2009 WI 75
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Supreme Court of |
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Case No.: |
2006AP2933 |
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Complete Title: |
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Kara Horst and Jonathan Horst, by his Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, v. Deere & Company, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Respondent. |
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REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2008 WI App 65 Reported at: 312 (Ct. App. 2008-Published) |
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Opinion Filed: |
July 14, 2009 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
February 3, 2009
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Source of Appeal: |
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Court: |
Circuit |
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County: |
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Judge: |
Annette K. Ziegler
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Justices: |
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Concurred: |
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed). PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the concurrence. |
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Dissented: |
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. |
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Not Participating: |
ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. |
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Attorneys: |
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For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioners there were briefs
filed by John C. Cabaniss and Cabaniss Law,
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Michael L. Zaleski and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison; Lars E. Gulbrandsen and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee; and James Brogan, Nancy Rappaport, and DLA Piper US LLP, Philadelphia, Pa., and oral argument by Michael L. Zaleski.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, III and the Law Offices William C. Gleiser,
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball,
2009 WI 75
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification. The final version will
appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
REVIEW
of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.
¶1 MICHAEL
J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a
published decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the
Washington County Circuit Court, Annette K. Ziegler, Judge.[1] After a jury trial, the circuit court
rejected Plaintiffs' negligence and strict products liability personal injury
claims. Plaintiffs moved for a new
trial, challenging the accuracy of the jury instructions on the strict products
liability claim. The circuit court
concluded that the jury was properly instructed and denied the motion for a new
trial. The court of appeals affirmed.
¶2 The
jury instructions were based on Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 3260 with a
supplemental statement regarding bystander claims. The jury was informed that a bystander
personal injury claim in strict products liability is only available if the
product is unreasonably dangerous based on the expectations of an ordinary user
or consumer (the "consumer contemplation test"). Plaintiffs claim that this jury instruction
was an incorrect statement of the law.
They contend that when a product is dangerous only to a bystander and
not to a user or consumer, the consumer contemplation test is inappropriate. Rather, the jury should be instructed that a
product is unreasonably dangerous based on the contemplation and expectations
of an ordinary bystander. They call this
a "bystander contemplation test," and assert that this is and should
be the law in
¶3 Thus,
the main question before us is whether
¶4 We
hold that the consumer contemplation test, and not a bystander contemplation
test, governs all strict products liability claims in
I.
BACKGROUND
¶5 The
facts of this case are horrific. On the
afternoon of May 2, 2004, the Horst family returned home from an overnight trip
to Wisconsin Dells. Two-year-old
Jonathan and his older brother went to play outside in the yard. Jonathan's mother, Kara, was planning to
watch Jonathan as she hung laundry on an outdoor clothesline, but stopped to
use the restroom first. Before Kara
arrived outside, Jonathan's father Michael decided to mow the lawn using their
John Deere LT160 riding lawn mower. As
Michael began to cut the lawn, he decided to mow in reverse along the rear of
the house, looking over his right shoulder.
Jonathan, however, had moved behind the lawn mower to Michael's left,
out of Michael's line of sight. As
Michael proceeded backwards, he saw Jonathan's shoe come out the other
side. Michael screamed, realizing that
he had severed both of Jonathan's feet.
Kara called 911, and Jonathan was flown to Children's Hospital. There he received multiple surgeries, and now
wears prosthetics on both legs.
¶6 The
John Deere LT160 mower Michael was using came equipped with a no-mow-in-reverse
safety feature that stops both the engine and mower blades when an operator
begins to travel in reverse while the mower blades are engaged. However, the lawn mower also had what amounts
to an override feature, the Reverse Implement Option ("
¶7 To
implement the RIO feature, an operator must depress the brake pedal and press
the
¶8 Michael
Horst engaged the
¶9 The
LT160 lawn mower operator's manual contained numerous warnings relating to
mowing in reverse and mowing in the presence of children or bystanders. The warnings included the following:
·
Before
backing up, stop mower blades or attachments and look down and behind the
machine carefully, especially for children.
·
CAUTION:
Avoid injury! Children or bystanders may
be injured by runover [sic] and rotating blades. Before backing up, carefully check the area
around the machine.
·
NOTE:
Backing up while the mower is engaged is strongly discouraged.
·
The
Reverse Implement Option should be used only when operating another implement
(attachment) or when the operator deems it necessary to reposition the machine
with the mower engaged.
The parties agree that Michael read
but disregarded these warnings, choosing to mow in reverse in the presence of
his young children.
¶10 Following
the accident, the Horsts filed a lawsuit against Deere & Company
("Deere") in Washington County Circuit Court, bringing negligence and
strict products liability claims. On the
strict products liability claim, the Horsts argued that designing a mower to
operate in reverse is unreasonably dangerous and that the mower should have had
an alternative design. The Horsts
asserted that the lawn mower should not have been equipped with the
¶11 Deere
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the "consumer contemplation
test" barred Jonathan's strict products liability claim. The circuit court denied the motion for
summary judgment. It concluded that
while bystanders injured by unreasonably dangerous products may recover under Howes
v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) (hereafter "Howes I"),
the question of whether the product was unreasonably dangerous and whether
punitive damages should be awarded were issues of fact for the jury.
¶12 At
trial, the Horsts requested that Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 3260, which
does not mention bystanders, be supplemented to reflect the availability of
recovery for bystanders. They
specifically proposed that the instruction include the phrase "or
bystander" following most occurrences of "user" and
"consumer" in the standard instruction. The circuit court denied the Horsts' proposed
instructions, choosing to give the standard instructions supplemented with the
following statement: "The law in
¶13 The
Horsts also requested a special verdict question asking the jury: "Do you
find from the evidence that the subject lawn tractor, when it left the hands of
Defendant, Deere & Company, was in a defective condition so as to be
unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user/consumer or bystander?" The circuit court denied this request and
submitted the question to the jury without the "or bystander"
language.[3]
¶14 The
jury ultimately found both Michael and Kara Horst, but not Deere, negligent in
the injury to their son, Jonathan. The
jury also found that the lawn mower in question was not in a defective
condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user or
consumer. Accordingly, Deere was not
strictly liable for Jonathan's injuries.
¶15 After
the jury verdict, the Horsts moved for a new trial on the grounds that the jury
was improperly instructed. The circuit
court concluded that the instruction was in accord with the facts and existing
case law, and thus was not prejudicial.
The circuit court therefore denied the motion for a new trial and
dismissed the Horsts' claims with prejudice.
¶16 The
Horsts filed a notice of appeal with the court of appeals, and also filed a
petition to bypass with this court, which was denied. On its review, the court of appeals agreed
with the circuit court, concluding that the consumer contemplation test is the
proper test for unreasonably dangerous products, and that the jury instructions
constituted an accurate statement of the law.
Horst v. Deere & Co., 2008 WI App 65, ¶20, 312
II.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
¶17 This
case asks us to evaluate the sufficiency of the circuit court's jury
instructions. Generally, "a trial
court has broad discretion when instructing a jury." White v. Leeder, 149
¶18 If
the jury instructions were an erroneous statement of the law, a new trial will
be ordered only if the court's error "affected the substantial rights of
the party."
III.
DISCUSSION
¶19 This
case is a dispute over both what the law is——that is, what
¶20 To
address these questions, we first, in subsection A (¶¶21-31), briefly introduce
the development of and theory behind strict products liability and the consumer
contemplation test. In subsection B
(¶¶32-35), we explain the proposed bystander contemplation test as proffered by
the Horsts. In subsection C (¶¶36-67),
we review the significant cases relied on by the parties. Finally, in subsection D (¶¶68-81), we
analyze and answer the ultimate question before us——whether the consumer
contemplation test is the proper standard for determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous when a bystander is injured.
