2010 WI 136
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
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Case No.: |
2009AP287-D |
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Complete Title: |
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nikola P. Kostich, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant-Respondent, v. Nikola P. Kostich, Respondent-Appellant. |
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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KOSTICH |
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Opinion Filed: |
December 21, 2010 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
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Source of Appeal: |
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Court: |
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County: |
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Judge: |
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Justices: |
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Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J. dissent (opinion
filed). |
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Not Participating: |
Prosser, J. did not participate. |
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Attorneys: |
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2010
WI 136
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly reprimanded with conditions.
¶1 PER
CURIAM. We review the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendations of Referee Christine Harris Taylor concluding that Attorney
Nikola P. Kostich engaged in unprofessional conduct in violation of the
rules of professional conduct. The
referee recommended a public reprimand and imposition of costs, which total $9,760.46
as of March 10, 2010. No appeal has been
filed in this matter. See SCR
22.17(2).[1]
¶2 We
approve the referee's findings and conclusions.
We consider a public reprimand barely adequate for the egregious
conflict of interest and therefore also impose the additional conditions as set
forth herein. We also order Attorney
Kostich to pay the costs of this proceeding.
¶3 Nikola
P. Kostich was admitted to the practice of law in
¶4 On
February 4, 2009, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a complaint
against Attorney Kostich alleging one count of professional misconduct related
to Attorney Kostich's decision to handle a criminal case in which he had a
conflict of interest. The referee
conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 15, 2009, and filed her report on
February 11, 2010. No appeal was pursued.
¶5 The
facts giving rise to this disciplinary matter are as follows. In 1965, when G.K. was 13 years old and in eighth
grade at St. Patrick's School in
¶6 In
late 1996 or early 1997 G.K. met with Attorney Kostich to explore the
possibility of bringing a civil action against Giannini. G.K. shared highly confidential information
with Attorney Kostich including specific information regarding the sexual
assaults. Attorney Kostich explained
that there might be a statute of limitations issue and stated he would research
that issue and get back to G.K. The
parties discussed attorney fees but no retainer agreement was signed. G.K. also authorized Attorney Kostich to
obtain medical records from G.K.'s therapist.
After the initial meeting Attorney Kostich sought additional details
about the abuse and obtained G.K.'s therapy records. In August 1997, after a second meeting with
G.K., Attorney Kostich advised G.K. that he would not take the case because he
believed the statute of limitations precluded a civil suit.
¶7 In
2006, after learning that Giannini's departure from the state of
¶8 On
January 9, 2007, Attorney Kostich appeared as attorney of record on behalf of
Giannini along with another attorney from
¶9 When
G.K. learned that Attorney Kostich was representing Giannini, he contacted Attorney
Kostich and objected to the representation on the basis of what he believed to
be Attorney Kostich's prior representation of him on the same matter. Attorney Kostich denied that he had any
conflict of interest in representing Giannini and refused to terminate his
representation of Giannini.
¶10 G.K.
filed a grievance against Attorney Kostich with the OLR. Attorney Kostich responded to the grievance in
a letter dated March 9, 2007, denying that he had ever represented G.K. or that
there was any conflict. He continued to
represent Giannini. Giannini
subsequently entered no contest pleas to both charges.
¶11 The
referee made a number of factual findings, ultimately finding that Attorney Kostich
did represent G.K. and concluding there was a clear conflict of interest with
respect to Attorney Kostich's representation of Giannini. These findings included the fact that Attorney Kostich knew
that G.K. ——identified as a victim by Giannini and in the criminal complaint——was
the same individual Attorney Kostich met with to discuss a possible civil case
against Giannini. Attorney Kostich had received
G.K.'s therapy records both when initially investigating the matter and then
later as part of the discovery materials obtained from the district attorney in
the Giannini criminal matter. The police
reports detailing the Giannini abuse investigation also indicated that G.K.
referred to Attorney Kostich as his attorney.
¶12 Attorney
Kostich testified that he reviewed the supreme court rules regarding conflicts
of interest and determined there was no conflict. He did not consider it necessary to obtain
written permission from G.K. to represent Giannini. The referee observed that Attorney Kostich
believed he met with G.K. out of professional courtesy and that was it. He did, however, acknowledge that he
considered retaining another attorney if it became necessary to cross-examine
G.K. in the Giannini criminal proceeding.
¶13 A
referee's findings of fact will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Kalal, 2002 WI 45, ¶23, 252
¶14 The
requirements of SCR 20:1.9 pertain to situations involving a conflict of
interest with a former client. SCR 20:1.9(a) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.
