PUBLISHED OPINION
Case
No.: 95-3242
†Petition
for Review Filed
Complete
Title
of
Case:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
WISCONSIN ASSOCIATION
OF LAKES, INC.,
Intervening
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF LINN,
Defendant-Appellant,
VILLAGE OF WILLIAMS BAY,
Defendant-Co-Appellant.†
Submitted
on Briefs: August 12, 1996
Oral
Argument:
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion
Released: October 9, 1996
Opinion
Filed: October
9, 1996
Source
of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full
Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower
Court. COUNTY: Walworth
(If
"Special", JUDGE: JOHN R. RACE
so
indicate)
JUDGES: Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of David W. Schlitz of Davison, Mulligan
& Schlitz, Ltd. of Lake Geneva.
On behalf of the defendant-co-appellant, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of Charles H. Bohl and John P. Spector of Whyte Hirschboeck
Dudek S.C. of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Joanne
F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED OCTOBER
9, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3242
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
WISCONSIN ASSOCIATION
OF LAKES, INC.,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN
OF LINN,
Defendant-Appellant,
VILLAGE OF WILLIAMS BAY,
Defendant-Co-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Walworth County: JOHN R. RACE, Judge. Affirmed and cause remanded.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
ANDERSON,
P.J. The Village of
Williams Bay (the Village) and the Town of Linn (the Town) appeal from the same
order for partial summary judgment enjoining the Village from applying or
enforcing its parking ordinance which restricts parking at its public boat
launch facility for nonvillage residents and the Town from applying or
enforcing its public boat launch fee ordinance, in violation of Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91. Because the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) substantially complied with § 893.80(1), Stats.,[1]
and because the DNR’s authority extends to the shore when it exercises its
authority to insure free public access to the waters of the state, as required
by the public trust doctrine, we affirm the trial court’s order as it relates
to the Village.
We
further conclude that the trial court was without competency to decide the Town’s
challenge to the constitutionality and the applicability of Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91 because the
Town failed to serve the joint committee on review of administrative rules
(JCRAR), pursuant to §§ 227.40(5) and 806.04(11), Stats. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s order partially granting the State’s summary judgment
motion and granting full injunctive relief to the State as it relates to the
Town.
Both
the Village and the Town are adjacent to Geneva Lake. Geneva Lake is located in Walworth County and is a navigable lake
which covers approximately 5262 acres.
There are approximately 5000 private boats moored or docked on Geneva
Lake at public and private marinas and at private residences. There are approximately 150 parking spaces
at public boat launching facilities which are provided by four municipalities
adjoining the lake and represent the only developed sites for the nonriparian
public to access the lake. Written
agreements between the DNR and the four Geneva Lake communities covering public
access expired on April 30, 1994.
The
Village owns and operates one public boat launching facility which provides
access to Geneva Lake. The Village
provides thirty-nine parking spaces, but reserves fourteen of these spaces for
residents only. The Village traffic
code allows only vehicles with resident stickers to use the fourteen resident
parking spaces, and any nonresidents who park in the reserved parking spaces
are issued tickets. The Village ropes
off the launch to nonresidents when the nonresident parking spaces are full,
even if resident spaces are available.
In addition, the Village does not allow vehicles with trailers to park
on its streets.
The
Town owns and operates two public boat launching facilities which provide
access to Geneva Lake. There is a
portable toilet at each of the Town’s boat launch facilities and no permanent
attendant. The Town’s boat launch fees
in 1994 for nonresidents were in excess of the fees prescribed under Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91(11),[2]
and residents were not charged a fee.
The Town has notified nonresidents that they must pay the full posted
fee charged by the Town or be subject to a $50 fine.[3] The Town submitted two incomplete
applications for approval of its proposed boat launch fees, pursuant to § NR 1.91(11)(e).
On
April 1, 1994, the revised administrative rules, Wis. Adm. Code §§ NR 1.90-1.93, governing public boating
access to the state’s waters, took effect.[4] In an April 29, 1994, letter regarding
Geneva Lake's public boating launch revenues/expenses supplied to the DNR,
Thomas Thoresen, deputy administrator in the DNR’s enforcement division,
responded that “[w]ith the expiration of the past agreement and code revision,
we will expect all communities to comply with the revised code or face possible
legal action by either private citizens and/or the Department of Justice.” Thoresen also noted the availability of
financial assistance if the launch fees failed to cover the costs of operating
the launch facility.
