APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Eau
Claire County, Eric J. Wahl, Judge. Affirmed
and cause remanded.
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Chippewa
County, Roderick A. Cameron, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded.
¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The court of appeals
certified this consolidated criminal appeal in two circuit court cases
involving the same defendant, Bill Paul Marquardt. In one case, the State appeals an order of the Chippewa County
Circuit Court suppressing evidence obtained in a search of Marquardt's cabin
and an order denying the State's motion for reconsideration of the suppression
order. In the other case, Marquardt
appeals an order of the Eau Claire County Circuit Court denying his motion for
post-commitment relief in which he had renewed an earlier challenge to the same
search.
¶2 The court of appeals certified the following questions regarding
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule:
(1) Does the
search warrant application in this case meet the third test set out in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), that it must not be so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render the officers' belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable?
(2) Did the
investigation in these cases meet the "significant investigation"
test set out in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶63, 245 Wis. 2d 206,
629 N.W.2d 625?
¶3 We determine that the affidavit in support of the warrant contains
indicia of probable cause sufficient to meet the Leon test and that the
facts here demonstrate a significant investigation pursuant to Eason. We therefore conclude that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the search of Marquardt's
cabin. Additionally, we reject an
assertion by Marquardt that the circuit court erred in finding him not
competent to represent himself in the Eau Claire County case.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the Chippewa County Circuit Court orders
and affirm the Eau Claire County Circuit Court order. We remand to the circuit court in each case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
¶5 On March 13, 2000, Marquardt's father discovered the dead body of
his wife, Marquardt's mother, in their Chippewa County home. She had been shot and stabbed.
¶6 That same day, law enforcement officers obtained and executed a
warrant to search the home. Within two
days of the discovery of the body, an estimated 20 law enforcement officers,
including State Department of Justice agents, became involved in an extensive
investigation of the crime.
¶7 On March 15, officers obtained and executed a search warrant for
an Eau Claire County cabin in which Marquardt had been staying. According to the warrant application,
Marquardt's father told Investigator Richard Price that Marquardt had not been
seen or heard from since the location of his mother's body. The warrant application also noted that the
body was covered in a blanket.
¶8 As a result of the March 15 search of Marquardt's cabin, officers
found three dog carcasses and three rabbit carcasses. They also found, among other evidence, sections of bloodstained
carpet, a bloodstained quilt, a bloodstained tarp, two rifles, and a large
knife with a sheath. Marquardt was
charged in Eau Claire County with mistreatment of an animal resulting in the
animal's death, and a warrant issued for his arrest.
¶9 On March 18, officers arrested Marquardt outside his cabin. During a search incident to arrest, they
found a folding knife and noticed blood spatters on Marquardt's shoes and
jacket. Subsequent crime lab testing
indicated that the DNA found in the blood on Marquardt's folding knife and one
of his shoes was a match for his mother's DNA.
¶10 Law enforcement officers also searched a vehicle parked at the
cabin. The vehicle had a reddish stain
on the interior driver's door panel, and crime lab testing indicated that blood
on a shirt in the vehicle's trunk was also a DNA match for Marquardt's mother.
¶11 Marquardt was charged in Chippewa County with intentional homicide
and possession of a firearm by a felon.
He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
to the charges. Marquardt then moved to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his cabin. He argued that the search warrant, on its
face, failed to provide probable cause for the search.
¶12 The circuit court denied Marquardt's motion to suppress, but the
court of appeals reversed. See State
v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶¶7-8, 20, 53, 247 Wis. 2d 765,
635 N.W.2d 188. The court of
appeals determined that the facts in the warrant were insufficient to support a
probable cause finding. Id.,
¶¶14-19. At the same time, however, the
court of appeals remanded for the circuit court to address the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule as adopted by this court in Eason. See Marquardt, 247
Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶20-23, 53.
¶13 After the court of appeals issued its decision in the Chippewa
County case, Marquardt moved the circuit court in the Eau Claire County case to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his cabin. In support of his motion, he cited the court
of appeals decision. In addition, he
argued that the good faith exception did not apply because the police had not
undertaken a "significant investigation" as required by Eason.
¶14 The circuit court denied Marquardt's motion after holding an
evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue.
The court determined that the State had met the test for good faith
under Eason.
