconsin.
The incident was investigated by West Salem Police Officer Robert
Schuppel. Schuppel, who gained
information from an informant indicating that Michael J.P. had been involved in
the incident, contacted the boy at his home on March 1, 1995. Michael was alone at the time, and when his
mother arrived the questioning had been completed. Schuppel suspected that Michael was not being truthful about the
incident and, as he investigated it further, he came to believe that Michael
had given him false information.
A
delinquency petition was prepared by the district attorney alleging the two
firearm counts, and that original petition formed the basis for the court's
issuance of the capias on the following day, March 2. The capias states that it was being issued because "[i]t
appears to the satisfaction of the court that serving the summons will not be
effective because ... [t]he parents are withholding the juvenile from police in
their residence."[2]
When
Schuppel came to Michael's home on March 2 to execute the capias, an
altercation apparently occurred between Schuppel and Michael's mother in which
she apparently (no evidence was either offered or taken on the point) was
knocked to the ground. Michael was
taken into custody and the original petition was eventually amended to add a
charge of obstructing an officer.[3]
At
trial, during cross-examination of Schuppel, Michael attempted to elicit
testimony about the circumstances leading up to the issuance--he challenged the
"truthfulness" of the recitation that his parents had withheld him
from police. He also attempted to
question Schuppel about the events surrounding his execution of the capias,
notably the altercation with Michael's mother.
The trial court sustained the State's objections to both lines of
inquiry on relevancy grounds.
The
trial proceeded and the jury acquitted Michael of the two firearms counts and
found him guilty of obstructing Schuppel's investigation of the case. The court placed Michael on supervision for
six months and he appeals. Additional
facts will be discussed below.
Michael
argues that the court's evidentiary rulings with respect to his questions to
Schuppel about the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the capias and the
altercation with his parents when he was arrested abridged his constitutional
right to confrontation and to present a defense. He asserts that Schuppel provided false information to the judge
issuing the capias. He bases the assertion
not on any evidence of record but solely on his counsel's statement that his
parents were not interfering with the police and thus there could be no basis
for the recitation of such interference in the capias unless Schuppel lied to
the court. He also maintains that he
should have been permitted to present evidence that his mother was
"knocked to the ground" during the altercation with Schuppel during
execution of the capias. He asserts
that this would "demonstrate the bias that [Schuppel] had toward Michael
and his family" and thus "reflect[] on [his] credibility."
It
is well established that a defendant's right to present evidence is not
unlimited; the constitution grants the right to present only relevant
evidence. State v. Pittman,
174 Wis.2d 255, 275, 496 N.W.2d 74, 83, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 137
(1993); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis.2d 633, 646, 456 N.W.2d 325,
330 (1990). It is equally well
established that the scope of cross-examination allowed for impeachment
purposes is within the trial court's discretion, and that "while the right
[of confrontation] is guaranteed by the constitution, the cross-examination of
even an adverse witness may be limited by considerations of relevance and
materiality." Chapin v.
State, 78 Wis.2d 346, 352, 353, 254 N.W.2d 286, 289-90, 290 (1977)
(citation omitted).
We
note also that, under § 906.08(2), Stats.,
"[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness's credibility ... may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence." The rule
exists because such evidence is collateral and "has a tendency to confuse
issues, waste time, and focus the jury's attention on trivial
matters." State v. Amos,
153 Wis.2d 257, 273, 450 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Ct. App. 1989) (footnote omitted).[4]
The
State contends that the evidence Michael sought to elicit from Schuppel was
properly disallowed by the trial court as irrelevant and collateral to the
issues in the case. We agree.
On
the morning of the trial, the district attorney filed a motion in limine
seeking an order prohibiting Michael from offering testimony concerning his
arrest--presumably about Schuppel's altercation with his mother--on grounds of
relevancy and possible prejudice.
Opposing the motion, Michael asserted that the notation on the capias
that his parents were withholding him from the police was not true and that
fact--which he said "could require a couple-hour hearing"--bore upon
Schuppel's credibility as a witness in the case.[5]
The
trial court denied the prosecutor's motion in limine, but it also stated, in
apparent reference to Michael's arguments, that it was "going to proceed
on the presumption that it's a validly issued capias." Michael's counsel then stated that he would
be calling both Schuppel and the district attorney to "make a record or an
offer of proof regarding the circumstances of the obtaining of this capias
...." This was never done,
however.
