2010 WI 39
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Supreme Court of |
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Case No.: |
2007AP2617-D |
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Complete Title: |
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In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scott F. Anderson, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant-Appellant, v. Scott F. Anderson, Respondent-Respondent. |
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DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST |
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Opinion Filed: |
May 21, 2010 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
May 14, 2009 |
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Source of Appeal: |
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Court: |
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County: |
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Judge: |
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Justices: |
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Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Not Participating: |
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Attorneys: |
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For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Julie M. Scott on behalf of the Office
of Lawyer Regulation,
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Scott F. Anderson, and oral argument by Scott F. Anderson.
2010
WI 39
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
appeals the portion of Referee Jonathan V. Goodman's report recommending as
discipline for professional misconduct that Attorney Scott F. Anderson pay his
former client $10,872.50. Attorney
¶2 The OLR does not seek restitution or a monetary penalty, and
argues a 60-day license suspension should be imposed. Attorney
¶3 We uphold the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law that Attorney Anderson committed three counts of professional misconduct. We conclude the nature of his misconduct and Attorney Anderson's disciplinary history warrant a 60-day license suspension. We do not order a monetary penalty. We further conclude Attorney Anderson shall bear the cost of this proceeding.
¶4 Attorney Anderson was admitted to practice law in
¶5 In November 2007 the OLR filed a three-count disciplinary
complaint against Attorney Anderson alleging a lack of diligence and failures
in communication with his former client, E.T., Jr. E.T. had been charged with three felony drug
offenses and felon in possession of a firearm in
¶6 In May 2005 the
¶7 At Attorney Anderson's request, the
¶8 Because E.T. remained in jail, he was not in court on July 15, 2005, and Attorney Anderson did not advise E.T. what had occurred during the hearing. In August 2005 E.T. wrote to Attorney Anderson expressing concern with the lack of contact and failure to communicate the outcome of the July 15, 2005, hearing. E.T. requested to see Attorney Anderson immediately.
¶9 Attorney Anderson did not respond to E.T.'s letter and did not
contact him between August 5, 2005, and September 29, 2005. On September 20, 2005, Attorney Anderson
filed a notice of motion and motion to adjourn the September 26, 2005,
suppression hearing. The court adjourned
the suppression hearing until January 10, 2006.
Attorney
¶10 On November 29, 2005, E.T. filed a pro se bail reduction motion and
requested a hearing. Attorney
¶11 On January 18, 2006, Attorney Anderson appeared by telephone to
request another adjournment due to a trial in a different court. The matter was adjourned to January 20,
2006. E.T. remained in jail and did not
appear in court on January 18. Attorney
¶12 On January 20, 2006, Attorney Anderson moved to reduce bail,
stating grounds other than those provided in E.T.'s pro se motion. Attorney
¶13 Although E.T. was brought to court for the April 20, 2006, suppression hearing, the court adjourned the hearing due to time constraints. At the May 18, 2006, adjourned hearing, E.T. once again was in court but the suppression hearing was adjourned yet again, this time to September 21, 2006, due to a co-defendant's attorney's conflict.
¶14 On June 2, 2006, the court denied another bail reduction motion;
E.T. remained in jail and was not at the hearing. Attorney
¶15 With respect to contesting the forfeiture of more than $48,000 of
E.T.'s bank accounts and cash, the DEA notified E.T. on March 22 and April 5,
2005, that certain claims must be filed with the DEA's counsel by April 26,
2005, and others must be filed by May 10, 2005.
Attorney
¶16 On May 13, 2005, the DEA notified Attorney Anderson that because they were received after the April 26 deadline, E.T.'s notices regarding most of the seized assets were being returned. On June 3, 2005, Attorney Anderson filed a petition for remission regarding the rejected claims, but failed to provide E.T. with copies until December 2006.
¶17 On June 6, 2005, the DEA sent Attorney Anderson a second notice of its seizure of $8,946 cash belonging to E.T. To contest this forfeiture, the notice required E.T. to file a claim by July 11, 2005. On July 7, 2005, Attorney Anderson sent a notice contesting the forfeiture but it was not until December 2006 that he provided E.T. a copy of the DEA's notice or the filed claim. On July 29, 2005, the U.S. Attorney filed a notice for civil forfeiture, a complaint, and verification for the forfeiture of $8,946 in cash and $1,926.50 in a bank account belonging to E.T.
¶18 On August 5, 2005, E.T. wrote Attorney Anderson, complaining he had
not received copies of documents relating to the federal forfeiture
action. Attorney
¶19 On August 24, 2005, the forfeiture complaint was served upon
Attorney Anderson. Attorney
¶20 Attorney Anderson stipulated to three counts of misconduct arising from his representation of E.T.:
· Count One. Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.3[2] by failing to file claims timely and failing to take action on his client's behalf with regard to the Complaint for Civil Forfeiture filed on July 29, 2005, or the Motion for Default Judgment filed on October 18, 2005.