¶15 Marquardt subsequently sought to represent himself. Although the Eau Claire County Circuit Court
had determined that Marquardt was competent to stand trial, it concluded that
he was not competent to proceed pro se.
¶16 After a jury found Marquardt guilty on all charges, the Eau Claire
County Circuit Court found Marquardt not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect. The court ordered Marquardt
committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 75 years.
¶17 Marquardt renewed his challenge to the search of his cabin in a
post-commitment motion. The circuit
court denied the motion, and Marquardt appealed.
¶18 Meanwhile, on remand in the homicide case in Chippewa County, the
circuit court concluded that the search of Marquardt's cabin failed to satisfy
the good faith requirement as set forth in Leon because the search
warrant application was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no officer
could have reasonably believed the warrant contained probable cause to search
Marquardt's cabin. Accordingly, the
circuit court ordered that evidence obtained as a result of the search be
suppressed. After the court denied a motion for
reconsideration by the State, the State appealed both the circuit court's
suppression order and the court's order denying the State's motion for
reconsideration.
¶19 Marquardt's appeal in the Eau Claire County case and the State's
appeal in the Chippewa County case are now before us on certification pursuant
to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-04).
II
¶20 There is no dispute that the facts in the March 15, 2000, search
warrant for Marquardt's cabin were insufficient to supply probable cause for
the search. The central issue we
address, which is the same in both cases, is whether the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule applies to the search of Marquardt's cabin. In addressing a good faith issue, we will
uphold a circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. See State v.
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). However, whether a search ultimately
satisfies constitutional standards is a question of law subject to independent
appellate review. See id.
at 137-38.
¶21 We must also address Marquardt's assertion that the Eau Claire
County Circuit Court erred in finding him not competent to represent
himself. We review a circuit court
determination of whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se under what
is "essentially a clearly erroneous standard of review." State v. Garfoot, 207
Wis. 2d 214, 224, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997); see also State
v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶45, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477.
¶22 In addressing the good faith issue, we initially examine the good
faith standards recognized in Leon and Eason. We then analyze the warrant in light of the
relevant standards and determine that the good faith exception applies. Finally, we turn to the competency issue and
conclude that the Eau Claire County Circuit Court did not err in determining
that Marquardt was not competent to proceed pro se.
III
¶23 Reviewing courts accord great deference to the warrant-issuing
judge's probable cause determination, which will stand "unless the
defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause." State
v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991). Here, the court of appeals has already
determined that the facts in the warrant were insufficient to support the
issuing judge's finding of probable cause.
See Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶19. The court of appeals determination does not,
however, end our inquiry in this case in light of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule as set forth in Leon and Eason.
¶24 In Leon, the Supreme Court recognized an objective good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the warrant context. Under Leon, evidence seized by
officers "reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate" will not necessarily be suppressed. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
"In the ordinary case," the Court in Leon explained,
"an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause
determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically
sufficient." Id. at 921.
¶25 At the same time, the Court in Leon described four sets of
circumstances under which the good faith exception does not apply:
[1] the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was
misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would
have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. . . . [2]
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial
role . . . . [3] Nor
would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on
an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." [4]
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may
be so facially deficient——i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized——that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.
Id. at 923 (citations
omitted; emphasis added).
¶26 In Eason, this court added two requirements that must be met
before the good faith exception may apply.
Specifically, the State must show that the process used in obtaining the
search warrant included (1) a "significant investigation," and (2) a
"review by a police officer trained in, or very knowledgeable of, the
legal vagaries of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable
government attorney." Eason,
245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶63.
¶27 Here, the parties as well as the certified questions of the court
of appeals focus on the third Leon disqualifying circumstance and the
first Eason requirement. The State's primary argument is that, based
on the warrant application, law enforcement officers could reasonably rely in
good faith on the issuing judge's finding of probable cause. Marquardt disagrees, asserting that under Leon
the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. In addition, the parties dispute whether,
under the facts of this case, the State has satisfied the Eason
requirement of a "significant investigation."
¶28 We address first whether the affidavit supporting the warrant
contained sufficient "indicia" of probable cause within the meaning
of Leon. In doing so, we begin
by observing that the inquiry into whether a warrant affidavit is "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable," Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, must be
different from the inquiry into whether the facts in the warrant application
are "clearly insufficient to support a determination of probable
cause." Higginbotham, 162
Wis. 2d at 989.