A. Strict
Products Liability and The Consumer Contemplation
Test
¶21 Historically,
with the exception of the sale of food, a supplier of a product was generally
not liable for injuries caused by that product without a showing of negligence
or privity of contract. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (hereafter "§ 402A") cmt. b
(1965).[5] This began to change in the 1950s and 1960s
as courts developed theories of liability, often based on warranty-like
concepts, to hold manufacturers or sellers liable for injuries even without
negligence or privity of contract. See
id. (describing some of the early decisions as displaying
"considerable ingenuity in evolving more or less fictitious theories of
liability to fit the case"). There
was, in short, a growing recognition that consumers needed protection from
defective products that caused harm to consumers or their property. See id.
¶22 In
the early 1960s, during this same time, the American Law Institute was drafting
what became the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The Restatement (Second) attempted to capture this emerging line of
cases by creating a new category of tort claims——strict products
liability——which it set forth in the newly created § 402A. Although strict products liability was still
in its intellectual infancy, § 402A was remarkably influential in speeding
the adoption of this emerging area of law in courts around the country. See Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1711 (2003); George W.
Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the Third
Restatement Languished, 26 Rev. Litig. 799, 808-09 (2007). We joined this trend and adopted § 402A
in 1967 in Dippel v. Sciano, 37
¶23 This
strict products liability structure, whereby a manufacturer bears the costs for
injuries resulting from product use, even when the manufacturer was not
negligent, arose for at least three important policy reasons.
¶24 First,
strict products liability serves as a cost shifter. See § 402A cmt. c. It takes the usually overwhelming cost of
injury off of the injured person and places it on the manufacturer. The manufacturer generally passes the costs
for injuries and preventative safety measures on to all consumers through
higher product prices. This liability
system, then, spreads the cost of the injury risk to all consumers.
¶25 A
second rationale underpinning strict products liability is fundamental fairness
to the injured person.
¶26 Finally,
a third reason for strict products liability is that it provides a strong
incentive for deterrence. Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereafter "Restatement
(Third)") § 2 cmt. a (1998). When a
manufacturer can reasonably prevent an injury, strict products liability gives
them a strong incentive to do so. This
litigation threat promotes manufacturer investment in safer designs, quality
control, and the furnishing of adequate warnings to the purchasers and users of
products.
¶27 Strict
products liability is not, however, absolute liability. Howes I, 56
¶28 Section 402A
describes what has been called the "consumer contemplation test" for
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Comment g explains that a manufacturer is
strictly liable "only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
§ 402A cmt. g. Similarly,
comment i states that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
¶29 One
of the implications of the consumer contemplation test is that consumers can
and do contemplate open and obvious dangers, and are not protected when injured
by such dangers. See id.
cmt. j (warnings are not required "when the danger, or potentiality of
danger, is generally known and recognized"); Tanner v. Shoupe, 228
Wis. 2d 357, 367, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In order
for a defective design to render a product unreasonably dangerous, the defect
must be hidden from the ordinary consumer, that is, not an open and obvious
defect."). Consumers are also not
protected if they proceed in the face of a known, though not open and obvious, danger. See § 402A cmt. n ("If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by
it, he is barred from recovery.").
Thus a manufacturer may be able to avoid liability under § 402A by
making consumers aware of dangers through warnings or simply by virtue of
selling a product with open and obvious dangers.
¶30 Section 402A
is explicitly neutral as to whether persons other than users or consumers
should be able to recover under strict products liability.
Thus
far the courts . . . have not gone beyond allowing recovery
to users and consumers . . . . Casual bystanders, and
others who may come in contact with the product, as in the case of employees of
the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle, or a pedestrian
hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery. There may be no essential reason why such
plaintiffs should not be brought within the scope of the protection afforded,
other than that they do not have the same reasons for expecting such protection
as the consumer who buys a marketed product.
In relatively short order, however, courts around the country
did extend protection to injured bystanders.
See Peter Zablotsky, Eliminating Proximate Cause As An Element
of the Prima Facie Case For Strict Products Liability, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev.
31, n.79 (1995). This court extended
such protection in Howes I, which is discussed below.
¶31 No
one in the case at bar disputes that bystanders may recover if a product is
unreasonably dangerous. The issue in
this case is the proper legal standard for determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous when a bystander is injured.
B. The Proposed Bystander
Expectations Test
¶32 The
Horsts argue that the jury instructions in this case, which asked whether the
lawn mower was unreasonably dangerous based on the expectations of the ordinary
user or consumer, were incorrect as a matter of law. They maintain that the law in
¶33 The
bystander contemplation test asks exactly the same question as the consumer
contemplation test, but replaces the expectations of the user or consumer with
the expectations of an ordinary bystander.
Accordingly, the Horsts assert that "when a bystander is injured by
a product, the question is whether the product was as reasonably safe as an
ordinary bystander would contemplate or expect, not whether the user or
consumer understood and appreciated the risk." Like the consumer contemplation test, the
bystander contemplation test is an objective test and not dependent on an injured
party's knowledge.
¶34 The
bystander contemplation test, according to the Horsts, applies when a bystander
is injured and "where a manufacturer designs and sells a product that
poses a unique risk of bodily harm to bystanders alone." They submit that the consumer contemplation
test is still proper when a bystander is injured and when the danger is present
for both the user or consumer and the bystander.
¶35 The
Horsts further contend that the bystander contemplation test is not only the
law, but that it is necessary to provide meaningful protection to
bystanders. They argue that bystanders
need greater protections than users and consumers because they have less
information about the product, and less access to warnings and
instructions. They also point to the
language in Howes I (which extended protection to bystanders injured by
unreasonably dangerous products), stating that "[t]here is no essential
difference between the injured user or consumer and the injured
bystander." 56
C. Prior
¶36 The
Horsts argue that the bystander contemplation test is the law in
¶37 Deere,
on the other hand, points to the standard jury instructions as well as our
prior decisions in Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) and Green to argue that, while
bystanders may recover if injured by an unreasonably dangerous product, the
consumer contemplation test applies in all strict products liability cases.[9]
¶38 Therefore,
we will briefly discuss the principal cases cited by the parties and the
arguments offered for each.
1. Howes I[10]
¶39 Two-year-old
Richard
Howes II[11]
("Richard") lived with his parents in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin in a
two-family dwelling owned by neighbor Naomi Schatzman. Howes I,
56
¶40 After
acknowledging
that our prior decision in Dippel only allowed users and consumers to
recover, the court chose to extend coverage to bystanders, holding that a
manufacturer is strictly liable "when he places a defective article on the
market 'that causes injury to a human being.'"
¶41 The
court extended protection because the rationale supporting protection for users
and consumers was equally applicable to bystanders. See Howes I,
56
¶42 The Horsts
claim that Howes I is
dispositive, and suggest that we cannot legitimately reconcile a rejection of
their proposed bystander contemplation test with this case.
¶43 Deere, on
the other hand, concedes that Howes I allows an injured bystander to
pursue a strict products liability claim, but disputes that it creates or
adopts a bystander contemplation test.
Deere points out that the case contains no language indicating that the
question of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in bystander cases is
evaluated from the perspective of the ordinary bystander. Howes I merely holds, according
to Deere, that a manufacturer may be strictly liable in tort when he places a
defective article on the market that causes an injury to any human being,
including bystanders. The case did not,
Deere contends, modify the test for whether the product was
defective/unreasonably dangerous.
