Appeal No. |
2007AP1396 |
|
|
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
DISTRICT II |
|||
|
|||
|
|
||
Kelly J. Harvot,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Solo Cup Company and Solo Cup Operating Company,
Defendants-Respondents. |
FILED JUN 25, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Supreme Court |
||
|
|
||
CERTIFICATION
BY WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
Before
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61 this court certifies the appeal in this case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for its review and determination.
ISSUES
1. Does the
2. In the alternative, under the test set forth in Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, does the Wisconsin State Constitution confer the right to a jury trial in a WFMLA civil action for damages?
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to this certification are brief and undisputed. Kelly J. Harvot worked for Solo Cup Company and its predecessors since 1984. During this time, she developed a medical condition commonly known as degenerative disc disease. Her condition became worse in 2005, and she missed work on July 25, August 1 and August 2 because of her condition. Harvot requested medical leave for those three dates and supported her request with the required paperwork. Solo denied Harvot’s request for medical leave and then fired her on August 15, 2005.
Harvot filed a complaint with the Department of Workforce Development, Equal Rights Division. She alleged that Solo had violated her WFMLA rights when it denied her leave request and then terminated her employment. The ERD investigated Harvot’s complaint and determined that there was probable cause to believe Solo had denied Harvot her WFMLA rights. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge held that Solo’s actions did in fact violate the WFMLA. The ALJ ordered Solo to stop discriminating against Harvot, provide training to its human resource staff, amend its records to reflect Harvot’s medical leave on July 25, and August 1-2, 2005, offer to reinstate Harvot to a position she would have had if she had continued her employment at Solo, make Harvot whole for lost wages and benefits, reimburse her for interest on the net back pay, and to reimburse her for reasonable attorney fees and associated costs.
Harvot then initiated a civil action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13)(a), seeking damages to be determined by a jury. Solo filed a motion to strike the jury demand on grounds there is no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in a WFMLA civil suit. The circuit court granted the motion, holding that the case would be tried to the bench. In its decision, the court stated, “I don’t find that the statute expressly allows a jury trial. I’m not convinced that there is an implied right to it …. I don’t find that it’s anywhere close to the case at hand, what was available in the common law at that time.” Harvot appeals.
DISCUSSION
Statutory right to a jury trial under the
WFMLA
Harvot first asserts that the WFMLA carries with it an implied right to a jury trial in a civil damages action. She emphasizes that the WFMLA distinguishes between the equitable remedies available in the administrative proceedings and the legal damages available in a civil action. The relevant statutory language from Wis. Stat. §§ 103.10(12)(d) and (13)(a) is as follows:
[The Division] may order the employer to take action to remedy the violation, including providing requested family leave or medical leave, reinstating an employee, providing back pay accrued … and paying reasonable actual attorney fees ….
….
An employee … may bring an action in circuit court against an employer to recover damages caused by a violation of [the WFMLA] after the completion of an administrative proceeding, including judicial review, concerning the same violation.
Harvot notes that the statute does not expressly deny the right to a jury trial and distinguishes this from other actions where the legislature has expressly declared the cases be determined without a jury.[1] She insists that the legislature could have used similar language to preclude a trial by jury for WFMLA actions under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(13), but did not.
Finally, Harvot contends that the remedial nature of civil damages under the WFMLA indicates a legislative intent to afford litigants a jury. For support, Harvot turns to case law construing the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She relies on Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1998), which states:
[T]he structure of the FMLA’s remedial provisions indicates that Congress intended to create a right to a jury. In the section describing the remedies available under the FMLA, Congress distinguishes between ‘damages’ and ‘equitable relief’ ….
The distinction … reflects Congress’s intent to make juries available to plaintiffs pursuing [civil damages], while leaving it to the judge to determine whether equitable relief is warranted ….
Harvot also points to several FMLA cases where the plaintiff received a jury trial. See, e.g., Haschmann v Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998); Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999); and Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2003).