¶29 Were it otherwise, the third Leon disqualifying
circumstance, which limits the applicability of the good faith exception, would
be superfluous. The limitation would
operate as nothing more than the usual yardstick by which reviewing courts
measure a warrant-issuing judge's probable cause determination. "If a lack of a substantial basis [for
probable cause] also prevented application of the Leon objective good
faith exception, the exception would be devoid of substance." United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192,
195 (4th Cir. 2002).
¶30 Consequently, the court of appeals' conclusion that the warrant
application was insufficient to support the warrant-issuing judge's probable
cause determination does not mean that the affidavit in support of the warrant
was lacking in indicia of probable cause within the meaning of Leon. Our task here is not the same as it would be
if we were reviewing the warrant-issuing judge's probable cause determination.
¶31 At the same time, the Leon "indicia" requirement
carries substantive force. The
requirement is grounded in Justice Byron White's concurrence in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (1983), in which Justice White explained that
"the good-faith exception would not apply if the material presented to the
magistrate or judge is . . . so clearly lacking in probable
cause that no well-trained officer could reasonably have thought that a warrant
should issue." See Leon,
468 U.S. at 923.
¶32 This court has previously recognized that, under Leon,
"even where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms,
exclusion may nonetheless be appropriate." Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶36 (citing Leon,
468 U.S. at 922). Although officers
cannot be expected to question a warrant-issuing judge's probable cause
determination "[i]n the ordinary case," Leon, 468 U.S. at 921,
the officers may not unreasonably rely on it.
¶33 Under Leon's rationale, sufficient "indicia" of
probable cause refers to more than the fact that one or more judges have
approved and signed the warrant.
"[I]t is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly
issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at
922-23 (footnote omitted). The
exclusionary rule will apply when "a reasonably well trained officer would
have known that the search warrant was illegal despite the magistrate's
authorization." Id. at 922
n.23.
¶34 In short, the very point of the third Leon circumstance is
that the good faith exception will not apply when the warrant is based on an
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause that a law enforcement
officer——who ordinarily should not be expected to second-guess the
warrant-issuing judge——can be said to have unreasonably relied on the warrant.
¶35 Here, the warrant application included an affidavit with the
following information:
Investigator Price [of the
Chippewa County Sheriff's office] reports that after finding the body of Mary
J. Marquardt, he spoke with her husband, Alfred E. Marquardt. Mr. Marquardt informed him that he and Mary
have a son, Bill Marquardt, who, since the location of Ms. Marquardt's body had
not been seen or heard from. Alfred
Marquardt further informed Investigator Price that Bill Marquardt owned with
Alfred Marquardt a cabin in which Bill resided at E27505 County Highway M, Town
of Fairchild, County of Eau Claire, Wisconsin.
Investigator Price further
reports that in examining the body of Mary J. Marquardt and the scene where she
was found, it appeared as though among the wounds incurred by her was a knife
wound. Also at the scene, officers were
able to locate a number of footprints that may be suitable for comparison with
the shoes that made them.
Investigator Barnier reports
that in checking Eau Claire County tax rolls, he learned that a
cabin . . . located at E27505 Highway M, Town of Fairchild,
Eau Claire County, [is] owned by Alfred and Bill Marquardt.
¶36 The warrant application also incorporated and attached the
affidavit supporting the search warrant that the Chippewa County Circuit Court
had issued two days earlier for the search of the home of Marquardt's
parents. That affidavit included this
information:
Inv. Price
reports that on March 13, 2000, Chippewa County Sheriff's Dispatch received a
911 call from 11766 State Hwy 178, Chippewa Falls, Township of Eagle
Point. The caller identified himself as
Alfred E. Marquardt, DOB 07/30/1946.
Marquardt reported that his wife was apparently dead at the residence.
Price
continued that he responded to the Marquardt home and met with [Alfred]
Marquardt. [Alfred] Marquardt relayed
that he had left home at about 7 AM that morning and tried to call home about
11:50. The phone was busy and remained
so the remainder of the day. [Alfred]
Marquardt stated that he left work early and returned home because of the busy
phone and upon arrival, found his wife, Mary J. Marquardt covered with a
blanket in the garage. She was cold and
unresponsive and appeared to have a head wound.