Despite
repeated attempts by DNR representatives to obtain compliance with the public
boating access revisions, the Village refused to eliminate its reserved parking
spaces and the Town declined to comply with the fee provisions of the boat
launching access code. Thereafter, the
DNR referred the matter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for prosecution.
On
August 18, 1994, a complaint was filed against both the Village and the Town
for each municipalities’ “unreasonable practices which exclude boats from the
free use of the water of the state in violation of Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.91,
Sec. 30.77(1)(b), Stats., and Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1.” In November 1994, the State moved for
judgment on the pleadings.[5] The trial court determined that the State
substantially complied with the notice of claim statute and that the DNR, not
local municipalities, was authorized to regulate access through parking
regulations at launching sites. The
trial court further concluded that it had no jurisdiction to address the Town’s
challenge to the validity of § NR 1.91, and that as a matter of law, the Town’s
boat launching fees were unreasonable.
Accordingly, the trial court granted the State’s injunction barring the
Village and the Town from enforcing their respective ordinances.[6] Both the Village and the Town appeal.
The
Village and the Town argue that the trial court erred by granting the State’s
motion for summary judgment. We review
a motion for summary judgment using the same methodology as the trial
court. M & I First Nat’l Bank
v. Episcopal Homes, 195 Wis.2d 485, 496, 536 N.W.2d 175, 182 (Ct. App.
1995); § 802.08(2), Stats. That methodology is well known, and we will
not repeat it here except to observe that summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. M
& I First Nat'l Bank, 195 Wis.2d at 496-97, 536 N.W.2d at 182; see
also § 802.08(2). Although summary
judgment presents a question of law which we review de novo, we still value a
trial court’s decision on such a question.
M & I First Nat'l Bank, 195 Wis.2d at 497, 536 N.W.2d
at 182. As the material facts are not
contested, only issues of law remain to be determined.
Village of Williams Bay
The
Village first argues that the trial court erred in holding that the State
substantially complied with the notice and claim provisions of § 893.80(1), Stats.
The Village contends that it only received a telephonic communication
that the DNR had referred the Village to the DOJ for prosecution and that the DOJ
sent no written correspondence to the Village prior to initiating the
suit. We disagree with the Village’s
characterization of the facts, and instead look to the trial court’s analysis
and finding of substantial compliance.
Section
893.80(1), Stats., provides that
“no action may be brought or maintained against ¼ political corporation, governmental subdivision or
agency thereof ¼” without notice.
The statute applies to all causes of action, not just those in tort or
those for money damages. DNR v.
City of Waukesha, 184 Wis.2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888, 893 (1994). Only substantial compliance with the notice
statutes is required. Id.
at 198, 515 N.W.2d at 896.
The
statute has two requirements. First, a
claimant must present the municipality with “written notice of the
circumstances of the claim signed by the party ¼.” Section
893.80(1)(a), Stats. However,
[f]ailure
to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the
[municipality] had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite
notice has not been prejudicial to the [municipality].
Id.
The
State contends that in the months before the complaint was filed, the Village
was aware of the DNR’s position that the reserved parking was illegal and that
the DNR had referred the Village to the DOJ for prosecution. We agree.
The Village was aware that the prior boating access agreement expired on
April 30, 1994, and that the revised administrative rules governing boating
access were in effect as of April 1, 1994.
Arguably, the State’s claim of noncompliance by the Village originated
on May 1, 1994. In fact, LaMarr
Lundberg, the Village president, admitted during his deposition that at the
April 27, 1994, Geneva Lake Use Committee meeting, the DNR and DOJ
representatives informed the committee that all parking spaces must be
available to the general public and that reserved parking constituted
discrimination.[7] It is disingenuous for the Village to now
assert complete ignorance to the State’s claim regarding the reserved parking
at public access sites.
Further,
it is evident from the affidavit of Thoresen, the deputy administrator of the
DNR enforcement division who also served as the chairperson of the DNR’s
boating opportunities and access team, that the Geneva Lake communities,
including the Village, were actively involved throughout the development of the
revised access code and consistently shared their opposition to the proposed
changes to the parking sites with the DNR.
After the April 1, 1994, effective date of the revised rules, the Geneva
Lake communities, including the Village, were informed of the prospect of legal
action if they refused to comply with the new rules at two separate meetings
held on April 27 and May 4. In
addition, Thoresen clarified the DNR’s position in his April 29, 1994,
letter: all communities must “comply
with the revised code or face possible legal action by ¼ the Department of
Justice.”
