No.
96-0736
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v. ERRATA SHEET
BERNARD B. KRIER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Marilyn
L. Graves Clerk
of Court of Appeals 231
East, State Capitol Madison,
WI 53702 |
Peg
Carlson Chief
Staff Attorney 119
Martin Luther King Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Court
of Appeals-District I 633
West Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee,
WI 53203 |
Court
of Appeals-District II 2727
N. Grandview Blvd. Waukesha,
WI 53188-1672 |
Court
of Appeals-District III 740
Third Street Wausau,
WI 54401-6292 |
Court
of Appeals-District IV 119
Martin Luther King Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Jennifer
Krapf Administrative
Assistant 119
Martin Luther King Blvd. Madison,
WI 53703 |
Hon.
Thomas R. Wolfgram Ozaukee
County Courthouse 1201
South Spring Street Port
Washington, WI 53074-0994 |
Sandy
A. Williams District
Attorney P.O.
Box 994 Port
Washington, WI 53074-0994 |
Christopher
A. Mutschler N9661
Willow Road Elkhart
Lake, WI 53030 |
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that
the attached pages 2 and 3 are to be substituted for pages 2 and 3 in the
above-captioned opinion which was released on September 4, 1996.
Dated this 12th day of March, 2005.
separate
notices of intent to revoke operating privileges. Krier requested refusal hearings, which were consolidated and
held on February 26, 1996.
At the hearing, the
trial court revoked Krier’s driving privileges, two years for the first refusal
and three years for the second refusal, after it found that his refusals to
submit to a breathalyzer test were unreasonable. See § 343.305 (9), (10), Stats. Krier now
renews his argument that the Informing the Accused Form that was read to him
was defective.
Krier focuses on how the
form did not reveal that any possible sanction would require proof that he had
been “driving or operating a motor vehicle.”
See § 343.305(4)(c), Stats. Nonetheless, we need not address Krier’s
specific theory because we find that the supreme court’s decision in Village
of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis.2d 680, 524 N.W.2d 635 (1994), forecloses
any claim that the form is defective.
There the court held that the form provides “sufficient information” to
the accused driver. Id.
at 694, 524 N.W.2d at 640.
Prior to the Bryant
decision, this court has consistently held that the Informing the Accused Form
must be assessed against its substantial compliance with the reasonable
objectives of the statute. See State
v. Sutton, 177 Wis.2d 709, 715, 503 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App.
1993); State v. Riley,
172 Wis.2d 452, 457‑58, 493 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Piskula, 168 Wis.2d
135, 140‑41, 483 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Muente, 159 Wis.2d
279, 280‑81, 464 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Ct. App. 1990). The form used by the arresting officer fully
advised Krier of his rights and the potential consequences of his refusal to
submit to a requested chemical test.
Krier does not dispute that. The
omission of the words “driving or operating a motor vehicle” does not affect
Krier being properly advised of his rights and penalties as recited in the
form.
The trial court's order
finding that Krier’s refusal to submit to the requested chemical test was
unreasonable is therefore affirmed.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.