April 9, 2013

 

wisconsin supreme court

 

table of pending cases

 

Clerk of Supreme Court

Telephone:  (608) 266-1880

Facsimile:  (608) 267-0640

Web Site:  www.wicourts.gov

Wisconsin Supreme Court Case Access:  http://wscca.wicourts.gov

 

            The following table describes pending cases the Supreme Court has accepted on petition for review, bypass, certification and original jurisdiction.

            The cases included for the first time (that is, the most recently accepted cases) are marked with an * next to the case number.  After the Supreme Court decides a case, the date of oral argument or date of submission on briefs is replaced with the date of the Supreme Court decision and abbreviated mandate.  That mandate will generally be listed in the table for two months and then the case will be removed from the table.

            The information in the table, from left to right, is as follows:

·         the case number;

·         an abbreviated caption of the case (case name);

·         a statement of the issue(s);

·         the date the Supreme Court accepted the case;

·         the method by which the case came to the Supreme Court:  REVW = Petition for review, CERT = Certification, CERQ = Certified Question, BYPA = Petition to bypass, ORIG = Original Action, WRIT = Petition for supervisory writ, REMD = Remanded from the U.S. Supreme Court;

·         the date of oral argument or submission on briefs; or the date of the Supreme Court decision and an abbreviated mandate;

·         the Court of Appeals district from which the case came, if applicable; the county;

·         the date of the Court of Appeals decision, if applicable;

·         whether the Court of Appeals decision is published or unpublished, and, if it is published, the citations to the public domain citation and the official reports for the Court of Appeals decision.

            The statement of the issue is cursory and does not purport to be an all-inclusive, precise statement of the issues in the case.  Readers interested in a case should determine the precise nature of the issues from the record and briefs filed with the Supreme Court.

            The following table covers cases accepted and decisions issued through April 9, 2013.  Please direct any comments regarding this table to the Clerk of Supreme Court, P.O. Box 1688, Madison, WI 53701-1688, telephone (608)266-1880.

 

 

Case No.

Caption/Issue(s)

SC Accepted

CA

Dist/

Cty

CA

Decision

2007AP221 &

2007AP1440

            Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District

 

Whether the plain language of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.80(3) and (5) restricts the judiciary’s equitable power to award injunctive relief.

 

Whether the statute’s damage cap limits damages recoverable on a continuing nuisance claim of an ongoing interference with use and enjoyment of property that is abatable.

 

Whether the statute’s damage cap violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution on its face or as applied.

 

Whether the government’s taking ground water contained within a claimant’s land without just compensation gives rise to an inverse condemnation claim and, if so, what would be the proper measure of damages.

 

Because the District maintains and operates the Deep Tunnel pursuant to a DNR permit, is the District deprived of immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) for its discretionary design decision to line only certain portions of the Deep Tunnel with concrete?

 

Did the plaintiffs comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)’s notice of claim requirements?

 

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/06/2012

1

Milwaukee

06/29/2011

Pub

2011 WI App 76

334 Wis. 2d 620

800 N.W.2d 518

2008AP1523

            Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, et al.  v. DNR, et al.

 

Did the DNR correctly apply Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) when considering effects upon property interests, such as residential values, business income, and public revenue?

 

Did the DNR exceed the scope of its authority to protect “public rights in navigable waters” under § 310.02(1), by considering the effects of the water level order on private wetlands located above the ordinary high water mark?

 

Did the DNR exceed the scope of its authority by applying Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103 to a water level proceeding under Wis. Stat. Ch. 31?

 

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/05/2012

4

Rock

08/30/2011

Pub

2011 WI App 115

336 Wis. 2d 677

803 N.W.2d 853

2009AP2916-CR

            State v. Gregory M. Sahs

 

Whether a defendant’s appeal can be dismissed on the basis that a statement made to a probation agent in question was allegedly not in the record.

 

Whether a defendant’s statement to a probation agent was coerced under the circumstances.