In
a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Village informed the DNR that it adopted,
under protest, the fee schedule set forth in Wis.
Adm. Code § NR 1.91(11).[8] The adoption was contingent upon a
satisfactory resolution of ten issues between the DNR and the Village,
including “[r]ecognition of or noninterference with the ability of
municipalities to reserve and allocate parking spaces in their owned or leased
parking lots for residents and senior citizens.” The letter further “advised” the DNR that if it refused to
address these issues, then the Village would take further action, including the
repeal of its current fee schedule and the enactment of a more accurate fee
schedule.
Thoresen
responded in a letter dated June 17, 1994.
In the letter he stated:
Historically, the Department has had
numerous complaints about the exclusion of the general public from Geneva
Lake. The record is clear, at public
facilities around Geneva Lake there were/are restrictive fees and other
prohibited acts which denies public use of either public facilities or access
to public waters through such restrictions as: high launch fees, limiting the
use to local residents only, or other fee provisions that discriminate against
the general public from use at public facilities. Attached you will find several citizen complaints that we have
received. ¼ The Department
has attempted to balance through the rule revision process the needs of both
communities and the general public who use the lake. ¼
¼.
(2) To allow exclusive use of public facilities
by a certain group not designated by state or federal law (i.e., the Americans with
Disability Act) discriminates against other public use and is illegal. When the code was developed, it was clear
that equal standards were to be applied (except for the fee differential) and
the general public was not to be excluded or discriminated from use (ss. NR
1.90(1) and NR 1.91(2)(i), Wis. Adm. Code).
¼.
(10) ¼ There must, however,
be some acceptance by the village that the Department is carrying out its
mandated responsibility in trying to uphold the public’s rights and
interests. There should not be
discrimination at public facilities to gain access to public waters. The Department has been more than patient in
trying to help the communities along in gaining compliance with the overriding
public responsibility to protect public resources and public’s use of those
resources.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the Village
was aware of the State’s claim and was not prejudiced by the State’s failure to
comply with the particularities of § 893.80(1)(a), Stats.
Second,
a claimant must present the municipality with “[a] claim containing the address
of the claimant and an itemized statement of the relief sought ¼.” Section 893.80(1)(b), Stats., amended by 1995-96 Wis. Act 158, § 18.[9] Under subsec. (b), the claim must: “1) identify the claimant’s address; 2)
contain an itemized statement of the relief sought; 3) be submitted to the city
clerk; and 4) be disallowed by the city.”
City of Waukesha, 184 Wis.2d at 197-98, 515 N.W.2d at
895. Two principles help determine the
sufficiency of a claim under subsec. (b): (1) the notice must provide the
municipality with the information necessary to decide whether to settle the
claim, and (2) the notice must preserve bona fide claims. Id. at 198, 515 N.W.2d at
895-96.
The
statute first requires that a notice of claim contain the address of the
claimant. All of the correspondence
between the DNR and the Village contained the DNR’s address. Thus, the first requirement is satisfied.
Second,
the claim must contain an itemized statement of the relief sought. Also, a request by the claimant for the
municipality “to attain compliance with the DNR regulation” must provide the
municipality with sufficient information to decide whether to settle the claim
prior to litigation. See Id.
at 199, 515 N.W.2d at 896.
Here,
Thoresen’s April 29, 1994, letter explicitly stated the DNR’s expectation that
the municipality would comply with the revised code or face possible action by
the DOJ. Also, the June 17, 1994,
letter reiterated previous statements that the exclusive use of public facilities
by a certain group is illegal and the general public was not to be excluded
from use of these facilities. These
letters clearly define the equitable relief sought and therefore satisfy the
second statutory requirement.
Third,
the notice of claim must be “presented to the appropriate clerk or person who
performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for the defendant ¼.” Section 893.80(1)(b), Stats.
The key is that the claim be presented to a proper representative,
whether that be the clerk, the city attorney or another more appropriate
individual. See City of
Waukesha, 184 Wis.2d at 199-200, 515 N.W.2d at 896.