¶44 We
acknowledge the broad language Howes I occasionally uses, especially the
statement that there is "no essential difference between the injured user
or consumer and the injured bystander."
¶45 In
short, Howes I did not purport to address a proposition
greater than the legal question before that court. Our holding today, rejecting a bystander
contemplation test, leaves intact and indeed reaffirms the basic holding of Howes I:
Bystanders injured by an unreasonably dangerous product may assert a strict
products liability claim against the manufacturer or seller.
2. Howes II[13]
¶46 Following
the decision in Howes I, all other defendants except Deere settled out
of court. Howes II, 71
¶47 The
Horsts find this case especially pertinent because of the language used in the
special verdict question, asking whether the product was "defective
in design so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a bystander?" This special verdict question was nearly
identical to the Horsts' proposed special verdict question that was denied by
the trial court.
¶48 Deere counters that the court in Howes
II did not consider or analyze the propriety of the special verdict
question. Rather, the case was reversed
because of the trial court's erroneous decision requiring plaintiffs to choose
between strict products liability and negligence theories of liability.
¶49 In
Howes II, the special verdict question was admittedly almost identical
to the Horsts'
proposed special verdict question. But
the special verdict question was not affirmed or intentionally addressed by the
court. We also do not know how the trial
court instructed the jury to determine whether the product was unreasonably
dangerous.[14] On this point, which is the central question
we address today, Howes II is no more helpful or determinative than Howes
I.
3. Vincer[15]
¶50 In
July of 1970, two-year-old Curt Vincer was visiting his grandparents' house
when he fell into the unsupervised swimming pool in their backyard. Vincer, 69
¶51 Curt
(through his guardian ad litem) and his parents sued the swimming pool company
and the company that sold and installed the pool.
Thus,
the test in
¶52 This
court ultimately found that the dangers inherent in a swimming pool were
obvious, and that the average consumer would be completely aware of the risk of
harm to unsupervised small children when a ladder for the pool is left in a
down position.
¶53 The
Horsts contend that Vincer does not stand for the proposition that the
consumer contemplation test is applicable in all § 402A cases. They argue that Vincer is not a
bystander injury case at all, much less one where the product poses a risk of
harm to bystanders alone. Rather, the
danger in Vincer was the same for everyone, and therefore the consumer
contemplation test was appropriate. In
any event, the Horsts contend use of the bystander contemplation test would
have yielded the same result.
¶54 Deere
argues that this case is far weightier than the Horsts would like to
admit. They submit that this is a
bystander injury case in which this court explicitly adopted and applied the
consumer contemplation test, decisively confirming it as the proper standard
for
¶55 We
need not decide whether Vincer is a bystander case. It
may be that the injured child in Vincer was a "user" of the pool
by virtue of being in the pool when the injury occurred. On the other hand, § 402A explains that a
user "includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit
of the product" (§
402A cmt. l), and it is self-evident that the drowning two-year-old was
neither using the pool for its intended purpose nor enjoying the benefit of the
pool. However the Vincer case is construed, it is clear that
it
strongly supports the notion that even when the injured person is not an
ordinary user or consumer (which the child surely is not), the consumer contemplation test,
which looks at the expectations of the ordinary adult user or consumer, is the
framework under which a product's defectiveness is to be governed. We do not vary the test depending on the
status of the injured person.
4. Komanekin[16]
¶56 In
this case from the Eastern District of Wisconsin, five-year-old
Jamie Komanekin was severely injured by a propane delivery truck that had come to his home. Komanekin, 819 F. Supp. at
804-05. While playing unsupervised,
Jamie somehow snagged his clothing near the connection to the pump, getting his
arms tangled in the rotating drive-shaft of the truck's pumping system.
¶57 The
Komanekins sued a number of companies involved in the manufacture and assembly
of the pumping system device that was attached to the propane delivery
truck.
¶58 In
its opinion, the Eastern District of Wisconsin described the injured child as a
bystander, and rightly stated that he may assert a strict products liability
claim just like a user or consumer under Howes I.
In a
bystander case, presumably, a product is unreasonably dangerous if it presents
dangers not apparent to the ordinary bystander.
Thus, a product not unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or
consumer might well be unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary bystander.
¶59 Though
not a decision of this court, the Horsts highlight this case because the Komanekin
court used a bystander contemplation test, concluding that it was the logical
outgrowth of Howes I.
¶60 Deere
counters that the court's analysis was dicta, and in any event, the court's use
of "presumably" shows a hesitance and lack of clarity regarding the
proper test.
¶61 The
court in Komanekin clearly did apply a bystander contemplation test, but
in our reading, did so without any analysis or consideration of the
implications of such an approach. The
court erred in assuming that because bystanders can recover, the perspective of
the ordinary bystander should control. Howes I
does not compel this conclusion, and we reject it.
5. Green[17]
¶62 Plaintiff
Linda M. Green filed suit when she suffered injuries from allergic reactions to
the proteins in latex medical gloves manufactured by Smith and Nephew AHP, Inc.
("S & N"). Green
alleged that S & N should be held strictly liable for her injuries. Green, 245
¶63 Our review addressed two
evidentiary questions and, more importantly for our purposes here, whether the
jury was properly instructed that the consumer contemplation test is (and
should be) the law for strict products liability cases in
¶64 The
Horsts acknowledge that Green reaffirmed
¶65 Deere
counters that Green's broad holding is applicable here. The court unambiguously stated that the
consumer contemplation test "and only the consumer-contemplation
test" applies "in all strict products liability cases."
¶66 In
our view, the analysis in Green is instructive, though not
determinative. The Horsts are correct
that the facts in Green did not involve bystanders, and thus, we cannot
say that Green answers the question before us today. That said, we were well aware when we decided
Green in 2001 that bystanders can recover in strict products liability.[18] Yet, the opinion made no concession and left
no room for exceptions to the rule that the expectations of the consumer or
user guide the determination of whether the product was defective/unreasonably
dangerous.
6. Case Law Conclusion
¶67 This
review leads us to the conclusion that while the language in these prior cases
is suggestive, no Wisconsin Supreme Court case directly answers the question
before us.[19] Our holding today clarifies the law related
to the consumer contemplation test; it impinges on no precedent and does not
require us to overturn or modify the holding of any prior cases.
D. The Consumer Contemplation Test Governs All Strict Products Liability Cases.
¶68 We
reject the proposed bystander contemplation test and reiterate that the
consumer contemplation test is the proper standard for all strict products
liability cases.
¶69 At
its root, the bystander contemplation test is inherently unworkable. While an ordinary consumer or user of a
product can be said to have some objective expectations regarding a product,
the same cannot be said of bystanders.
The consumer contemplation test was developed in recognition of the fact
that it is reasonable for users and consumers of products to hold certain
expectations regarding the products they use and the products they buy. See Rebecca Korzec, Dashing
Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer
Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 232 (1997)
("[T]he consumer expectations test is the natural, logical outgrowth of
strict products liability as the extension of implied warranty law."). Thus, the concept of an "ordinary
consumer" has some reasonably objective content. But bystanders may have no familiarity with a
product. This is especially so in
complex design defect cases. What does a
bystander expect of the technical design and reasonably available safety
features of a product he or she does not buy, does not use, and may not even be
aware of?
¶70 In
addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern who an
"ordinary" bystander is and what they know. To illustrate, if a bystander is injured by a
combine on a farm, is the "ordinary" bystander a neighboring farmer
or a life-long urbanite who cannot tell you what a combine does?[20] In short, the notion of an "ordinary
bystander" is a concept without content.