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/25/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2010AP425

            State v. Tramell E. Starks

 

Whether a defendant’s motion to vacate a DNA surcharge counts as a prior motion for purposes of the successive motion bar under Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), addressing specifically the holdings in State v. Starks, No. 2010AP425, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2011), State v. Matamoros, No. 2009AP2982, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2010), and State v. Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, 330 Wis. 2d 750, 794 N.W.2d 765.

 

What are the pleading standards for determining whether a defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel satisfy the “sufficient reason” requirement of Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4)?

 

08/02/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

*2010AP1639-CR

             State v. Erick O. Magett

 

Where a defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, may a court summarily refuse to hold a jury trial on the defense if it determines that the defendant will not present sufficient evidence to create a jury question?  Would such circumstances result in harmless error upon appellate review?

 

03/13/2013

REVW

4

Grant

Unpub.

2010AP2003-CR

             State v. Courtney C. Beamon

 

Is a jury instruction which describes the factual theory alleged to satisfy an element legally erroneous?

In a criminal case, are the instructions given the jury the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured or is the evidence to be measured against “the actual elements of the offense”?

Does the harmless error rule of State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction?

Was State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 153, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), which held a conviction may be upheld “only if there was sufficient evidence to support guilt on the charge submitted to the jury in the instructions” overruled by State v. Harvey, supra?

 

04/25/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

11/05/2012

(Justice On Wheels, Green County Justice Center)

 

2

Racine

09/28/2011

Pub.

2011 WI App 131

336 Wis. 2d 438

804 N.W.2d 706

2010AP2363-CR/

2010AP2364-CR

           State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller

 

Whether an outside laboratory report was not testimonial on the basis of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).

 

01/14/2013

REVW

Oral Arg

04/10/2013

 

1

Milwaukee

08/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 89

343 Wis. 2d 703

820 N.W.2d 149

2010AP2809-CR

             State v. Matthew A. Lonkoski

 

Does a police officer cease interrogation as required by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), where, in response to the interrogated person’s invocation of the right to counsel, the officer places the person under arrest?

 

Does the right to invoke Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] protections when custodial interrogation is “imminent or impending” apply where interrogation is ongoing but custody is imminent?

 

10/17/2012

REVW

Affirmed

04/09/2013

2013 WI 30

3

Oneida

Unpub.

*2010AP3016-CR

             State v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio

 

Whether police may track the real-time location of a cell phone user without a warrant.

 

Whether a criminal suspect made an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel during interrogation.

 

Whether evidence obtained from cell phone tracking and statements made during interrogation should be suppressed or whether the admission of such evidence and statements constitutes harmless error.

 

03/13/2013

REVW

2

Kenosha

Unpub.

2010AP3034-CR

             State v. Kenneth M. Sobczak

 

May a temporary houseguest consent to a police search of his or her host’s home and a computer located inside the home that the houseguest was explicitly permitted to use?

 

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

12/04/2012

2

Washington

01/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 6 338 Wis. 2d 410 808 N.W.2d 730

2010AP3158

             Park Bank v. Roger E. Westburg

 

Is a corporate shareholder and guarantor barred from asserting a personal claim for damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duties against a lender, if the corporation also sustained injury as a result of the same alleged wrongful conduct of the lender?

 

Does a default foreclosure judgment in favor of a lender in a prior lawsuit solely between the lender and a limited liability corporation borrower preclude member-guarantors from personally asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims in a separate lawsuit brought by the lender against the guarantors on their separate guaranty contracts?

 

Does the filing of a Wisconsin Chapter 128 receivership proceeding by a corporation preclude shareholder-guarantors from asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims in a subsequent lawsuit brought by one of the corporate entities’ lenders against the shareholder-guarantors on their personal guaranties of the corporation?

 

Can a plaintiff rely upon unpled allegations of loan defaults in a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine, without amending its Complaint, and over repeated objections, Motion in Limine, and Motion to Strike made by defendants?

 

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/10/2013

2

Walworth

Unpub.

2011AP203

             Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v. LIRC

 

Whether the circuit court lacked competency due to counsel for Xcel and ACE American Insurance Co. (ACE) failing to name ACE a party to the case.