Here,
the correspondence was submitted to Lundberg, the Village president. Although this does not follow the letter of
the statute, it is clear that Lundberg forwarded all the relevant information
to and discussed the notice of claim with the Village Board and the Village
Attorney, John Andrews. In fact, the
board directed Andrews to compile a report to investigate the charges by the
DNR that the Village was discriminating by reserving parking spaces for Village
residents. In order to preserve an
otherwise bona fide claim, we conclude that the State substantially complied with
the requirement of presenting the notice of claim to the appropriate
party. See id.
Finally,
the claimant must wait until the municipality disallows the claim before it can
commence the action in circuit court.
Section 893.80(1)(b), Stats. Failure of the municipality to disallow the
claim within 120 days is considered a disallowance. Id. Here,
the State did not wait 120 days after sending its last letter dated June 17,
1994, before filing the complaint.
Therefore, if the Village did not disallow the claim, then the State
failed to comply with the statute. See
City of Waukesha, 184 Wis.2d at 200, 515 N.W.2d at 897.
The
State contends that certain actions and letters by the Village made it clear
that the Village had disallowed the claim.
The State points to:
(1) [t]he Village’s continued enforcement of its illegal parking
restrictions in June;
(2) the Village of Williams Bay’s president’s May 17, 1994, letter
demanding ‘[r]ecognition of noninterference with the ability of municipalities
to reserve and allocate parking spaces ¼ for residents;’
(3) the Village president’s testimony that the Village would continue
to maintain the parking restrictions in the face of the state’s objections.
We agree.
Although these actions and statements do not expressly disallow the
State’s claim, collectively they make it clear that the Village did not intend
to resolve the matter prior to litigation.
Despite
repeated efforts by the DNR to explain why the Village must comply with the
revised code, the Village continued to seek “noninterference” with its control
over reserved parking spaces for residents.
In addition, citizen complaints regarding the Village’s practice were
being reported to the DNR. Even after the
Village was notified that the DNR had referred the matter to the DOJ, the
Village continued with its practice. In
fact, in an article in the Lake Geneva Regional News by Dan Truttschel,
Lundberg is quoted as stating, “[U]ntil the DNR presents its case, the village
will continue to follow its previous practices at the launch.” The DOJ filed the complaint on August 18,
1994, within a week of the article appearing in the Geneva Lake newspaper. Based on the Village’s openly defiant
stance, it was reasonable for the State to conclude that the Village had
disallowed the claim. The State has
satisfied the fourth requirement as well.
We conclude that the State substantially complied with the notice of
claim statute in this case and is therefore entitled to the injunctive relief
as set forth in the trial court’s order.
The
Village also maintains that the trial court misapplied the law in determining
that its ordinance providing reserved parking spaces for Village residents
unreasonably excluded boats from the free use of Geneva Lake in violation of
Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1; § 30.77(1)(b), Stats.;
and provisions of Wis. Adm. Code §§
NR 1.90 and 1.91. The Village contends
that § 30.77(1)(b) prohibits ordinances that relate to the use and operation of
boats on public waters and therefore “should not be construed to restrict the
use to which a municipality may put its property when that use does not
restrict access to the water itself.”
The Village further argues that §§ NR 1.90 and 1.91 were “intended
to apply to restrictions that infringe on the public’s ability to use the
navigable waters of Wisconsin, and not to ordinances that relate only to the
availability of convenient parking at boat launch facilities.” These contentions are disingenuous and
simply ignore the law and the facts.
In
Wisconsin, navigable waters are held in trust by the state for the public’s
use. Wisconsin Const. art. IX, §
1. The trust reposed in the state is
“an active, administrative, and governmental trust, and one which should be administered
to promote not only navigation but the public health and welfare
generally.” State v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 119, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1957) (quoted source
omitted).
Our
supreme court has noted that “[t]he right of the citizens of the state to enjoy
our navigable streams for recreational purposes ¼ is a legal right that is entitled to all the protection
which is given financial rights.” Muench
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 511-12, 53 N.W.2d 514, 522
(1952). “Early decisions frequently
spoke of navigation, often in a commercial sense, as the purpose of the trust,
but all public uses of waters have from time to time been recognized, including
pleasure boating, sailing, fishing, swimming ¼ and enjoyment of scenic beauty.” Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis.
at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 74. Although the
state cannot change an entire lake, or destroy its character as a lake, the
trust doctrine does not prevent minor alterations of the natural boundaries
between water and land. Id.;
see also City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 453,
214 N.W. 820, 831 (1927) (when modification of the doctrine is necessary, the
legislature and courts should not hesitate to adopt an extension of the early
principles to meet and to harmonize with the spirit of this modern, progressive
age). We conclude that it is
appropriate to extend the public trust doctrine to include navigable waters and
the shore appurtenant in order to ensure the public’s continued access and free
use of the waters.