·
Count Two. Attorney
· Count Three. Attorney Anderson violated SCR 20:1.4(b)[4] by failing to explain to his client the effect of correspondence he received from the DEA and the U.S. Attorney's Notice of Complaint for Civil Forfeiture of Property, Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, Verification, Motion for Default Judgment, Judgment of Default and Forfeiture, and Application to Clerk for Entry of Judgment; failing to explain the implications of the assistant district attorney's May 4, 2005, letter; and failing to explain the implications of the State's dismissal of the Milwaukee County case, including that the case was dismissed due to the charges in federal court, and that Attorney Anderson's representation would not include representation with regard to the federal charges.
¶21 Because of Attorney
¶22 The referee observed Attorney Anderson admitted he mishandled the forfeiture. The referee considered that Attorney Anderson had fully cooperated with the OLR and showed contrition at the disciplinary hearing, but concluded these actions did not outweigh the harm to E.T., which was Attorney Anderson's fourth disciplinary proceeding involving similar supreme court rules in six years. The referee also noted that while subject to the disciplinary proceedings resulting in his 2005 public reprimand, Attorney Anderson was engaged in similar misconduct in this matter.
¶23 The referee recommended that Attorney Anderson be required to compensate E.T. within 365 days for the $10,872.50 forfeited by the DEA. The referee recommended that if Attorney Anderson would fail to make the payment, Attorney Anderson should remain obligated to make the payment and his license to practice law should be suspended for 60 days. The referee also recommended the full costs of this proceeding be imposed and, if Attorney Anderson would fail to pay the costs within 180 days, his license be suspended until costs are paid in full.
¶24 The OLR objects to the recommended stayed suspension dependent upon a monetary sanction. The OLR states it does not seek restitution of forfeited sums because the funds were not in Attorney Anderson's direct control. The OLR says the forfeited funds constitute incidental or consequential damages resulting from Attorney Anderson's misconduct, but claims that reimbursement fails to achieve the goals of attorney discipline. The OLR contends that a stayed suspension does not protect the public or legal system from further misconduct, nor would it impress upon Attorney Anderson the seriousness of his misconduct.
¶25 Attorney Anderson responds that the recommended sanction is a severe financial burden, but he does not challenge the amount. He argues his misconduct does not involve dishonesty and, therefore, a license suspension is not justified. He states he is painfully aware of the seriousness of his misconduct and requests the court impose the referee's recommended sanction.[5]
¶26 A referee's findings of fact will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248
¶27 We adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Attorney Anderson's professional misconduct. We do not adopt the referee's recommendation as to discipline. We conclude Attorney Anderson's disciplinary history and the nature of his misconduct warrant a 60-day license suspension.[6]
¶28 Contrary to Attorney Anderson's suggestion, not all cases imposing
a license suspension involve dishonesty.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Whitnall, 230
¶29 We are not persuaded a monetary penalty would satisfy the
objectives of attorney discipline.
Attorney
¶30 The OLR does not seek restitution and the record lacks documentary evidence as to the source of the forfeited funds; we decline to order compensation to the client in this instance.
¶31 We order Attorney Anderson to pay the costs of this proceeding
within 90 days of the date of this order.
Under SCR 22.24(1m),[7]
the court's general policy is to impose costs on the respondent. To award less than full costs, the court must
find "extraordinary circumstances."
¶32 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Scott F. Anderson to practice law
in
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 90 days of the date of this
order, Scott F. Anderson pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of
this proceeding. If costs are not paid
within the time specified and absent a showing of his inability to pay the
costs, Scott F. Anderson's license to practice law in
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott F. Anderson shall comply with SCR
22.26 regarding the duties of a person whose license to practice law in
[1] In 2005 Attorney Anderson was publicly reprimanded
for violations of SCR 20:1.3, former SCR 20:1.4(a), former SCR 20:1.5(b), and
SCR 20:1.16(a)(3). Public Reprimand of
Scott F. Anderson, No. 2005-06. In 2004
Attorney Anderson was publicly reprimanded for misconduct in three cases,
including violations of former SCR 20:1.4(a), SCR 20:1.4(b), SCR 20:1.3, and
SCR 20:3.4(c). Public Reprimand of Scott
F. Anderson, No. 2004-05. In 1999
Attorney Anderson received a private reprimand for violations of former SCR 20:1.4(a)
and SCR 20:1.3. Private Reprimand of
Scott F. Anderson, No. 1999-13.
[2] SCR 20:1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
[3] Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) provided, "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."
[4] SCR 20:1.4(b) provides, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
[5] Subsequent
to oral argument, the clerk of court received an unsolicited letter from an
attorney who wished to convey to the court his thoughts regarding this
disciplinary matter. The attorney
attached to his letter copies of court records in E.T.'s federal
prosecution. Attorney
We sustain the OLR's objection. This court does not find facts, but rather
reaches its conclusion based on the record made before the referee. See
[6] Because
the stipulation was not entered into pursuant to SCR 22.12, additional
proceedings are not required when the court rejects the recommended
sanction. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Peterson, 2006 WI 41, ¶10, 290
[7] SCR 22.24(1m) reads, in part:
The court's general policy is that upon a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, including the expenses of counsel for the office of lawyer regulation, upon the respondent. In cases involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of costs imposed upon a respondent. . . .
[8] On May 27, 2009, the OLR filed a statement seeking costs of $5,863.96.