Price reports
that a shell casing, tentatively identified as 9 mm, was observed on the
premises.
¶37 A search warrant may issue upon a determination of probable
cause. Before issuing a search warrant
a magistrate must be "apprised of 'sufficient facts to excite an honest
belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the
commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the place
to be searched.'" Higginbotham,
162 Wis. 2d at 989 (quoting State
v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131-32, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)). As discussed above, an "indicia"
of probable cause is not the same as a probable cause determination. Rather, the standard for "indicia"
is less demanding. It requires
sufficient signs of probable cause, not probable cause per se.
¶38 Here, the objects sought in the search warrant included firearms,
knives, shoes, and any clothing containing hair, blood, or fibers linking the
victim to such clothing. A number of
facts in the warrant application, along with reasonable inferences that law
enforcement officers could draw from those facts, satisfy us that there is
sufficient indicia of probable cause that the objects sought are linked with
the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the
place to be searched.
¶39 First, regarding objects sought in the warrant, the warrant
application states that there was a nine-millimeter shell casing found at the
scene of the homicide, and that it appeared as though one of the wounds suffered
by the victim was a knife wound.
Additionally, the application includes information that a number of
footprints found at the scene were thought to be suitable for comparison with
the shoes that made them.
¶40 Second, the warrant application indicates that Marquardt's father
provided police the location of Marquardt's cabin and reported that Marquardt
had not been seen or heard from since the time of his mother's death two days
earlier. From these facts, an officer
could draw a reasonable inference that Marquardt's absence was suspicious and
that Marquardt's father thought that Marquardt might be involved in his
mother's death.
¶41 Third, the application indicates that Marquardt's mother was found
covered in a blanket. Officers could
reasonably infer from this fact, as has another court under similar
circumstances, that the perpetrator was familiar with the victim and felt
remorse or guilt. See Thiel
v. Schuetzle, 200 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999) (victim's body "was
found covered with a blanket, which was circumstantial evidence that the
murderer was a family member or friend").
This may not be the only inference, but it is an inference that a
reasonable officer could make.
¶42 Fourth, the warrant application makes no mention of evidence of a
forced entry, sexual trauma, or missing valuables. The absence of such facts in the application supports a
reasonable inference that the motive of the killer was not burglary or sexual
assault, tending to further suggest that Marquardt's mother knew her killer.
¶43 Fifth, the application included information that the phone was busy
starting at 11:50 a.m. and remained busy for the rest of the day. A reasonable inference from this information
is that the phone was off the hook, likely in relation to the homicide, and
that the perpetrator had therefore been inside the residence. Again, this raises an inference that the
perpetrator was someone who Marquardt's mother knew.
¶44 In determining whether an affidavit contains sufficient indicia of
probable cause, any competing reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of
the State. See State v.
Schaab, 2000 WI App 204, ¶13, 238 Wis. 2d 598, 617
N.W.2d 872; see also State v. Dunn, 121
Wis. 2d 389, 397-98, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). Based on all the facts in the warrant
application, and the reasonable inferences from those facts, we determine that
the warrant was based on an affidavit containing sufficient indicia of probable
cause for purposes of Leon.
¶45 Having determined that Leon's third disqualifying
circumstance is not a bar to the application of the good faith exception to the
search of Marquardt's cabin, we turn to the Eason requirements. In Eason, this court concluded that
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution requires additional
protection beyond that afforded by the good faith exception as recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon. Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶3.
¶46 Testimony at the good faith hearing in the Eau Claire County case
established that an experienced district attorney had met with officers and had
drafted the warrant application. Thus,
there can be no real dispute that the State satisfied the second Eason
requirement because the process used in obtaining the search warrant included
"review by . . . a knowledgeable government
attorney." Id., ¶63.
¶47 The parties do, however, dispute whether the State satisfied the
first Eason requirement that there be a significant investigation. In determining that there was a significant
investigation here, we rely primarily on facts from two sources: a report by one of the officers who
responded to the murder scene, Investigator Price of the Chippewa County Sheriff's
office, and the good faith hearing in the Eau Claire County case.