¶71 One
of the basic requirements of a coherent legal test is that it offer a framework
for analyzing claims that provides some measure of predictability. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989)
("Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the
means of knowing what it prescribes."). Predictability is important in the
law because it allows citizens and businesses to shape their behavior
accordingly.
¶72 This
is particularly important in strict products liability, where one of the main
purposes is to incentivize manufacturers to research and implement safer
designs. If a manufacturer cannot
predict with some degree of accuracy when its product is and is not unreasonably
dangerous, it will not be able to efficiently adopt appropriate safety
precautions. This uncertainty may lead
some manufacturers to needlessly remove useful products from the market. The bystander contemplation test would move
our state further away from the goal of an efficient deterrent effect on
manufacturers by creating unpredictability.
Manufacturers and all members of the business community need the ability
to anticipate how their choices will be adjudicated in a court of law. Because it does not provide the requisite
predictability, the bystander contemplation test fails this basic measure of a
legal test.
¶73 Although
noted earlier, it is important to emphasize that strict products liability is
not absolute liability. And a bystander
contemplation test comes dangerously close to absolute liability by adopting an
amorphous, ambiguous, and standard-less test that effectively gives a jury the
power to find a manufacturer liable under almost any conceivable fact
situation. This would impose huge and
unjustified burdens on businesses (and through businesses, consumers as
well). That is not what strict products
liability is about, and that is not where we will take it.
¶74 Another
problem with the bystander contemplation test is that it changes the focus from
the product to the injured party, creating discordant results. A bystander contemplation test would in
effect create different levels of duty for strict products liability purposes,
blurring the line between negligence and strict products liability. Manufacturers would owe a certain level of
duty to the user or consumer, and a different, likely higher level of duty to a
bystander. This is true because a jury
could plausibly find a bystander to have higher expectations with respect to
the safety and design features of a product than the user or consumer of that
same product. This opens the door to a
jury finding the same product unreasonably dangerous under some circumstances,
but not others, depending on who was injured.
Under the Horsts' scheme, a manufacturer could be strictly liable if its
product causes injury to a bystander, but not be strictly liable if a consumer
suffers the same injury from the same product.
Strict products liability, particularly design defect cases, should
ensure that products are not unreasonably dangerous, not create
different levels of duty and incongruous liability, depending on who is
injured.
¶75 The
Horsts' suggested application of the bystander contemplation test is equally
puzzling. They argue it applies only
when the threat of injury is to a bystander alone. It is difficult to conceive of a situation
where a product is dangerous to a bystander, yet poses no danger to a user or
consumer. The Horsts say that is the
case here, but surely there is some danger to the user of a riding lawn mower
who is driving in reverse. Undoubtedly,
the risk of danger is much lower than the danger of running over an
unsuspecting child, but it does exist.
This means that, under the Horsts' proposal, the bystander contemplation
test would not be appropriate here, and may never be.
¶76 Perhaps
the Horsts do not mean to suggest a danger must be to bystanders
"alone" for the bystander contemplation test to apply. It may be that merely a greater risk of
danger to the bystander should trigger application of the bystander
contemplation test. But this approach
would likely require a legal and factual determination by the judge before
instructing the jury as to whether the danger posed by a product is greater to
bystanders than to users or consumers.[21] It is not clear how a judge would make such a
determination or what procedures he or she would use. It seems that if a bystander contemplation
test were adopted, it ought to govern whenever a bystander is injured, avoiding
any sort of early judicial fact-finding as to the potential danger posed by a
product.[22] This, however, is not what the Horsts
propose.
¶77 The
Horsts also argue in their brief that if we reject their proposed test, we
"completely eliminate[] any duty owed by manufacturers to bystanders in
cases where the risk of bodily injury is unique to bystanders." It is true that under our holding today,
where a product is not unreasonably dangerous based on the expectations of the
ordinary user or consumer, the bystander does not receive additional
protections. But if a product is
unreasonably dangerous in light of the expectations of the ordinary user or
consumer and a bystander is injured, a strict products liability claim remains
available. In addition, the Horsts
ignore the availability of recovery under negligence. They are understandably dissatisfied with
that avenue of recovery because the jury considered it in this case, and found
that Jonathan's parents, and not John Deere, were negligent in the tragic
injury to Jonathan.
¶78 Additionally,
a user or consumer's expectations regarding a product will often include safety
expectations relating to bystanders.
That is, users and consumers do not just have expectations regarding
their own safety; they expect that a product will be reasonably safe for
bystanders as well. Juries can certainly
take this into account in their deliberations and evaluation of whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous.[23]
¶79 The
Horsts also argue that our holding today impermissibly delegates the duty to
make a product safe to the user or consumer.
But this is begging the question; it assumes a product is unreasonably
dangerous. If a product is not unreasonably
dangerous (based on consumer expectations), the user or consumer has no duty to
make the product safe for bystanders because, by definition, it is sufficiently
safe for strict products liability purposes.
Users and consumers simply have a duty to use the potentially, but not
unreasonably dangerous product with the appropriate standard of care toward
their fellow citizens, as they do in all of life.
¶80 Finally,
even if we accept the Horsts' proposed test, we have difficulty seeing how an
ordinary bystander's contemplation (to the extent it exists) would be
significantly different than a consumer's contemplation in this case.[24] Everyone is aware that a lawn mower is very
dangerous. While a bystander may or may
not be aware or expect a lawn mower to go in reverse, a bystander would
certainly know that it is dangerous to allow an unsupervised two-year-old child
to play in the yard while it is being mowed.[25] The risks here are known to all people,
including bystanders. The jury confirmed
this in finding that Jonathan's parents were the negligent actors. To argue that a bystander is less aware of
the very real dangers present here strains credulity.
¶81 This
truly was a tragic injury, but we cannot simply invent legal theories to make
the manufacturer pay for the injuries.
This was a horrible accident caused by the negligent use of the lawn
mower and negligent supervision of the boy by his parents. At the end of the day, as has been noted
elsewhere in a case involving almost precisely the same legal claims, a lawn
mower is a lawn mower[26]——it
is dangerous, and accidents happen. A
bystander contemplation test is a creative, but ultimately unsupported, unwise,
and unfair attempt to create liability where none exists.
IV.
CONCLUSION
¶82 We
hold that the consumer contemplation test, and not a bystander contemplation
test, governs all strict products liability claims in
By the Court.—The decision of the court of
appeals is affirmed.
¶83 ANNETTE
K. ZIEGLER, J. did not participate.
¶84 N.
PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring). I join the majority opinion, but I write
separately in response to Justice Gableman's concurrence, in which he urges the
adoption of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) in
design defect cases. Justice Gableman's
concurrence, ¶104. In the briefing that
was provided for this case, references to § 2(b) were made in passing in
three places. There are two footnotes in
the petitioners' reply brief, one of which refers to the rationale underlying
§ 2(b), cmt. 1. and suggests that it supports a bystander contemplation
test, and one of which suggests that the risk-utility test would be appropriate
in bystander cases, though inappropriate in consumer cases. (At oral argument, the Horsts' attorney
stated, "I didn't argue for the adoption of a risk-utility
test." See Justice Bradley's
dissent, ¶130 n.1.) There is also a
paragraph in a non-party brief where amicus argues that as to the bystander
question the case would come out the same under either the Restatement (Second)
or Restatement (Third) because neither treats the bystander's expectations
differently from the ordinary consumer's expectations.
