COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED JANUARY
29, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3299
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
DUSAN
JANKOVIC and
ZORICA
JANKOVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v.
ROGER
P. PETERSEN and
ROXANE
D. PETERSEN,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha County: MICHAEL FISHER, Judge. Reversed.
Before
Brown, Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
ANDERSON,
J. This is a dispute over a 2.9-foot strip of
land that runs along the property line between the parties’ homes. In response to the defendants, Roger P. and
Roxane D. Petersen (the Petersens), erecting a fence, the plaintiffs, Dusan and
Zorica Jankovic (the Jankovics), filed this action under § 893.28, Stats., to establish their right to a
prescriptive easement over this strip of land, which was used as a driveway by
the Jankovics’ tenants, but is owned by the Petersens. The Jankovics also sought an injunction
barring the Petersens from interfering with the Jankovics' use of the strip of
land. The trial court found that the
Jankovics had not established that they, or previous owners, had continuously
and without interruption parked on the Petersens’ property for twenty years and
therefore dismissed the Jankovics’ complaint.
The Jankovics appeal that determination.
The
residential lot owned by the Jankovics is neighbored to the east by a lot owned
by the Petersens. Both lots are
improved with homes. The distance
between the two homes is an eight-foot, one-inch strip of land, of which two
feet, nine inches are on the Petersens’ property. According to Mr. Jankovic, the strip of land consists largely of
gravel and dirt. Since acquiring the
property, the Jankovics or their tenants have used this strip as a
driveway. Mr. Jankovic testified that
he would park his vehicle “up to [the Petersens’] house by the door, as you
open the door, so you don’t bump into the house, all the way up to the
house. ¼ [F]rom wall to wall to [the Petersens’] property.”
The
previous owners of the Jankovics’ lot, dating back to 1947, also testified that
they parked their vehicles within the entire area between the two homes. First, Joseph Williams, the Jankovics’
predecessor in title, testified that he always used the driveway and that
people could get out on the passenger side.
Second, Charlotte Beam, a woman who as a child lived at what is now the
Jankovics’ property, testified that from 1947 until it was sold to Williams,
the whole property between the two houses was used as a driveway. She testified that a person could park a car
without the wheels going up on the sidewalk and people could get out on the
passenger side.
The
Petersens’ testimony differed. Mr.
Petersen testified that when they first moved in, around October 1993, “there
was garbage and weeds; and there was a little bit of grass over there, about a
foot or so of grass,” which they cleaned up.
Mrs. Petersen testified that they continued to clean up the area until
they finally put up the fence. The
fence was erected to prevent further damage from car doors to the siding of the
house and to the water spigot, which was knocked off the house.
The
previous owner, Michael Morelli, similarly maintained the 2.9-foot strip of
land. He “raked it, the leaves and
stuff.” He also recalled a strip of
grass along the house that he mowed and he mended the fence that runs
north/south between the backyards of the two properties. Morelli also needed to replace the siding
because of damage from car doors slamming into the house.
On
appeal, the Jankovics contend that they have established all the elements
necessary to sustain their claim to a prescriptive easement over the east 2.9
feet of the Petersens’ property. There
are four elements of a prescriptive easement: (1) adverse use that is hostile
and inconsistent with the exercise of the titleholder’s possessive rights (2)
that is visible, open and notorious (3) under an open claim of right (4) and is
continuous and uninterrupted for twenty years.
County of Langlade v. Kaster, 202 Wis.2d 449, 458, 550
N.W.2d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 1996). The
user must present positive evidence to establish a prescriptive easement, and
every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the landowner. Id.
The
existence of a prescriptive easement is a mixed question of law and fact. Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139
Wis.2d 695, 728, 408 N.W.2d 1, 14 (1987).
We apply different standards of review to the factual and legal
determinations. This court must affirm
the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Section 805.17(2), Stats. If more than
one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, this court must accept
the inference drawn by the trial court.
Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis.2d 243, 250,
274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979). We owe no
deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court. Klinefelter v. Dutch, 161
Wis.2d 28, 33, 467 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Ct. App. 1991).
The
Jankovics argue that the trial court’s finding that they did not park on the
Petersens’ property for twenty years is clearly erroneous. In their view, the evidence consists of
“uncontroverted testimony from Jankovic and his predecessors in title as to
their use of the East 2.9' of Petersen’s property [which] requires a reversal
of the Judgment.”
We
agree. The trial court’s only finding
was that “[w]hile vehicles parked between the houses, the evidence did not
establish they parked on the defendants’ property for 20 years.” (Emphasis added.) This finding is clearly erroneous; it is neither supported by the
uncontradicted testimony nor reasonable inferences. Mr. Jankovic testified that he used the entire area wall to wall,
but in such a way as to avoid hitting the Petersens’ home. Williams, who sold the house to the
Jankovics, testified that they used the total area between the two houses. Beam, who grew up in the Jankovics’ home,
testified that she would drive straight up into the driveway to “make sure you
didn’t hit either house.” This
uncontradicted testimony does not support the trial court’s findings.
Adverse
possession and prescriptive easement share the same elements. See Shellow v. Hagen,
9 Wis.2d 506, 511, 101 N.W.2d 694, 697 (1960).
But the difference is that a person seeking a prescriptive easement
merely wants to “use” the property in conjunction with the owner; ownership is
not being sought. Id. The use need not be exclusive of or
inconsistent with the rights of the owner as long as the particular use is made
in disregard or nonrecognition of the true ownership. Id. Thus,
claim of title is not necessary and the use need not be to the exclusion of, or
inconsistent with, the owners.
The
uncontradicted evidence cannot support a reasonable inference that the use of
the driveway was not visible, open, notorious, continuous and
uninterrupted. There is ample evidence
that, before the fence was erected, passengers could open the passenger side
door and exit. Now it is not possible. Surely, the only reasonable inference is
that the passenger side door was opened over the 2.9 feet of space and that
passengers used that space for ingress and egress to the parked vehicle. Whether or not the wheels of the vehicle
overlapped onto the 2.9 feet of land is not relevant.
The
trial court noted the damage to the side of the Petersens' house by passengers
banging the door against the siding.
This evidence supports only one reasonable inference, that the
passengers were using the strip of land to enter and exit vehicles. The activities of those using the driveway
from 1947 to the time the fence was erected were not consistent with sporadic,
trivial and benign trespass. Rather,
the use of the driveway for ingress and egress of both drivers and passengers
was visible, open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted. It is the unambiguous use to which
the driveway was put that is important.
Finally,
the fact that the Petersens and their predecessor in title maintained the
2.9-foot strip of land cannot be used to defeat the Jankovics’ claim of a
prescriptive easement. The Jankovics
seek to use the strip of land in conjunction with the Petersens. The maintenance of the strip at the same
time it is being used for ingress and egress from a vehicle is consistent with
a prescriptive easement.
By
the Court.—Judgment reversed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports.
No. 95-3299
BROWN,
J. (concurring). I use the
method of a concurrence to add that from a law and economics standpoint, the
trial court's determination does not maximize the values of these
properties. The photographs in the
record show that the fence is located right in the driveway separating the two
houses. It is a spite fence and looks
it. Surely, the home values of both
houses are lowered as a result. And
while it is true that a car can still get up the driveway, it is no longer an
efficient driveway because the driver must drive on the sidewalk and the
passenger may not alight from the car.
This case would be better resolved by a fence, paid for by the
Jankovics, that goes right along the Petersen's house plus enough damages to
convince the Jankovics to take better control of their tenants. In my view, this result can be accomplished
through a private nuisance action.