Even
if the public trust doctrine was directed solely to navigable waters, Wis.
Const. art. IX, § 1 does not preclude the legislature from protective action as
long as it is not inconsistent with the constitutional provision. See Omernik v. State,
64 Wis.2d 6, 13-14, 218 N.W.2d 734, 739 (1974). Authorizing the DNR to supervise and regulate the adequacy of
public access to the waters of the state is not inconsistent with the doctrine. Rather, the opposite is true. The general public certainly cannot benefit
from the public trust doctrine if it is unable to access the waters.
The
legislature may delegate to the DNR the authority to exercise such legislative
power as is necessary to “make public regulations interpreting [its] statute[s]
and directing the details of [their] execution.” Schmidt v. Department of Local Affairs & Dev.,
39 Wis.2d 46, 59, 158 N.W.2d 306, 313 (1968).
This is precisely what the legislature has done with the public trust
doctrine. The legislature has mandated
that the DNR “provide an adequate and flexible system for the protection,
development and use of ¼ lakes ¼ and other outdoor resources in this state.” Section 23.09(1), Stats. Subsection (2)
vests authority in the DNR to effectuate that purpose through rules it deems
necessary. Also under § 23.11, Stats., the DNR is conveyed general
rule-making power to supervise all the lands in which the state has an
interest. Clearly, the public trust
doctrine requires that the general public benefit from any such rules. Wisconsin Const. art. IX, § 1.
Regulation
of the state’s public access facilities by the DNR certainly is not
inconsistent with these principles.
Rather, this authority is outlined in Wis.
Adm. Code § NR 1.90(1), which states:
It is the goal of the state of Wisconsin to provide, maintain and
improve access to the state’s navigable lakes, rivers and streams for the
public. Public access facilities shall
allow for public rights of navigation, related incidental uses and other uses
which are appropriate for the waterway.
Waterway uses shall be equally available to all waterway users and
include enjoyment of natural scenic beauty and serenity. These public rights and uses may be provided
by any combination of publicly and privately owned access facilities which are
available to the general public free or for a reasonable fee. The [DNR], alone or in cooperation with
local government, shall exercise its management and regulatory responsibilities
to achieve this goal and to assure that levels and types of use of navigable
waters are consistent with protection of public health, safety and welfare,
including protection of natural resources.
The DNR also must develop standards that “provide
recreational opportunities consistent with demand, commensurate with the
capacity of the resource to support recreation and that provide a broad range
of recreational experiences.” Section
NR 1.90(2)(e). Wisconsin Adm. Code §§ NR 1.91 to 1.93 were promulgated to
apply to the DNR’s decisions “related to acquiring, developing, maintaining and
improving public boating access sites ¼ and to other department decisions relating to
protection and use of navigable waters.”
Section NR 1.91(1).
Consequently,
the DNR promulgated standards to determine the adequacy of public boating
access. Under these standards, a
5000-acre lake must provide, at a minimum, one or more access sites which in
total provide one car-trailer unit per 70 open-water acres but no less than 100
units. Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91(4)(d)1. An “access site” is defined as “an area of land providing public
boat access or carry-in access, which provides parking for vehicles with or
without trailers.” Section NR
1.91(2)(b). The DNR or a local
government may set up an alternative boating access plan pursuant to § NR
1.91(6). However, public boating access
must provide for use which is consistent with the protection of navigable water
and generally enjoyed by all users.
Section NR 1.91(4)(d)7 (our emphasis).
Moreover,
§ 30.77(1)(b), Stats., precludes
a municipality from “enact[ing] any ordinance or local regulation that in any
manner excludes any boat from the free use of the waters of this state ¼.”[10] The Village has two ordinances which
collectively contravene this mandate.
Pursuant to the Village traffic code, vehicles with boat trailers may
not be parked on any Village street and only vehicles with resident stickers
may use fourteen of the thirty-nine parking spaces restricted for use by
residents.