 

Did the court of appeals properly grant itself authority to review the circuit court’s denial of the Labor and Industry Review Commission’s (LIRC’s) motion to dismiss when LIRC did not file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal?

 

Should LIRC’s modification of one Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) order be set aside because LIRC’s decision was inconsistent with another ALJ’s prior unappealed holding that it was premature to assess permanent total disability until respondent underwent additional treatment?

 

Should LIRC’s modification of the ALJ’s order be set aside and remanded because substantial and credible evidence does not support LIRC’s finding that the respondent reasonably refused medical treatment?

 

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/11/2013

3

Chippewa

02/29/2012

Pub.

 2012 WI App 19

339 Wis. 2d 413

 810 N.W.2d 865

2011AP394-CR

               State v. Demone Alexander

 

Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to be present when the trial court questions a sitting juror during the course of a jury trial and dismissing that juror for cause, or may that right be waived by counsel without the trial court conducting a colloquy with the defendant?

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

03/14/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP407/408/

409-CR

             State v. Brent T. Novy

 

Was it error to allow fingerprint evidence to be admitted in the state’s rebuttal after the court had previously ruled the evidence was not admissible because the state violated the discovery statute by not providing it to the defense?

 

Was defendant-appellant-petitioner deprived of the right to an impartial jury and fair trial when defense counsel observed a juror sleeping during his closing argument?

 

06/13/2012

REVW

Affirmed

03/14/2013

2013 WI 23

2

Kenosha

01/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 10 338 Wis. 2d 439 809 N.W.2d 889

2011AP450-CR

             State v. Julius C. Burton

 

Since the defendant had the right to a jury trial to determine whether he was not responsible for the crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, even if he had pled guilty to the crimes, and since defense counsel had not indicated at the plea hearing that he had been made aware of that right and intended to waive it, was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel and was he entitled to have his guilty pleas withdrawn? 

 

Since the circuit court failed to advise the defendant that he had a right to plead guilty to the crimes charged and still have a jury trial to determine whether he was not responsible for the crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, had the defendant’s pleas of guilty not been knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made and, therefore, was the defendant entitled to have his guilty pleas withdrawn?

 

09/27/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/11/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP557

             Dale P. Veto v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.

 

Whether language in an insurer’s personal liability umbrella policy that “uninsured . . . motorists coverage under this policy will be no broader than the underlying insurance,” unambiguously incorporates an uninsured motorist reducing clause from the underlying family car policy.

 

09/14/2012

REVW

Dismissed

03/20/2013

 

4

Dane

05/31/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 56 341 Wis. 2d 390 815 N.W.2d 713

2011AP564

             Marshall Schinner v. Michael Gundrum, et al.

 

Is the act of giving alcoholic beverages to underage persons at a party leading to an injury to a person at the party an “occurrence” or “accident” as that term is used in a homeowner’s liability insurance policy?

 

Does the act of hosting a party in a secluded shed on separate business property have some connection with that real property where it happened so as to constitute a “claim arising out” of a business location that was not the insured home?

 

Does the storage of some personal property on undisputedly business property that is not listed or defined as an insured location on a homeowner’s insurance liability policy convert the business location to an insured location under the homeowner’s insurance liability policy?

 

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/23/2012

2

Washington

03/28/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 31 340 Wis. 2d 195 811 N.W.2d 431

2011AP583

             Marilyn M. Brown v. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company

 

Is a volunteer firefighter’s decision, while responding to an emergency call in his personal vehicle, to drive through a red light without sounding an audible signal a discretionary decision entitled to governmental immunity?

 

Is a volunteer firefighter acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of governmental immunity while driving in his personal vehicle from his home to the fire station in response to an emergency call?

 

10/17/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

2

Waukesha

06/27/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 66

342 Wis. 2d 236

815 N.W.2d 719

2011AP685-CR

           State v. Lamont L. Travis

 

Whether a sentencing court’s reliance on inaccurate information at sentencing, with the inaccuracy consisting of a mistaken belief that the sentence required a minimum period of five years of confinement, qualifies as a structural error requiring automatic reversal and therefore precludes the State from proving harmless error (cf., State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1).