¶15 Attorney Kostich contended that he did not represent G.K. Attorney Kostich noted that no retainer
agreement was signed, no authorizations were signed at his office, no file was
created on behalf of G.K., and no notes were
taken during the initial meeting with G.K.
¶16 Whether an attorney-client relationship is created depends upon the
intent of the parties and is a question of fact. See, e.g., Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Hartford Specialty Co., 194
¶17 G.K.
reasonably believed that there was an attorney-client relationship with Attorney
Kostich when he shared highly confidential information about childhood sexual
assaults and other sensitive mental health information with Attorney Kostich
for the purpose of pursuing litigation against Giannini.
¶18 We agree with the referee's finding that G.K. was a former client of Attorney Kostich. As noted, SCR 20:1.9(a) provides that an attorney may not represent one client whose interests are materially adverse to the interests of a former client if the representation involves a matter that is the same or substantially related to the nature of the prior representation of the former client unless the former client consents in writing.
¶19 Attorney Kostich's former relationship with G.K. and his subsequent representation of Giannini were both adverse and substantially related. G.K. sought legal advice from Attorney Kostich regarding assaults committed by Giannini and whether he could pursue litigation against Giannini. Attorney Kostich then undertook to defend Giannini in a criminal matter in which she was prosecuted for the same assaults on G.K. There is no dispute that Attorney Kostich received G.K.'s therapy records sometime in 1997 or that Attorney Kostich later received substantially the same records as part of the discovery materials in the criminal case against Giannini. See ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.9 cmt. ("When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited." (Emphasis added).)
¶20 Attorney
Kostich certainly did not obtain G.K.'s consent to the later representation of
Giannini. Indeed, when G.K. learned that
Attorney Kostich was going to represent Giannini in the criminal charges
arising from the assaults, G.K. contacted Attorney Kostich and voiced his
objection to the representation, and Attorney Kostich refused to step down as
Giannini's attorney.
¶21 Thus,
the record evidence amply supports the referee's conclusion that by
representing Giannini on criminal charges in which G.K. was the victim, after
G.K. had consulted with Attorney Kostich about bringing a civil action against
Giannini for the same sexual assaults that were the subject of the criminal
proceedings, Attorney Kostich acted contrary to former and current SCR
20:1.9(a).[2]
¶22 We turn to the appropriate sanction for Attorney Kostich's misconduct. The referee noted that cases involving a violation of SCR 20:1.9(a) generally result in a private reprimand, public reprimand, or short-term suspension. See, e.g., Public Reprimand of Roger Merry, 1999-1; Public Reprimand of Russell Falkenberg, 1992-2. The referee also noted that in addition to the two prior public reprimands for unrelated conduct, Attorney Kostich "demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive when undertaking the representation of Gianinni [sic]."
¶23 Case law supports imposition of a public reprimand for cases involving a single conflict of interest. However, the conflict in this case was egregious. Attorney Kostich's failure to recognize that it was unethical for him to defend Giannini, who was being criminally prosecuted for abusing G.K., without obtaining G.K.'s consent in accordance with SCR 20:1.9(a), reflects a troubling lack of awareness of or attention to the rights of his clients or his responsibility as a lawyer to guard sensitive information with which he had been entrusted. This court believes that further precautions are necessary. Accordingly, in addition to the public reprimand we impose today, we also direct Attorney Kostich to complete, within 12 months of the date of this decision, ten credits of continuing legal education coursework approved for ethics. Failure to complete this ethics coursework may result in Attorney Kostich's suspension from the practice of law.
¶24 IT IS ORDERED that Nikola P. Kostich is publicly reprimanded.
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Nikola P. Kostich is directed to
complete ten ethics-approved continuing legal education credits within 12
months of the date of this order and to advise this court and the Office of
Lawyer Regulation of his compliance with this requirement within 12 months of
the date of this order. Failure to
comply with this condition may result in suspension of Nikola P. Kostich's
license to practice law in
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order,
Nikola P. Kostich shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of
this proceeding. If the costs are not
paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to this court of an
inability to pay the costs within this time, the license of Nikola P. Kostich
to practice law in
¶27 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent because I disagree
with my colleagues regarding the appropriate level of discipline to be imposed
in this matter. Generally, discipline is
progressive in nature. See, e.g.,
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, 296
¶29 For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
¶30 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.
[1] SCR 22.17(2) states:
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the matter to the referee for additional findings; and determine and impose appropriate discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order the parties to file briefs in the matter.
[2] Prior to July 1, 2007, SCR 20:1.9(a) stated that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not:
Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents in writing after consultation.
From July 1, 2007, to the present, SCR 20:1.9(a) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.