The
Village attempts to distinguish the inconvenience created by its ordinances for
nonresidents as only related to parking and not to boating. However, this ignores the fact that inland
lakes are primarily used for navigation in connection with recreation. See City of Milwaukee,
193 Wis. at 432, 214 N.W. at 823. It
also ignores the reality that users—residents and nonresidents alike—of
boat-launching facilities need a place to park their vehicles and/or boat
trailers while enjoying the state’s public waters. The Village does not allow vehicles with trailers to be parked on
the streets and it ropes off the launch to nonresidents when the nonresident
parking spaces are full, even if resident spaces are available. Limited parking facilities, such as these,
discourage and restrict the use of Geneva Lake by the general public.[11]
In
sum, the regulation and enforcement of the public trust doctrine has been
reposed with the legislature and the DNR, and occasionally in cooperation with
municipalities. The doctrine mandates
that access to the state’s navigable waterways be equally available to all
users. The legislature has ordered the
DNR to insure equal public access to the waters of the state. We conclude that the DNR’s authority
implicitly extends to the shore or public access facilities in its enforcement
of the public’s rights. Here, the
parking lot is an integral part of access to the lake and coupled with the
prohibition against parking vehicles with trailers on the streets, the
Village’s ordinances overly limit access.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order enjoining the Village
from restricting parking at the public boat launching facility for
nonresidents.
Town of Linn
In
response to the DNR’s allegations that the Town’s boat launching fees exceeded
allowable surcharges, the Town asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the
provisions of Wis. Adm. Code § NR
1.91 are unreasonable and in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution as applied
to the Town.[12] On appeal, the Town contends it “is not
challenging the validity of [§ NR 1.91], but, rather, the [DNR’s]
application of it in attempting to acquire injunctive relief ¼ .” Either position fails.
Sections
227.40 and 806.04(11), Stats.,
provide the exclusive means for judicial review of the validity of an
administrative rule. Section 227.40(5)
states:
The joint committee for review of administrative rules
shall be served with a copy of the petition in any action under this section
and, with the approval of the joint committee on legislative organization,
shall be made a party and be entitled to be heard.
Section 806.04(11), Stats.,
provides in relevant part:
In any proceeding under this section in which the constitutionality,
construction or application of any provision of ch. 227, or of any statute
allowing a legislative committee to suspend, or to delay or prevent the
adoption of, a rule as defined in s. 227.01(13) is placed in issue by the
parties, the joint committee for review of administrative rules shall be served
with a copy of the petition and, with the approval of the joint committee on
legislative organization, shall be made a party and be entitled to be heard.
Service on the JCRAR must be made within sixty days
after the filing of the complaint.
Section 893.02, Stats.; Richards
v. Young, 150 Wis.2d 549, 557, 441 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1989).
The
supreme court has stated that “[t]hese statutes are not permissive, but rather
are mandatory.” Id. at
555, 441 N.W.2d at 744. The legislature
sought to give the JCRAR the opportunity to become a party to an action at a
meaningful point in time when the constitutionality of an administrative rule
was contested. Id. Service allows the JCRAR to choose whether
to defend the rule in court or to avoid the litigation by suspending the
rule. Id.
Here,
it is not disputed that the Town failed to serve the JCRAR within sixty days of
its answer and affirmative defenses.
The trial court and this court are without competency to decide the
constitutionality, validity or application of Wis.
Adm. Code § NR 1.91 as to the Town.
Accordingly, the State is entitled to an injunction preventing the Town
from charging the excessive boat launching fees.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed and
cause remanded.
[1] Section 893.80, Stats., has been amended by 1995-96
Wis. Act 158, § 17. The changes
do not affect our analysis. All
statutory references are to the 1993-94 statutes.
[2] For example, if
the Town had a permanent attendant and toilet facilities, under Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91(11), it could
charge $5.50 for a resident or nonresident boat under twenty feet long or
$40-$120 for a nonresident season pass.
Under the Town’s ordinance, the fee was $26/weekday or $39/weekend for a
nonresident boat between seventeen and twenty feet long or $150 for a
nonresident season pass (limited to the first 100 applicants and to boats under
eighteen feet long). The Town’s
residents were not charged a boat launching fee.
[3] At each of the
Town’s two facilities, five parking spaces are posted as DNR spots and
nonresidents who park in those spaces may pay the fees under the administrative
code without receiving a $50 ticket.
However, the DNR has not approved the higher fees charged for the
non-DNR spots under Wis. Adm. Code
§ NR 1.93, in effect prior to April 1, 1994, or Wis. Adm. Code § NR 1.91(11)(f), in effect since April
1, 1994.