 

Whether, if classifying the error as structural, the remedy of resentencing complies with mandatory precedent requiring complete reversal of a structurally infected prosecution.

 

Whether, assuming harmless-error analysis applies to this error, the supreme court should decide the harmless-error issue or should remand the issue to the court of appeals to decide.

 

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/10/2013

2

Kenosha

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 46

 340 Wis. 2d 639

 813 N.W.2d 702

2011AP691-CR

        State v. Matthew R. Steffes

 

Whether the elements of the theft by fraud statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.20 (1), require a false promise or representation of payment that induces the victim to provide or relinquish some tangible property to the defendant.

 

Whether electricity used to power a telephone network can be considered tangible property under the theft by fraud statute.

 

Whether the court correctly valued the stolen applied electricity by the value of the telephone services used by the criminal conspiracy and not paid for.

 

10/16/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

1

Milwaukee

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 47

340 Wis. 2d 576

812 N.W.2d 529

2011AP788

           Christopher T. Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc.

 

Had the employee been terminated within the meaning of section 6 of the Stock Repurchase Agreement?

 

Was the employee required to prove a constructive termination under the essential elements set out in Strozinsky v. School Dist. Of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶83, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443, in order to put his shares to Sideline Software, Inc. for the stipulated price?

 

Does the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing require a court to “assess competing equities” between the parties in making a determination whether an unambiguous provision of a contract has been breached?

 

When a breach of contract lawsuit has been pled as an equitable action for specific performance, does a trial court have greater latitude in reaching a conclusion that the contract has been breached by the defendant than if the lawsuit has been pled as one for money damages?

 

Whether the concept of “constructive discharge” as used in the context of wrongful termination claims has any applicability to the claims asserted by plaintiff-appellant in this case.

 

If “constructive discharge” as that term is used in wrongful termination claims is at issue in this case, whether the concept should be modified in situations where the employer is claiming that the employee remained employed (as opposed to situations where the employer is claiming that the employee voluntarily resigned his or her employment), including whether the requirement of the resignation of employment is appropriate in such situations.

 

If the concept of “constructive discharge” as used in wrongful termination claims either is not at issue in this case and should not be modified, whether a new concept should be adopted to address situations where a plaintiff employee asserts that his/her employment was effectively terminated while the employer asserts that the employee’s employment continued, as has occurred in this case.

 

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

1

Milwaukee

03/28/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 36

 340 Wis. 2d 433

 811 N.W.2d 856

2011AP825

& 2011 AP826

             Dane County Dept. of Human Services v. Mable K.

 

When a trial court grants partial relief on remand in a termination of parental rights (TPR) appeal, is further appeal precluded by the ordinary rules of civil procedure?

 

Where the trial court determines that it denied the right to counsel during a TPR trial, must the court grant an entirely new hearing before a different judge or may the court remedy the violation by returning the parent to that point of the proceedings where the deprivation occurred and permitting the parent’s counsel to present evidence for determination as to whether to order default?

 

Did the trial court misuse its discretion when it did not vacate a 10 minute-old default judgment when the cognitively challenged parent arrived in court?

 

05/03/2012

REVW

Reversed; remanded

03/29/2013

2013 WI 28

4

Dane

Unpub.

2011AP902

             Isaac Sawyer v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company

 

Is a one-page faxed advertisement sent by one business to another in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) considered a publication of material violating a person’s right to privacy thereby entitling the violator to liability coverage under the specifically defined personal and advertising injury insurance coverage?

 

Does the Knowing Violation of Rights of Another exclusion clause exclude coverage under the personal and advertising injury coverage for the sending of a one page facsimile advertisement that is in violation of the TCPA?

 

11/14/2012

REVW

1

Milwaukee

08/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 92

 343 Wis. 2d 714

 821 N.W.2d 250

2011AP1030-CR

             State v. Gerald D. Taylor

 

Whether the trial court properly employed the harmless error doctrine to deny the defendant’s plea withdrawal motion without a hearing where the court had misinformed the defendant about the maximum sentence he faced with a repeater allegation.  (See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).