¶48 Within approximately one hour after discovery of the body of
Marquardt's mother on March 13, 2000, Investigator Price interviewed
Marquardt's father for approximately four hours. Price learned that Marquardt had a problem with law enforcement
in the past and had gone to jail. In
addition, Price discovered that when Marquardt last visited his parents' house,
he dug up $12,000 in cash that he had previously buried. Marquardt was very upset at the time and
told his parents that someone was after him and that he had to get out of the
country. Price also learned that when
Marquardt's parents had last visited Marquardt at the cabin, Marquardt was
agitated and appeared not to want his parents at the cabin.
¶49 In addition, Price discovered that a phone message for Marquardt,
which Marquardt's mother had put on the refrigerator, had been removed. Price also learned that Marquardt was the
only one other than his parents who had keys to their residence and that the
service doors to the residence were normally locked when Marquardt's mother was
home alone.
¶50 The same evening that Investigator Price interviewed Marquardt's father,
officers obtained and executed the search warrant for the residence of
Marquardt's parents. Agents from the
State Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation arrived on the
scene to assist in pursuing the investigation.
Agents then drove to Marquardt's cabin and attempted to contact him
during the early morning hours of March 14. The agents interviewed one of Marquardt's neighbors that morning,
and discovered that there had been a break-in at the neighbor's home and that
the neighbor's dog had been shot.
Agents also learned from the neighbor that the officers investigating
the break-in had found five nine-millimeter shell casings, which were the same
caliber as the casing found at the homicide scene. The agents returned to the homicide scene later that day and
continued investigating.
¶51 Also on March 14, an initial autopsy was performed on the
body. The autopsy revealed that there
was no indication of sexual assault and suggested that the victim's death
resulted from a gunshot wound to the head and a stab wound to the throat.
¶52 Investigator Price estimated that over the course of March 13 and
14, a total of 20 law enforcement officers had become involved in the
investigation of the homicide. The
circuit court aptly observed as follows in concluding that the State had met
the Eason "significant investigation" requirement:
You have the Chippewa County Sheriff, Eau Claire County
Sheriff. You had the State
investigators and I think Sergeant Vogler even though maybe the City of
Chippewa Police Department [was] involved.
So you in any event had different officers from different jurisdictions
all working what I would consider to be nearly around the clock efforts.
¶53 Like the circuit court, we are satisfied that the facts demonstrate
the State has shown that police were engaged in a significant investigation
within the meaning of Eason. Our
read of Eason is that a "significant investigation" does not
require a showing that the investigation yielded the probable cause that would
have been necessary to support the search at issue. Thus, contrary to what some of Marquardt's arguments seem to suggest,
we need not determine whether, by the time officers searched Marquardt's cabin
pursuant to the March 15 warrant, their investigation had provided them with
probable cause for the search.
¶54 At the same time, we recognize, as does the State, that a
significant investigation for purposes of Eason refers to more than the
number of officers or hours devoted to an investigation. In other words, as the State essentially
acknowledges, the nature and focus of the investigation are important.
¶55 To summarize our good faith analysis, we determine that the warrant
was based on an affidavit that contained sufficient indicia of probable cause
to satisfy Leon, and Marquardt does not argue that the good faith
exception is otherwise barred by Leon.
We also conclude that the State has shown compliance with the
requirements of Eason.
Accordingly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies
to the search of Marquardt's cabin.
IV
¶56 We turn to address Marquardt's assertion that the circuit court
erred in finding him not competent to represent himself in the Eau Claire
County case. Defendants have a
constitutional right to self representation.
See State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 217-18,
564 N.W.2d 716 (1997). When a
defendant seeks to proceed pro se, the circuit court undertakes a two-part
inquiry, ensuring that the defendant (1) has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived the right to counsel, and (2) is competent to proceed pro
se. Id. at 203.
¶57 Marquardt's focus is on the second part of the inquiry. He asserts that the circuit court erred by
applying a higher standard of competence for self representation than for
competence to stand trial. He argues
that, under Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the standard of
competence for self representation can be no higher than the standard of
competence to stand trial.