¶85 These
glancing references to Restatement (Third) provide an exceedingly flimsy basis
for reaching the question of whether the court should adopt § 2(b) in
design defect cases. Because any
consideration of such a fundamental change in Wisconsin law should not be done
without a full and thorough briefing followed by oral arguments before this
court, I believe we should decline to reach beyond the controversy the parties
ask us to resolve, which in this case is whether
¶86 I
therefore respectfully concur.
¶87 MICHAEL
J. GABLEMAN, J. (concurring). I write separately because this case
highlights some of the serious deficiencies with our current approach, the
"nearly universally reviled"[28]
consumer contemplation test, to determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous in design defect products liability cases. As the majority opinion makes clear, a
bystander contemplation test is not the answer.
Rather, I believe it is time for this court to adopt the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereafter "Restatement (Third)")
§ 2(b) (1998) in design defect cases.
My purpose here is not to make a comprehensive case for the adoption of
the Restatement (Third).[29] My goal instead is to examine some of the
numerous reasons I believe this court should reconsider its adherence to the
consumer contemplation test, reasons that this case brings to the fore.
¶88 The
Restatement (Third) is simply a more appropriate framework for meeting the
needs of
I.
BACKGROUND
¶89 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (hereafter
"§ 402A"), which
¶90 Section
402A was not drafted to address the design defect line of cases. See Introduction to Restatement
(Third).
It was instead written to address what came to be classified as manufacturing defect cases. See Douglas
A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700,
1713-14 (2003). The consumer contemplation test in
§ 402A was therefore formulated to respond to manufacturing defect
cases——where, despite quality control mechanisms in place, a product was not
made or did not function according to its design specifications.
¶91 It
was not until after § 402A was published in 1965 that litigation over
defects in design was addressed by experts and commentators. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. &
Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of
Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 874, 890-91 (2002)
("[C]ases
involving conscious design decisions did not become common until the early
1970s."). Courts soon realized that
the consumer contemplation test, which followed naturally from manufacturing
defect cases, did not work as well for design defect cases. Id. at 891 ("[M]any courts
quickly realized that using a consumer expectations test in design defect cases
presents implications significantly different from those involved in applying
the test to manufacturing-defect cases."); Restatement (Third) § 1
cmt. a.
¶92 Hence,
courts began to move away from the consumer contemplation test in design defect
cases and adopt some form of a risk-utility test. The Restatement (Third) § 2(b),
published in 1998, identified and captured this shift in approach. It provides that a product is defective in
design when the "foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . .
. and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe." Assessing whether a product
is reasonably safe and whether a reasonable alternative design should have been
adopted requires a "risk-utility" test that balances the costs and
benefits of various design alternatives.[31]
II.
A
NEW FRAMEWORK IS NEEDED
¶93 The
consumer contemplation test as an independent test in design defect cases has
been roundly, consistently, and justifiably criticized by commentators. Restatement (Third) § 2(b) cmt. d. One scholar, Douglas Kysar, calls the
consumer contemplation test "a doctrine nearly universally reviled but
stubbornly and inexplicably persistent."
Kysar, supra, at 1701. By
the 1980s, he explains, "a consensus view among products liability
scholars emerged that the consumer expectations test was both indefensible in
theory and unworkable in practice."
¶94
¶95 One
of the major criticisms of the consumer contemplation test is that it is an
exceedingly vague standard for design defect cases.[34] See W. Page Keeton, Prosser &
Keeton on Torts § 99, 699 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing how the consumer
contemplation test "can be utilized to explain most any result that a
court or jury chooses to reach").
As one treatise explains:
A[n] . . . especially
problematic aspect of the consumer contemplation test lies in the vagueness of
consumer expectations in many contexts.
Particularly in considering the design adequacy of a complex
product——such as an automobile, a pharmaceutical drug, or other chemical
product——consumers often have no meaningful idea how safely the product really
ought to perform in various situations.
How can an ordinary consumer possibly know the extent of crash
protection or injury fairly to expect when an automobile crashes into a tree at
10, 20, or even 40 miles per hour?
Lurking at the very heart of the consumer expectations test, the
vagueness problem undermines the test in the most complex cases where a
reliable standard of liability is needed most.
David G. Owen, Owen's Hornbook on Products Liability
§ 5.6 (2d ed. 2008). When a
standard is vague, it is less useful, and less legitimate as a rule of law
because citizens cannot anticipate the lawfulness of their actions and adjust
their behavior accordingly. See
majority op., ¶¶71-73; see also Kysar, supra, at 1715 (discussing
the widely held view that "consumer expectations provide only the most
meager and insufficient guidance to factfinders charged with the difficult task
of assessing the adequacy of a product design," making the test "'so
vague as to be lawless'") (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 Cornell L.
Rev. 867, 882 (1998)); see also id. at n.60 (citing additional
authorities who criticize the vague nature of the consumer contemplation
test).
¶96 The
Restatement (Third), however, offers coherence, consistency, and predictability
because it is based on a more objective standard. Manufacturers are aware of alternative
designs that may be available for their products, as well as the costs and
benefits of those designs. A jury's
determination, on the other hand, of an "ordinary" consumer's
expectations about design and safety features is guesswork, with potentially
disastrous consequences for the manufacturer if wrong. The more predictable standards in the
Restatement (Third) will promote the efficient implementation of safety
precautions better than the less predictable consumer contemplation test
because the risks are, by definition, foreseeable and reasonably preventable.
¶97 Another
problem with the consumer contemplation test is the practical reality that
consumer/user expectations might be determined by a jury to be either
unrealistically and unreasonably high or unacceptably low when compared with
the optimum level of safety.
¶98 Consumer
expectations may be unrealistically and unreasonably high in that a
manufacturer might be held liable for injuries it did not or should not have
reasonably foreseen, or when alternative designs were not reasonably
available——for instance, expectations that a knife should not be able to cut
off fingers or a car should not be able to rollover. This is the danger of absolute
liability——holding manufacturers liable for all injuries resulting from their products. No court openly desires such a system. The Restatement (Third) helps avoid
unreasonably high expectations with its negligence-style evaluation of the
costs and benefits, imposing liability for only reasonably foreseeable injuries
or injured persons. See
Restatement (Third) 2(b) cmt. a; Owen's, supra, § 8.8.
¶99 Alternatively,
consumer expectations may be unacceptably low.
One example is the open and obvious danger doctrine, which precludes
recovery when a product is manifestly dangerous. Because consumers and users know of the
danger, the level of danger is in accord with their expectations, and they are
unprotected. But this result may neither
be fair nor adequate to compensate injured persons where an open and obvious
danger can be eliminated with the implementation of a simple, relatively
low-cost safety feature. Owen's, supra,
§ 8.3 ("[A] dire consequence of the consumer expectations
test . . . is that it effectively rewards manufacturers for
failing to adopt cost-effective measures to remedy obviously unnecessary
dangers to human life and limb.").
The Restatement (Third) rejects the open and obvious danger doctrine,
providing greater protection to injured persons and greater accountability for
product manufacturers. See
Restatement (Third) § 2(b) cmt. d. ("The fact that a danger is open
and obvious is relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily
preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable alternative design
should have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the
plaintiff.").
¶100 The
Horsts argue that our rejection of a bystander contemplation test leaves
bystanders unprotected. While this
contention is plainly wrong (see majority op., ¶77), the Horsts are
correct that the consumer contemplation test leaves bystanders less protected
than they arguably should be. The facts
of this case——where a bystander is injured by an allegedly defectively designed
and therefore unreasonably dangerous product——serve to underscore and highlight
the deficiencies in our current approach.