 

Whether there is a conflict between the holdings in State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 and State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492 786 N.W.2d 64 requiring resolution by the court.

 

03/15/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

09/06/2012

3

Outagamie

--

2011AP1044-CR /  2011AP1105-CR

           State v. Dale R. Neumann

          State v. Leilani F. Neumann

 

What is the scope of the prayer treatment exception under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) where defendants are charged with second-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat. § 940.06 (1) and what are the appropriate jury instructions when that exception is raised in a reckless homicide case?

 

06/13/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

12/04/2012

 

3

Marathon

--

*2011AP1045

           Thomas D. Nowell v. City of Wausau

 

Whether circuit court review of municipal court decisions under Wis. Stat. § 125.12 (2) (d) to determine non-renewal of an alcohol license is pursuant to certiorari or a de novo hearing.

 

03/12/2013

REVW

3

Marathon

09/27/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 100

344 Wis. 2d 269

823 N.W.2d 373

2011AP1121

           Paul Davis Restoration of S.E. Wisconsin, Inc. v. Paul

           Davis Restoration of Northeast Wisconsin

 

Whether a judgment entered against only a business entity’s trade name is enforceable against the trade name and the underlying entity (See Jacob v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 203 Wis. 2d 524, 553 N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1996)).

 

Whether a judgment against an entity’s trade name in a principal action can be collaterally attacked in a subsequent garnishment action.

 

12/10/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

03/14/2013

3

Brown

Unpub.

2011AP1158

           Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc.

 

Is a private governmental contractor entitled to sovereign immunity under Estate of Lyons v. CAN Insurance Company, 207 Wis. 2d 446, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996) for its efforts to maintain water drainage on a construction site so as to protect an adjacent private property from water damage?

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

03/13/2013

2

Winnebago

07/27/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 80

 343 Wis. 2d 623

 819 N.W.2d 316

2011AP1176/

2011AP1177

           Joseph McLeod v. Patricia Mudlaff, et al.

 

Does a court have the authority to entertain an action to declare a marriage void after one of the spouses has died?

 

10/17/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

2

Washington

--

2011AP1240

            Patricia A. Johnson v. Michael R. Masters

 

Is it an “action” barred by the statute of repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.40, when a wife seeks to obtain a pension award by submitting a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) as required by the divorce judgment, and the submission is approximately one year after the former husband retires, but more than twenty years after the divorce judgment?

 

05/14/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

09/07/2012

2

Waukesha

--

2011AP1451

           Amjad T. Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC

 

Whether a judicial interpretation of a use provision in a lease for premises to operate a fast-food restaurant comports with the standards of contract interpretation.

 

01/14/2013

REVW

Oral Arg

04/11/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP1566

           United Concrete & Construction, Inc. v. Red-D-Mix

           Concrete, Inc.

 

Whether the determination that statements made by a seller are puffery is a question of fact or law.

 

Whether the appellate discussion of assigned claims of homeowners/customers circumvents the holding in Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 639 N.W.2d 189.

 

12/10/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

04/23/2013

3

Outagamie

Unpub.

2011AP1770-CR/

2011AP1771-CR

           State v. Brandon M. Melton 

 

Whether a circuit court has inherent authority to destroy an extra presentence investigation (PSI) report after entry of judgment for purposes not related to the original sentencing proceeding.

   

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

03/13/2013

2

Waukesha

08/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 95

 343 Wis. 2d 784

 820 N.W.2d 487

2011AP1956

         James E. Kochanski v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC

 

Did the trial court err in giving Wis JI-Civil 410 (absent witness) instructions to a jury under the circumstances of the case?

 

02/12/2013

REVW

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP2067

        Mary E. Marlowe v. IDS Property Casualty Ins. Co.

 

Because there is no statutory authority specifying discovery in arbitration (outside of depositions under § 788.07), after Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42, do arbitrators have the inherent authority to determine the necessity and scope of allowable discovery in the absence of an express agreement by the parties?

 

In light of Borst, does an arbitration panel have exclusive authority to interpret an arbitration agreement to determine discovery procedures that apply to an arbitration absent an express agreement by the parties?