At
trial, after the State had offered Schuppel's direct testimony, Michael's
counsel cross-examined him and, when he broached the subject of the altercation
at the time of the execution of the capias, the trial court sustained the
State's objection on grounds of relevancy.
The
jury was excused and Michael's counsel again argued his position to the court:
that both Schuppel's altercation with Michael's mother and the facts
surrounding the issuance of the capias "go[] to [Schuppel's]
credibility." The trial court
restated its ruling, explaining that: (1) the capias was valid on its face and
the circumstances of its issuance were not relevant to either the charge or
Schuppel's credibility; and (2) evidence of the circumstances surrounding
Michael's arrest was irrelevant and unrelated to Schuppel's credibility and
further was an "attempt ... to introduce an element of prejudice and passion
to the jury ...."
We
have noted above that the extent of impeachment cross-examination, like rulings
on evidence generally, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and we have long held that "[w]e will not reverse a discretionary determination
by the trial court if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised
and we can perceive a reasonable basis for the court's decision." Prahl v. Brosamle, 142 Wis.2d
658, 667, 420 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). That rule holds whether or not we ourselves
would agree with the trial court's ruling.
Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis.2d 585, 590, 478 N.W.2d 37, 39
(Ct. App. 1991).
The
trial court's explanation of the reasons underlying its rulings on the State's
objections to Michael's questioning of Schuppel satisfies us that it exercised
its discretion in each instance.[6] Under the circumstances of this case as we
have outlined them above, we cannot say that the result reached by the trial
court was unreasonable.[7]
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] Under
§ 48.28, Stats., a capias
may issue for a child's arrest in cases where a summons cannot be served, or
the party served refuses to comply, or where it appears to the court that
service will be ineffectual.
[3] As will be discussed in more detail below, infra
note 7, the obstructing charge dates the offense as occurring "[o]n or
about March 2, 1995." It was later
amended at trial on the motion of the district attorney to reflect an incident
date of March 1--the date of Schuppel's discussion with Michael.
[4] A matter is "collateral" within the
meaning of the rule if the fact sought to be elicited "could not be shown
in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction." State v. Olson, 179 Wis.2d
715, 724, 508 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
[5] Neither side put on any testimony on the
subject either before, during or after the trial. Countering Michael's counsel's assertion that the notation in the
capias was untrue, the district attorney informed the court: "[I]t's my
understanding that ... Officer Schuppel did have conversations with the father
on the phone. He said he would not turn the juvenile over and the capias was
used basically as an arrest warrant ordering ... the juvenile into custody
...." We are thus left with no
record on the subject, other than Michael's counsel's reference to a report
filed by Schuppel (which is not referenced to the record) indicating that
Michael's father had told Schuppel that he would not bring Michael to speak
with him without a warrant.
[6] We have held that the trial court's statement
of the reasons for a ruling need not be either exhaustive or lengthy: "It
is enough that they indicate to the reviewing court that the trial court
`undert[ook] a reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts' and `the record
shows that there is a reasonable basis for the ... court's
determination.'" Burkes v.
Hales, 165 Wis.2d 585, 590-91, 478 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citation omitted) (quoted source omitted).
And, as we also have said: "`Because the exercise of discretion is
so essential to the trial court's functioning, we generally look for reasons to
sustain discretionary decisions.'"
Id. at 591, 478 N.W.2d at 39.
[7] Michael also argues at length that the fact
that the amended petition charging the obstructing offense stated the offense
date as "on or about March 2, 1995" should also have been put before
the jury as evidence bearing on Schuppel's credibility, because Schuppel's
contact with Michael occurred on the preceding day, March 1. It is a mountain/molehill argument.
As
indicated above, supra note 3, the trial court amended the petition to
conform to the evidence received at trial, rejecting Michael's request that he
be allowed to use the date discrepancy in the petition to attempt to impeach
Schuppel by showing that he had "provided false information" to the
judge issuing the capias. The court,
noting that the petition was drafted and signed by the district attorney, not
by Schuppel--and there is no evidence that Schuppel played any part in seeking
the capias from the judge--denied Michael's request to use the document,
stating: "I'm not going to allow you to impeach the officer on a document
which was not signed by him or drafted by him." Under the principles governing discretionary trial court
decisions which we have outlined above, we see no abuse of discretion in the
ruling.