¶101 Bystanders
face several inequities when compared with users and consumers under the
current system. First, bystanders are
less protected when a product poses a greater danger to a bystander than to the
user or consumer. The instant case is a
perfect example; a riding lawn mower is clearly more dangerous to bystanders
than to the person driving the tractor.
Second, bystanders do not have access to the instructions and warnings
that assist and protect users and consumers.
Third, bystanders are, to some extent, dependent for their safety on the
care exercised by users of dangerous products.
Finally, bystanders may not be aware of open and obvious dangers that a
user or consumer perceives. In all these
circumstances, bystanders are stuck with less protection and less control over
their own safety, and, under the current system, with less access to
compensation in the event of injury.
¶102 The
Restatement (Third) levels this playing field by focusing the inquiry on the product itself,
not the status of the injured person.
The Restatement (Third) requires manufacturers to implement reasonably
available safety features with regard to all foreseeable injured persons. This analytical framework provides more
protection for injured persons than our current approach. This is especially true for bystanders,[35]
many injuries to whom are reasonably foreseeable, thereby putting manufacturers
on notice.
¶103 If
the Restatement (Third) were the law in
¶104 To
conclude,
¶105 For
the foregoing reasons I concur.
¶106 I
am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER and Justice PATIENCE D.
ROGGENSACK join this concurrence.
¶107 ANN
WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). I agree with the majority that bystanders can
recover in strict liability for a product that is unreasonably dangerous to
bystanders, and that the test for products liability in
¶108 I
write separately, however, because an improperly worded special verdict
question asked the wrong question and the jury instruction which accompanied it
misstated the law.
¶109 The
majority masks the problem by concluding that the special verdict question and
jury instruction are not as clear as it would prefer but that any error is harmless. Majority op., ¶78 n.23. I instead call it what it is when a jury is
not asked to answer the central question in the case and is given an erroneous
instruction: prejudicial error.
¶110 Additionally,
I write separately to address Justice Gableman's concurrence, which sua sponte
advocates for a sea change in the law of products liability, would discard over
forty years of precedent, and would over rule scores of cases.
¶111 For
the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
I
¶112 The
majority aptly sets forth the facts and relevant procedural history. Two-year-old Jonathan was injured when his
father, Michael, was mowing the lawn using a John Deere riding lawn mower. The mower was equipped with a safety feature
that stops both the engine and the blades when an operator begins to travel in
reverse with the blades engaged.
However, the lawn mower is designed with an override of this safety
feature.
¶113 Michael
decided to mow in reverse along the rear of the house and disengaged the safety
feature. Unknown to him, Jonathan moved
behind the mower, out of his father's line of sight. As the mower proceeded in reverse, it struck
the two-year-old Jonathan, causing both of his feet to be severed.
¶114 The
John Deere operating manual warns of danger to young children when the safety
feature is disengaged and the mower is operated in reverse. The warnings provide:
·
Before
backing up, stop mower blades or attachments and look down and behind the
machine carefully, especially for children.
·
CAUTION:
Avoid injury! Rotating blades are
dangerous. Children or bystanders may be
injured by runover and rotating blades.
Before backing up, carefully check the area around the machine.
¶115 The
Horsts filed a lawsuit against Deere & Company alleging that a mower which
operates in reverse is unreasonably dangerous, and that the mower should not
have been designed with a device that can override the safety feature. At trial, the Horsts requested that the
standard jury instruction, Wis JI——Civil 3260, be modified consistent with the
law to reflect the facts of this case——that the safety override feature
presented a danger to Jonathan, a bystander.
They argued that the jury should not be asked whether the design
presented a danger to the person using the machine. It was obvious that because Michael was
riding on the mower, it presented no back-up danger to him. Rather, as the warnings noted, the danger
presented was to the young child behind the mower.
¶116 The
circuit court declined the Horsts' request, and instead asked the jury:
Question
No. 1: Answer this question: Do you find
from the evidence that the subject law tractor when it left the hands of
Defendant, Deere & Company, was in a defective condition so as to be unreasonably
dangerous to a prospective user/consumer?
(Emphasis added.) The
jury instructions explained:
With
respect to special verdict Questions #1 and #2, you are instructed as follows:
A
manufacturer of a product who places on the market a defective product which is
unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer, and which is
expected and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold, is regarded by law as responsible for harm
caused by the product . . . .
. . . .
A
product is said to be defective when it is in a condition not contemplated by
the ordinary user or consumer which is unreasonably dangerous to the
ordinary user or consumer, and the defect arose out of design, manufacture,
or inspection while the article was in the control of the manufacturer. A defective product is unreasonably
dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer when it is dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
possessing the knowledge of the product's characteristics which were common to
the community. A product is not
defective if it is safe for normal use.
A
manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture a product which is absolutely
free from all possible harm to every individual. It is the duty of the manufacturer not to
place upon the market a defective product which is unreasonably dangerous to
the ordinary consumer. The law in
Question
One (1) on the verdict form asks:
Do you
find from the evidence that the subject lawn tractor when it left the hands of
Defendant, Deere & Company, was in a defective condition so as to be
unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user/consumer?
Before
you can answer question One "yes," you must be satisfied that: (1)
the product was in a defective condition; (2) the defective condition made the
product unreasonably dangerous to people; (3) the defective condition of
the product existed when the product was under the control of the manufacturer;
and (4) the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it was sold.
. . .
.
(Emphasis added.)
¶117 The
majority correctly states that since 1972, the law of
¶118 Accordingly,
the majority determines that the special verdict question and jury instruction
were not as clear as it would prefer and that the circuit court should not have
limited the inquiry about whether the lawn mower was unreasonably dangerous to
only "a prospective user/consumer."
¶119 The
majority attempts to salvage the error here by pointing to the following
explanation buried in the special verdict: In order to determine that the
product was defective, the jury must first find that "the defective
condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to people."
¶120 As
the majority acknowledges, the special verdict question was wrong. It failed to ask the correct question. The question is not whether the product posed
a danger to the father riding on the lawn mower, but rather whether it posed a
danger to Jonathan, the young child behind it.
¶121 The
problem with the special verdict question was exacerbated by the jury
instruction. Five times, the instruction
indicated that the product must be unusually or unreasonably "dangerous to
the ordinary user or consumer." See
infra, ¶116.
¶122 Further,
in an attempt to cure the defect in the instruction, the circuit court added
the following sentence: "The law in
¶123 "The
purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and fairly inform the jury of a rule
or principle of law applicable to a particular case." Nommensen v. Am. Continental Ins. Co.,
2001 WI 112, ¶36, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301. The instruction should not only state the law
accurately, but it should also "explain what the law means to persons who
usually do not possess law degrees."
¶124 The
instruction did not fully and fairly inform the jury of the applicable
law. Instead, it created the clear
impression that a bystander could only recover if he was injured by a product
that was also unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer. However, in Howes I, the court held
that "there is no essential difference between the injured user or
consumer and the injured bystander," and that an injured bystander could
recover in strict liability for a product that is unreasonably dangerous to
bystanders. 56
¶125 Instead
of accurately describing
¶126 Here,
the majority appears to conclude that an otherwise defective instruction and
special verdict question is cured because, after the jury was repeatedly told
that defectiveness is determined by danger to "an ordinary user or
consumer," the special verdict contained the following explanation:
Before
you can answer question One "yes," you must be satisfied
that . . . the defective condition made the product
unreasonably dangerous to people[.]"