 

When arbitration is an alternative to litigation and formal court proceedings, should an arbitration panel, absent an explicit clause in an arbitration contract, order the parties to participate in formal discovery proceedings that would generally only be available to litigants in the circuit court process?

 

After Borst, in the absence of an express agreement by the parties as to the scope of discovery, does a party have a right to request declaratory relief from the trial court on the interpretation of an arbitration clause in an automobile insurance policy?

 

If the court determines that the plaintiffs were seeking an intermediate review of an arbitration panel decision, can intermediate rulings by an arbitration panel be challenged in the circuit court before a final award is made on the grounds that an arbitration panel did not have authority to act in the first place?

 

06/13/2012

REVW

Modified, affirmed and remanded

04/05/2013

2013 WI 29

 

3

Brown

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 51 340 Wis. 2d 594 811 N.W.2d 894

2011AP2166

        David J. Rosecky v. Monica M. Schissel

 

Is the surrogacy parentage agreement valid and enforceable?

 

Is any portion of the surrogacy parentage agreement, in the event found void and unenforceable by the court, severable from the remaining terms of the agreement?

 

Is it in the child’s best interest to have no placement with the biological mother?

 

Was the trial court’s decision granting placement rights to the biological mother based on the evidence presented or was it arbitrary, constituting an abuse of discretion?

 

09/27/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

4

Columbia

--

2011AP2424-CR

(consolidated with

  2012AP918,

  State v. Seaton)

        State v. Nancy J. Pinno

 

Whether the failure to object at trial to a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation should be analyzed on appeal as a “forfeiture” or a “waiver” of the issue.

 

02/25/2013

CERT

2

Fond du Lac

--

2011AP2698-CR

       State v. Curtis L. Jackson

 

Whether the trial court improperly denied a defendant’s motion to admit evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence where the victim’s reputation was unknown to the defendant.  (See McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973) and Wis. Stats. §§ 904.04 (2) (b) and 904.05 (1) and (2)).

 

02/12/2013

REVW

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP2733-CR

       State v. Minerva Lopez

 

Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the prosecution’s case would be prejudiced if recorded statements of a 14-year-old victim are ruled inadmissible at trial when the victim had turned 16 and is no longer under the testimonial protection of Wis. Stat. § 908.08.

 

02/11/2013

REVW

4

Dane

Unpub.

2011AP2833-CR

       State v. Jacqueline R. Robinson

 

Did a trial court’s amended sentence for criminal convictions violate the double jeopardy clause of the state and federal constitutions?  (See State v. Burt, 2000 WI App 126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42).

 

02/12/2013

REVW

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP2864-CRAC

         State v. Samuel Curtis Johnson, III

 

Do defendants have a constitutional right to disclosure of privately-held privileged medical records?  If so, what is the basis for the constitutional right?  How should the constitutional right be defined and what are its parameters?

 

If defendants have a constitutional right to disclosure of privately-held privileged records, does the constitutional right trump privilege statutes?  May a circuit court protect the constitutional right by ordering privately-held privileged records for in camera review and then reviewing records in camera to determine what, if any, should be disclosed to the defendant?

 

If defendants have a constitutional right to disclosure of privately-held privileged records, did the defendant establish a constitutional right to disclosure of the alleged victim’s privately-held privileged therapy records?  (See State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, discussing State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993)).

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/25/2013

2

Racine

Unpub.

2011AP2888

         Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka

 

Does a court have competence to hold a refusal hearing if the defendant does not meet the Wis. Stat. § 343.305 pre-condition of requesting a hearing within ten days?

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

03/13/2013

2

Waukesha

Unpub.

2011AP2916-CR

         State v. Andrew M. Edler

 

Should Wisconsin follow Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010), which held that the Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) prohibition against seeking a waiver of the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) warnings and reinitiating police interrogation no longer applies when there has been a 14-day break in custody, or does the Wisconsin constitution provide a greater level of protection to individuals suspected of committing a crime?

 

When the defendant asked, in the squad car on the way to the second interrogation, “Can my attorney be present for this?”, did he unambiguously invoke his right to counsel?