Solo responds that the WFMLA is silent on the availability
of a jury trial and argues that where the legislature chooses not to create an
express statutory right to a jury trial for a statutory civil claim, no right
can be inferred. Solo counters Harvot’s
reliance on federal case law by noting that Wisconsin courts have rejected
federal precedent that conflicts with Wisconsin law: “Wisconsin courts … must construe Wisconsin
statutes as it is believed the
Solo also asserts that the substantive rights under the
two statutes are different. An FMLA
claimant is entitled to twelve weeks of protected leave for any combination of
listed events under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), while the WFMLA claimant is
entitled to two weeks of leave for a serious health condition, two weeks for
the serious health condition of an immediate family member, and six weeks for
the birth or adoption of a child. See Wis.
Stat. § 103.10(3) and (4).
Further, Solo notes, the enforcement procedures under the FMLA are
different than those under the WFMLA. An
FMLA claimant need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a cause
of action in federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). In contrast, the
Constitutional right to a jury trial
Solo posits that because the legislature did not create a
statutory right to a jury trial for a WFMLA claimant, the only remaining avenue
available to Harvot is article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The constitution preserves the right of trial
by jury by stating, “[T]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” That is, “[t]he right to trial by jury
preserved by the constitution is the right as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the constitution in 1848.” Town
of
The first part of the Village Food test
requires the current action to be “essentially [a] counterpart[ ]” to a legal
cause of action existing in 1848. See id.,
¶28. In Village Food, the court
took up the history of the Unfair Sales Act by looking to prohibited trade
practices at common law. See Village Food, 254
Harvot argues that, in keeping with the broad approach
espoused in Village Food, the legal lineage of the WFMLA can be traced back
to pre-1848 minimum labor standards or fair employment laws. Harvot points to the revised statutes of 1849,
which protected apprentices against cruelty and a master’s failure to educate them,
and instituted remedies for a master’s breach of duty toward an apprentice. See
Wis. Stat. §§ 81.11 through
81.15 (1849). Harvot also directs the
court to chapter fourteen, “Of Master and Servant,” 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 423 (1807),[2]
where Blackstone discussed the types of servants, the creation and destruction
of the servant relationship, and the effect of the relationship on the parties
in
Solo disagrees, arguing that the court’s most recent
decision on point signals a more narrow analysis is warranted. In State v. Schweda, 2007 WI 100, ¶34, 303
Wis. 2d 353, 736 N.W.2d 49, the court stated that having “doctrinal roots” in
the common law was not enough to show that a modern cause of action existed in
1848. The court required more than a
“passing resemblance,” and rejected Schweda’s claim that modern environmental
regulations were the essential counterpart to common law nuisance actions.
Village Food also requires that the
cause of action be “at law.” See Village
Food, 254
Wis. 631, 632 (1887) for the proposition that an action to recover money is an
action at law: “That an action to
recover money, given by statute by way of penalty for the neglect or refusal of
a party to do a prescribed act … is legal, and not equitable, in its
character, seems to us a proposition too plain for discussion.”
Solo responds that even if an analogous employment law
claim existed in 1848, the only remedies were equitable. It offers little in the way of analysis,
however, except to assert that the forfeiture remedy available under Wis. Stat. § 81.16 (1849) was
equitable in nature. This unsupported
assertion, is refuted in Columbia County v. Bylewski, 94
CONCLUSION
Whether the WFMLA creates an implied right to a jury trial is a novel and important question. This is particularly pressing because the federal FMLA cases demonstrate that jury trials are often afforded. In the alternative, whether the WFMLA is an essential counterpart to common law labor standards and employment law has never been addressed. A decision by the supreme court will develop and clarify the law, assuring that the constitutional right to a jury trial is not inconsistently interpreted. A pronouncement of the law in this regard will have widespread impact on WFMLA actions throughout the state. For these reasons, we respectfully request that the supreme court accept certification of the issue.
[1] See, e.g. Wis. Stat. § 76.08(1) (review of assessments or adjustments); Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1) (petition for judicial review of Administrative Procedures Act); and Wis. Stat. § 971.14(4)(b) (competency determination regarding mental health treatment).
[2] A digitized version of Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books (1807) is available online at http://books.google.com/books?id=TZkkAAAAMAAJ.