|
STATE
OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
IV |
|
|
|
State
of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kimy
E. Trotter,
Defendant-Appellant. |
FILED October 30, 1998 CLERK OF COURT Of APPEALS OF WISCONSIN |
|||
ERRATA SHEET
Marilyn L. Graves
Clerk of Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 1688
Madison, WI 53701-1688
Court of Appeals District I
633 W. Wisconsin Ave., #1400
Milwaukee, WI 53203-1918
Court of Appeals District III
740 Third Street
Wausau, WI 54403-5784
Jennifer Krapf
Administrative Assistant
119 Martin Luther King Blvd.
Madison, WI 53703
Peg Carlson
Chief Staff Attorney
119 Martin Luther King Blvd.
Madison, WI 53703
Court of Appeals District II
2727 N. Grandview Blvd.
Waukesha, WI 53188-1672
Court of Appeals District IV
119 Martin Luther King Blvd.
Madison, WI 53703
Hon. James Welker, Trial Judge
County Building
250 Garden Lane
Beloit, WI 53511
Judi Farmer, Court Services Supervisor - 96-CF-1085B
250 Garden Lane
Beloit, WI 53511
Daniel J. O'Brien
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
William E. Schmaal
Asst. State Public Defender
P.O. Box 7862
Madison, WI 53707-7862
Jodi D. Bollendorf
Asst. Dist. Atty., Rock County
250 Garden Lane
Beloit, WI 53511
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the attached pages 3 and 4 are to be substituted for pages 3 and 4 in the above-captioned opinion which was released on September 17, 1998.
can be reasonably defined based on the circumstances of the situation without giving the police unbridled authority to search. And, under the facts at issue here, the car driven by Trotter clearly “pertain[ed]” to the premises because it was Trotter’s car and it stopped at the home immediately before it was searched.
Trotter next argues that the search was outside of the scope of the warrant because it took place several blocks away from her home. We disagree. Under the circumstances presented, the car was sufficiently “near” the home when it was searched to fall within the scope of the warrant. It was reasonable for the police to conclude that it would be a safety risk to simultaneously search the car in the driveway and execute the warrant to the house, especially because the additional officers who were going to execute the warrant for the house had not yet arrived. The officer’s decision to stop the car somewhat away from the house both provided a measure of safety and ensured that anyone in the home would not have advance notice before the warrant was executed. Under these circumstances, the police officer’s search several blocks from the home fell within the scope of the warrant.
Trotter next argues that the warrant, as it pertained to the premises, was not supported by probable cause and that it was overbroad in its description of the residence to be searched. Trotter did not, however, raise these arguments with specificity until after she had been convicted. In fact, Trotter conceded at the suppression hearing that there was probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant as it pertained to the residence. Because Trotter did not timely raise these issues, we conclude that she has waived her right to have the arguments considered during postconviction proceedings and on appeal. Cf. State v. Caban, 210 Wis.2d 598, 604-05, 563 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1997).[1]
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Trotter also requests that we use our discretionary authority under § 752.35, Stats., to reverse. We decline to do so.