 

If the statement set forth in the second issue is declared to be ambiguous, does it make a difference whether the ambiguous statement was made before or after Miranda warnings were given?

 

01/15/2013

CERT

Oral Arg

04/10/2013

2

Sheboygan

--

2012AP99

         Outagamie County v. Melanie L.

 

Did the county fail to prove that an individual was incompetent to refuse medication and treatment for psychiatric disorders within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 51.61 (1) (g) 4.b. where evidence tended to show that the individual recognized the need for medication and treatment for mental illness?

 

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/26/2013

3

Outagamie

Unpub.

2012AP500

        Dane County v. Sheila W.

 

Does Wisconsin recognize the “mature minor doctrine,” a common law rule providing that a minor may consent or refuse consent to medical treatment upon a showing of maturity, intelligence and sufficient understanding of the medical condition and treatment alternatives?

 

Does Wisconsin recognize a mature adolescent’s due process right to refuse unwanted medical treatment?

 

Did the circuit court violate an adolescent’s common law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment when it appointed a temporary guardian to consent to treatment over the adolescent’s objection?

 

Should the exceptions to the mootness doctrine be utilized to address the above issues?

 

01/15/2013

REVW

Oral Arg

04/11/2013

4

Dane

Unpub.

2012AP544-W

        Office of the State Public Defender v. Court of Appeals,   

        District IV

 

Is defense postconviction counsel in a merit appeal required to first seek circuit court permission to “access, cite to, and quote from a PSI [presentence investigation] report” before litigating a PSI-related sentencing issue? 

 

Does the decision in State v. Parent, 2006 WI 132, 298 Wis. 2d 63, 725 N.W.2d 915, which related to a no-merit appeal, also require such circuit court permission in a merit appeal?

 

06/13/2012

WRIT

Rights declared, relief granted

04/09/2013

2013 WI 31

4

Wood

--

2012AP665

         Manitowoc County v. Samuel J. H.

 

Whether Wis. Stat. § 51.35 (1) (e) mandates a hearing within ten days for all transferred patients, including those transferred for medical reasons, under § 51.35 (1) (e)1., or whether the mandate applies only to those patients transferred due to a violation of conditions of outpatient placement as set forth in § 51.35 (1) (e)2. – 5. (See Fond du Lac County v. Elizabeth M.P., 2003 WI App 232, ¶¶26, 28, 267 Wis. 2d 739, 672 N.W.2d 88).

 

11/14/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

02/26/2013

2

Manitowoc

--

2012AP805/

2012AP840

       Scott N. Waller, et al. v. American Transmission Company,

       LLC

 

How must a landowner raise a claim that a condemnor has taken too little property, leaving the landowner with an uneconomic remnant: in a valuation proceeding, in an inverse condemnation action, or in a right-to-take action?

 

Did the court correctly interpret and apply the uneconomic remnant statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.06 (3m)?

 

May a landowner recover litigation expenses for obtaining a judicial ruling that the property remaining after a taking is an uneconomic remnant?

 

Is a landowner who voluntarily moves from a property because of personal preferences nonetheless “displaced,” entitling the landowner to relocation benefits under Wis. Stat. § 32.19?

 

01/14/2013

BYPA

Oral Arg

04/11/2013

2

Walworth

--

2012AP918

 (consolidated with

  2011AP2424-CR,

  State v. Pinno)

      State v. Travis J. Seaton

 

Whether the failure to object at trial to a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation should be analyzed on appeal as a “forfeiture” or a “waiver” of the issue.

 

02/25/2013

CERT

2

Fond du Lac

--

2012AP958

     Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R.

 

Under State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80, is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute forfeited where the issue was presented to the circuit court but not as a constitutional challenge, and further where the constitutional argument does not challenge the entire statutory chapter?

 

Does Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (11), which provides a jury of six people and requires a five-sixths verdict for persons subject to involuntary commitment, violate equal protection, given that Chapter 980 provides persons subject to involuntary commitment a jury of twelve and requires a unanimous verdict?

 

02/12/2013

REVW

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.