¶127 An
error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." State v. Hale,
2005 WI 17, ¶60, 277
¶128 Based
on the evidence presented at trial, the jury was required to answer
"no" to the special verdict question because there was no evidence
presented that the lawn mower was unreasonably dangerous to Michael, its
user. Nevertheless, there was evidence
from which a properly instructed jury could have determined that the mower was
unreasonably dangerous to Jonathan.
Because Deere & Company has not demonstrated that the errors did not
contribute to the verdict obtained, I conclude that they were prejudicial.
II
¶129 This
is the second case this term where members of this court, sua sponte and not
responding to the parties' arguments, have advocated for the adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b). See Justice Gableman's concurrence; see
also Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 2009 WI 78, __
¶130 The
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A and Dippel v. Sciano, 37
¶131 In
advocating for this policy change, the concurrence in this case and the
concurrence in Godoy fundamentally misunderstand the role of an
appellate court. Instead, they appear to
act like legislators, advancing a policy initiative which they favor. Typically, it is the role of the legislature
to identify and enact policy initiatives.
Appellate courts, on the other hand, play a more restrained role.
¶132 Courts
decide cases and controversies. A court
depends upon the parties to identify and raise issues and to advocate for a
position. After considering the parties'
briefs and arguments, the court renders a decision.
¶133 Tossing
stare decisis to the wind and without the benefit of briefing or argument by
the parties, the concurrence would over rule or otherwise modify scores of
cases because they set forth a test for products liability that would no longer
be good law.[38] Of course the court can and sometimes should
over rule prior cases. See Justice
Gableman's concurrence, ¶104 n.9. That
is not the question here. Rather, the
question is whether the court here should overrule or modify these
cases, creating a sea change in the law, without the benefit of briefing or
arguments by the parties.
¶134 I
am uncertain whether the Restatement (Third) should be adopted. What I am certain of, however, is that rather
than pushing a predetermined agenda, I would wait until the issue is raised by
a party, and briefed and argued before this court.
¶135 For
a more thorough discussion of my concerns regarding the sua sponte discussion
of the Restatement (Third), see my concurrence in Godoy, __
¶136 I
am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this
dissent.
[1] Horst v. Deere &
Co., 2008 WI App 65, 312
[2] The dissent confuses and muddles the issue and our holding in this case. It begins: "I agree with the majority that bystanders can recover in strict liability for a product that is unreasonably dangerous to bystanders . . . ." Our holding is more precise. The issue is not who is the product unreasonably dangerous to, but whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. This distinction is subtle, but important.
[3] The trial court's instruction
to the jury was substantially identical to Wis JI——Civil 3260. The instruction, as given, is here reproduced
in its entirety:
A
manufacturer of a product who places on the market a defective product which is
unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer and which is expected
and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold, is regarded by law as responsible for harm caused by the
product even though he or she has exercised all possible care in preparation
and sale of the product, provided the product was being used for the purpose
for which it was designed and intended to be used.
There
is no claim in this case that the subject lawn tractor failed to perform its
intended purpose of mowing the lawn. You
may find the subject lawn tractor was dangerous beyond the reasonable
contemplation by an ordinary user or consumer even if it served its intended
purpose.
A
product is said to be defective when it is in a condition not contemplated by
the ordinary user or consumer, which is unusually dangerous to the ordinary
user or consumer and the defect arose out of design, manufacture or inspection
while the article was in the control of the manufacturer.
A
defective product is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer
when it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer possessing the knowledge of the products' characteristics
which were common to the community. A
product is not defective if it is safe for normal use.
A
manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture a product which is absolutely
free from all possible harm to every individual. It is the duty of the manufacturer not to
place upon the market a defective product, which is unreasonably dangerous to
the ordinary consumer.
The
law in
Question
1 in the verdict form asks, when the subject lawn mower left the possession
of——Question Number 1 asks, do you find from the evidence that the subject lawn
mower, when it left the hands of Defendant Deere and Company, was in a
defective condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective
user/consumer?
Before you can answer Question 1 yes, you must be satisfied that; one, the product was in a defective condition. Two, the defective condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to people. Three, the defective condition of the product existed when the product was under the control of the manufacturer. And four, the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
[4] Some of our prior decisions
have used the term "possibility" instead of
"probability." We believe
"probability" is a better statement of the test. See Green v. Smith &
Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶¶114-19,
245
[5] Section 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[6] Dippel v. Sciano announced a five-part test to prove strict liability under § 402A:
(1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or control of the seller,
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,
(3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injuries or damages,
(4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling such product or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the principal business of the seller, and
(5) that the product was one which the seller
expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition it was when he sold it. 37
[7] A risk-utility analysis requires a balancing of the risks and benefits of a product design "in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution." Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a (1998).
[8] The Horsts also suggest
that our decision in Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121
[9] Deere also cites
several other
[10] Howes v. Hansen, 56
[11] The injured child in this case is Richard Howes II. However, because this case came before us twice, the naming convention we will use to describe the two cases is Howes I for the 1972 decision and Howes II for the 1976 decision.
[12] The opinion noted that some
courts suggested bystanders should have more protection than consumers because
of their disadvantaged position.
[13]
Howes v. Deere, 71
[14] We note here and further address in footnote 23 below that, because bystanders may recover, it does not matter who a product is dangerous to (i.e.——a bystander versus a user or consumer). What matters is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous as an objective matter. Today we address the proper test for making that determination when bystanders are injured.
[15]
Vincer
v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69
[16] Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
[17]
Green, 245
[18] It is indicative of the
court's intent to adhere to the consumer contemplation test that the majority cited
our opinion in Howes I on two occasions.
Green, 245
[19] While Komanekin did
answer the question, it was a federal case, not one of our precedents. No prior
[20] A combine is a "power-operated harvesting machine that cuts, threshes, and cleans grain." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 377 (3d ed. 1992).
[21] In fact, this legal/factual determination by the judge would probably be required even under the Horsts' suggested application of the test. Under their approach, a determination must be made before instructing the jury that the danger is to bystanders alone, and not to users or consumers.
[22] To be clear, we reject the bystander contemplation test. Our point is to show that the Horsts' more limited suggested application of this test has many practical problems.
[23] The special verdict question in this case asked: "Do you find from the evidence that the subject lawn mower, when it left the hands of Defendant Deere & Company, was in a defective condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user/consumer?" The trial court rejected a plea by the Horsts to add "or bystander" to the end of the special verdict question. The jury was further instructed that to answer "yes" to the special verdict question, they were required to find, among other things, that "the defective condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to people."
We think a better special verdict question need not query to whom the product is unreasonably dangerous. The question is not whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer versus unreasonably dangerous to a bystander. The question is simply whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. And the determination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is an objective inquiry based on the expectations of an ordinary user or consumer. Any injured person, whether a bystander or user or consumer, may recover if injured by an unreasonably dangerous product.
The dissent asserts that the jury instructions in Wis JI——Civil 3260, even with the trial court's insertion making clear the availability of recovery for bystanders, were wrong and misleading. Dissent, ¶¶120-128. Though the standard jury instructions are not as clear as we would prefer, when viewed as a whole, the jury instructions given here sufficiently conveyed that a bystander may recover if the product was unreasonably dangerous, and that such a determination is based on the expectations of the ordinary user or consumer.
The dissent fails to acknowledge that the jury instructions themselves define when a product is "unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer," and that is "when it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer possessing the knowledge of the products' characteristics which were common to the community." In other words, the instructions define the phrase that so troubles the dissent and do so by reference to the consumer contemplation test. Moreover, the inconsistency between the instruction's dual statements that the product must be unreasonably dangerous to "a prospective user/consumer" and later to "people" is harmless.
