No.
96-1148
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
ROBERT B. CIARPAGLINI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ERRATA SHEET
KELLY FLURY and BELOIT
DAILY NEWS,
Defendants-Respondents.
Marilyn
L. Graves Clerk
of Court of Appeals 231
East, State Capitol Madison,
WI 53702 |
Peg
Carlson Chief
Staff Attorney 119
Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Court
of Appeals District I 633
W. Wisconsin Ave., #1400 Milwaukee,
WI 53203-1918 |
Court
of Appeals District II 2727
N. Grandview Blvd. Waukesha,
WI 53188-1672 |
Court
of Appeals, District III 740
Third Street Wausau,
WI 54403-5784 |
Court
of Appeals District IV 119
Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Jennifer
Krapf Administrative
Assistant 119
Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Hon.
James E. Welker Rock
County Courthouse 250
Garden Lane Beloit,
WI 53511 |
Donna
Heiser, Trial Court Clerk Green
County Courthouse 1016
16th Avenue Monroe,
WI 53566-1703 |
Robert
B. Ciarpaglini, Pro Se Box
351 Waupun,
WI 53963 |
William
T. Henderson Collins
& Henderson P.O.
Box 777 Beloit,
WI 53511 |
|
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that
the attached pages 1, 5, 10 and 12 are to be substituted for pages 1, 5, 10 and
12 in the above-captioned opinion which was released on February 20, 1997.
Dated this 27th day of March, 2005.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED February 20, 1997 |
NOTICE |
A
party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse
decision by the Court of Appeals. See
§ 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This
opinion is subject to further editing.
If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of
the Official Reports. |
No. 96-1148
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
ROBERT
B. CIARPAGLINI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KELLY
FLURY and BELOIT DAILY NEWS,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Green County: JAMES E. WELKER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Vergeront and Roggensack, JJ.
ROGGENSACK,
J. Robert B. Ciarpaglini appeals from an order which dismissed
his defamation action, as a sanction for failing to obey a court order, and
required him to pay attorney fees, for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Ciarpaglini
to
award costs, alleging the action was frivolous. Ciarpaglini requested the substitution of Judge Deininger and the
case was again assigned to Judge Welker in Rock County.
On April 3, 1996, Judge
Welker issued an order requiring Ciarpaglini to file affidavits explaining his
basis for believing that Flury resided in Delavan or in Monroe, and listing all
funds he had received and dispersed since the December 1993 stipulation. It also ordered that no further motions or
other pleadings be filed pending Ciarpaglini’s compliance with its order.
On April 8, 1996,
Ciarpaglini filed a motion, which he dated April 3, 1996, requesting that Judge
Welker recuse himself because Ciarpaglini planned to name him as a codefendant
in an amended complaint. The motion set
forth no facts to explain any possible connection between the judge and the
defamation action. The court dismissed the action two days later, stating:
The
filing of [the recusal] motion is a disobedience of the prior order of the
court. Based upon [Ciarpaglini’s]
conduct in this case and his history of flagrant disregard of court orders, it
is apparent to this court that the plaintiff will not comply with the orders of
this court.
In
addition, the court awarded the defendants $1,221 in attorney fees, reasoning
that Ciarpaglini should have known that the lawsuit was frivolous after his
petitions to proceed in forma pauperis were twice denied for failure to
state a claim upon which
The
trial court’s order in this case does not mention which subsection of the
statute it was applying. This court
could infer that the trial court intended to apply § 814.025(3)(b), Stats., since it found that “the
plaintiff knew or should have known based upon two prior times when he filed
this same lawsuit that there was no reasonable basis upon which he could have
prevailed and that this action is frivolous.”
However, the original denial of Ciarpaglini’s indigency fee waiver did
not constitute judgment on the merits of his defamation action. Had Ciarpaglini paid the filing fees within
thirty days, his action could have proceeded.
Or, had Ciarpaglini sought review of the Rock County order through the
proper channels instead of playing venue games, this court could have directly
addressed the sufficiency of his complaint.
The
order awarding attorney fees made no analysis of the actual merit of the
defamation action. The only discussion
of the merits of the complaint occurred in the prior orders denying the
plaintiff’s motions to waive filing fees, but these orders are insufficient to
sustain the trial court's award of attorney fees based on § 814.025(1) and
(3)(b), Stats.
However,
our conclusion on the § 814.025, Stats.,
issue does not end our analysis of whether the award of attorney fees was
proper. This court “may affirm a lower
court’s decision on different grounds than those relied upon by the
We
conclude that the undisputed facts of record demonstrate Ciarpaglini’s
pleadings were not well-grounded in knowledge formed after a reasonable
inquiry. They alleged that Flury
resided in Monroe and in Delavan, while her affidavit establishes that she
resided in Janesville. Ciarpaglini has provided no basis for the inconsistent
allegations he made in the three filings of his defamation action. Instead, Ciarpaglini attempted to rid
himself of the judge who was calling him to account. The record provides sufficient evidence to conclude that
Ciarpaglini knew the allegations he made in his complaints, in regard to
Flury's residence, were not well-grounded in fact. We are satisfied that the result reached by the trial court—an
award of attorney fees—was supported by uncontradicted evidence in the record;
and therefore, we affirm the award.
CONCLUSION
The
circuit court’s discretionary determination that Ciarpaglini’s conduct merited
dismissal was rational and based on appropriate law and facts of record. However, the court’s finding that
Ciarpaglini should have known that his defamation action was without a reasonable
basis in law because the court had previously issued an unappealed order
denying a fee waiver on that basis, was insufficient to support the conclusion
that the lawsuit was frivolous.
Nonetheless, we conclude that the award of attorney fees was a proper
sanction under § 802.05(1)(a), Stats.,
because