[4] Wisconsin Adm. Code §§ NR
1.91-1.93 are the result of a six-year statewide boating access policy
revision process. Both public and
municipal officials were invited to participate and provide input on the
proposed rules through a series of workshops, seven informational hearings and
six public hearings. The rules included
fees for use of public boat launch facilities.
The fees were based upon a statewide comparison of costs required to
operate and maintain the facilities.
After revisions by the legislature, the Natural Resources Board adopted
the rules, as revised, and referred them to the legislature. The rules became effective on April 1,
1994.
[5] The defendants
also filed a motion to sever the State’s claims against them, which was denied
on January 23, 1995. There was also a
motion to intervene by the Wisconsin Association of Lakes, Inc., which was
joined as an intervening plaintiff on February 21, 1995.
[6] The trial
court’s order only granted the first component of the injunctive relief
requested by the State. The second
component, the repayment of money by the Town which represented the amount paid
above the fees allowed under state law, was left to be addressed in further
proceedings. Accordingly, we remand
this issue to the trial court.
[7] Lundberg stated
in his deposition that the date was April 28, 1994. However, according to the April 13, 1994, Geneva Lake Use
Committee minutes, the next meeting was set for April 27, 1994. Accordingly, we accept April 27, 1994, as
the correct date.
[8] Although it is
unclear from the record, it would appear that the Village’s May 17, 1994,
letter was in response to Thoresen’s April 29 letter, the meeting with DNR
representatives on May 4, 1994, and resulted from the May 17, 1994, Geneva Lake
Use Committee meeting.
[9] Section
893.80(1)(b), Stats., has been
amended by 1995-96 Wis. Act 158, § 18, effective April 13, 1996. The amendment moved the 120-day time
limitation for disallowance from para. (b) to subsec. (1g). The change does not affect our analysis.
[10] There are two
exceptions, neither of which is applicable here. A municipality may enact ordinances which are in strict
compliance with §§ 30.50 to 30.71, Stats.,
or rules promulgated under those sections.
Section 30.77(2), Stats. In addition, a municipality may, in the
interest of public health, safety or welfare, enact ordinances relating to the
equipment, use or operation of boats or to any activity regulated by §§ 30.60
to 30.71, if the ordinances are not contrary or inconsistent with ch. 30, Stats.
Section 30.77(3)(a), 1993-94.
However, an ordinance that pertains to the equipment, use or operation
of a boat must be adopted by all towns, cities and villages having jurisdiction
on the lake to be valid. Id. The Village’s ordinance does not relate to
§§ 30.50 to 30.71. In addition, the
Village’s ordinance does not relate to the equipment, use or operation of boats
and was not enacted throughout all of Geneva Lake.
[11] In Town of
La Grange v. Martin, 169 Wis.2d 482, 484, 485 N.W.2d 287, 287-88 (Ct.
App. 1992), the towns adopted an ordinance which set a daily boat launching fee
for a single boat at $25 for nonresidents under § 30.77(3)(e), Stats., 1991-92. The DNR determined that excessive fees
restrict public access to and use of navigable waterways and found $4 to be a
reasonable fee under the statute. Town
of La Grange, 169 Wis.2d at 486, 485 N.W.2d at 288-89. This court also determined that the
ordinance violated § 30.77(3)(e) by setting the fee above the reasonable fee
without seeking express DNR approval. Town of La Grange, 169
Wis.2d at 488, 485 N.W.2d at 289.
Similarly, the DNR has determined the number of access sites for
reasonable public boating access. The
Village has unilaterally reduced the number of access sites in violation of
§ 30.77(1)(b) and (3)(a), Stats., as
well as Wis. Adm. Code § NR
1.91(4)(d) and (6).
[12] The Town filed
the following affirmative defenses: (1)
the complaint fails to state a claim for relief due to the DNR’s failure to
comply with § 893.80(1), Stats.;
(2) the complaint is not ripe for adjudication due to the pendency of the
administrative process; (3) the provisions of Wis.
Adm. Code § NR 1.91 and § 30.77(1)(b), Stats., are unreasonable and in violation of the Wisconsin
Constitution; and (4) joinder of the two claims is improper and should be
severed. Because of our determination
regarding service of the JCRAR, we lack competency to determine the remaining
issues.