[24] In other courts around the country, plaintiffs proceeding in strict liability upon the injury to a child have argued that it is the expectations of an ordinary child that should govern. Courts have resoundingly rejected this argument, in large part because children do not have expectations regarding the dangers of certain products. Courts have thus held that it is the ordinary consumer or user's expectations that govern. See Kelley v. Rival Mfg. Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (in a case involving a small child who was injured by pulling a crock-pot onto himself, the question of whether the crock-pot was unreasonably dangerous is determined by the perspective of the parent consumer who purchased the product, not the perspective of the minor child) (applying Oklahoma law); Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (in a case involving a two-year-old child whose diaper was set on fire by his three year old brother, the question of whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous is determined by the contemplation of the ordinary adult consumer, not the viewpoint of the minor child) (applying Tennessee law); Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 814-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (in a case involving a child who suffered injuries after lighting his pajamas on fire when playing with a lighter, the question of whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous is determined by the perspective of the ordinary adult consumer, not the perspective of the minor child) Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725-26 (N.H. 1976) (in a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals involving a five-year-old whose pajamas were set on fire when playing with matches, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that the question of whether the pajamas were unreasonably dangerous should be based on the expectations of consumer parents) (note, New Hampshire has moved away from the consumer contemplation test and now engages in a risk-utility balancing test).
[25] The Horsts state the question as follows: "[I]f the ordinary bystander would have expected Deere to design its mower so that it would be incapable of mowing in reverse, instead of simply instructing operators not to do so, Deere breached its § 402A duty to bystanders." But the issue is not whether a bystander (or consumer) would expect the lawn mower to go in reverse, but whether a bystander (or consumer) would appreciate the danger posed by the RIO-equipped lawn mower to a two-year-old child.
[26] Transcript of Record at 4, Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003) No. 01-4226 ("A lawn mower is a lawn mower.").
[27] Godoy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 2009 WI 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.
[28] Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1701 (2003).
[29] I joined Justice Prosser's excellent concurrence in Godoy v. DuPont, 2009 WI 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which ably makes a fuller case for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)") § 2(b) (1998).
[30] The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (hereafter "§ 402A") provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[31] Factors to be considered include the nature and strength of consumer expectations, the degree of the foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the product, and the advantages and disadvantages of the original product and alternative design. Restatement (Third) § 2(b) cmt. f.
[32] Green v. Smith &
Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245
[33] See also Victor E.
Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-Emergence of "Super
Strict" Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 917,
918 (2003):
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.,
2001 WI 109, ¶122, 245
(Emphasis added.)
[34] This criticism holds true in even greater measure for a bystander contemplation test as well. See majority op., ¶¶71-73.
[35] The Horsts recognize
this too, asserting the
following in a footnote in their reply brief:
If the Court were to conclude that a "bystander contemplation test" is too onerous on manufacturers, the Horsts submit that the risk/utility test adopted in Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 2, where the plaintiff must establish the viability of an alternative design, would be appropriate in bystander cases, even though inappropriate in consumer cases.
I have difficulty understanding why we have a "flimsy basis" (as Justice Crooks' concurrence asserts) for addressing an issue the petitioners asked us to address if we found against them on their chief argument.
[36] The dissent makes several bald, unsupported, and blatantly incorrect assertions in chastising this concurrence. First, the dissent alleges that this concurrence raises the adoption of the Restatement (Third) sua sponte, and that neither party called upon the court to do so. Dissent, ¶¶129-130. The dissent is wrong. As noted above, the Horsts did ask this court to adopt the Restatement (Third) for bystander claims in the event that we rejected their proposed bystander contemplation test, which we have.
Second, the dissent claims that this concurrence
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of appellate courts.
Third, the dissent clouds the issue by citing a lineage of cases that would purportedly be over ruled or modified by adoption of the Restatement (Third) § 2(b) in design defect cases. The dissent goes too far. Although § 2(b) sets forth an approach that is analytically distinct from the consumer contemplation test, there is no reason, beyond the dissent's bald assertions, to believe that adoption of § 2(b) would in any way affect, much less over rule, the results reached in those cases. See also Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 2009 WI 78, ¶6 n.1, __ Wis. 2d __, __N.W.2d __ (Prosser, J., concurring).
Finally, the dissent cautions a wait-until-argued
approach to this issue.
[37] Justice Gableman's concurrence
asserts that the Horsts advocated for the adoption of the Restatement (Third)
in a footnote in their reply brief. For
a discussion of the "flimsy basis" upon which the concurrence reaches
out to address the Restatement (Third), see Justice Crooks' concurrence,
¶84.
Any
doubt as to whether the Horsts are advocating adoption of the Restatement
(Third) is erased by a review of the oral arguments. No attorney uttered the words
"Restatement (Third)" at oral argument. In fact, the Horsts' attorney specifically
disclaimed any reliance on a risk-utility test, which is one of the principles
underlying the Restatement (Third). He
stated unequivocally: "I didn't argue for the adoption of a risk-utility
test[.]" See
Wisconsin Court System, Supreme Court Oral Arguments, http://wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm
(search "Party name" for "Horst"; then follow
"Playback" link) at 26:35.
[38] See, for example:
·
Tatera
v. FMC Corp., 2009
WI App 80, ___ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (publication decision
pending);
·
Haase
v. Badger Mining Corp.,
2004 WI 97, 274
·
Green
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245
·
Insolia
v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying
·
Morden
v. Continental AG,
2000 WI 51, 235
·
Sharp
ex rel. Gordon v. Case Corp.,
227
·
Bittner
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 194
·
Westphal
v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 192
·
Sedbrook
v. Zimmerman Design Group, Ltd., 190
·
Estate
of Cook v. Gran-Aire, Inc.,
182
·
·
Beacon
Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176
·
Glassey
v. Continental Ins. Co.,
176
·
Northridge
Co. v. W.R. Grace and Co.,
162
·
Kolpin
v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc., 162
·
Nelson
v. Nelson Hardware, Inc.,
160
·
Rolph
v. EBI Cos., 159
·
Kemp
v. Miller, 154
·
Estate
of Schilling v. Blount, Inc.,
152
·
Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v.
·
St.
Clare Hosp. of
·
O'Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 149
·
Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146
·
Griffin v. Miller, No. 1986AP1562, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 1,
1987);
·
Van's Realty & Const. of Appleton, Inc. v. Blount Heating and
Air Conditioning, Inc., No. 1985AP1812, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7,
1986);
·
Clarke v. Flad & Associates, 1984AP780, unpublished slip op.
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1988);
·
Gonzalez v. City of
·
Sumnicht v.
·
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116
·
Burrows v. Follett and Leach, Inc., 115
·
Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111
·
Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104
·
Wangen v.
Ford Motor Corp.,
97
·
Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90
·
Priske v. General Motors Corp., 89
·
Black v. General Elec. Co., 89
·
Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87
·
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87
·
Keller v. Welles Dept. Store of Racine, 88
·
Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86
·
Fonder v. AAA Mobile Homes, Inc., 80
·
Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72
·
Howes v. Deere & Co., 71
·
Barter v.
General Motors Corp.,
70
·
Greiten
v. LaDow, 70
·
Vincer
v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69
·
Schuh
v. Fox River Tractor Co.,
63
·
Jagmin
v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
61
·
City
of
·
Air
Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58
·
Gies
v. Nissen Corp., 57
·
Howes
v. Hansen, 56
·
Schnabl
v. Ford Motor Co.,
54
·
Netzel
v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51
·
Dippel
v. Sciano, 37