¶58 This court has previously analyzed and rejected this very argument
in Klessig. See Klessig,
211 Wis. 2d at 208-12.
In Wisconsin, there is a higher standard for
determining whether a defendant is competent to represent oneself than for
determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. This higher standard is not based on the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment, but stems from the independent adoption of
the higher standard by [individual states] as allowed under Godinez.
Id. at 212 (footnote
omitted).
¶59 Marquardt also asserts that the circuit court erred because the
court improperly focused on his lack of legal or technical ability. Further, Marquardt argues, the court failed
to make a finding that he had a specific problem or disability that prevented
him from representing himself.
¶60 This court in Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549,
292 N.W.2d 601 (1980),
set forth standards by which the circuit court should measure a defendant's
competence to proceed pro se:
[A]lthough technical legal knowledge is not relevant,
literacy and a basic understanding over and above the competence to stand trial
may be required. Surely a defendant who
. . . is simply incapable of effective communication or, because of less than
average intellectual powers, is unable to attain the minimal understanding
necessary to present a defense, is not to be allowed "to go to jail under
his own banner. . . ."
Factors to
consider . . . include the defendant's education, literacy,
fluency in English, and any physical or psychological disability which may
significantly affect his ability to communicate a possible defense to the jury. However, since Faretta [v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),] indicates that persons of average ability
and intelligence are entitled to represent themselves, a timely and proper
request [to proceed pro se] should be denied only where a specific problem or
disability can be identified which may prevent a meaningful defense from being
offered, should one exist.
Id. at 568-69
(citations omitted); see also Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at
212.
¶61 Thus, the circuit court may consider the factors enumerated in Pickens,
in addition to other factors. At the
same time, the record must demonstrate an identifiable problem or disability
that may prevent a defendant from making a meaningful defense.
¶62 Although the record here shows that the circuit court was concerned
about Marquardt's lack of legal skill, Marquardt's lack of legal skill was not
the sole basis for the circuit court's determination. At the hearing on Marquardt's competency to proceed pro se, the
court asked Marquardt about his education and experience, and Marquardt
testified that he had a high school education and that he had never been to a
trial before.
¶63 The circuit court voiced concern about "the absolute
seriousness of the charges[,] . . . the complexity of the
case[,]" and evidence of Marquardt's mental illness. In addition, the court observed that it was
"particularly concerned over Mr. Marquardt's kind of microscopic review of
all of these things, whether he's detached enough to make any sense out of the
charges and to put the state to its burden of proof."
¶64 Finally, the court relied on medical and psychological opinions as
to Marquardt's competence, which identified specific psychological problems or
diagnoses. In at least one instance, an
opinion concluded that Marquardt's psychological problems interfered with his
ability to plan a defense strategy.
¶65 The State in its brief refers to compelling evidence in the record
of Marquardt's mental illness. For
example, one psychiatrist opined that Marquardt suffers from a mental illness
that interfered with his ability to appreciate the charges against him. She explained as follows:
I believe that Mr. Marquardt suffers from a delusional
symptom which leaves him living in a world where he believes everything that's
going on around him is part of a plot to frame him and as such he cannot
appreciate that these are serious charges, that these things have occurred,
that there is evidence which indicates he has committed these crimes. He simply can't get beyond his belief that
the legal system is framing him.
The psychiatrist concluded that
Marquardt was "so delusional that he cannot appreciate the evidence"
and that "[h]e cannot plan a defense strategy that is
realistic . . . ."
¶66 Similarly, a psychologist opined that Marquardt suffers from a
delusional disorder of paranoid schizophrenia and that the nature of the
delusional system was a "command hallucination." According to the psychologist, Marquardt
professed to be "the [prophet] foretold by Nostradamus, to provide the
gift that will save the world."
Further, Marquardt's mental illness caused him to view anyone who
challenged his beliefs as "the enemy."
¶67 The circuit court concluded as follows, in reference to the medical
and psychological opinions that were before the court:
That would be at least part of the ruling because of
the fact that that has been——his mental status has been put into question by a
number of people, but I was more focusing on the recent, and that is watching
him here in court and understanding what I consider to be a very complex case. It isn't just some simple shoplifting, but
yes, I would also add that——and incorporate the reports that have been
received.
¶68 Contrary to what Marquardt argues, we conclude that the record
supports the circuit court's determination that Marquardt was not competent to
represent himself. We do not share
Marquardt's view that the circuit court must always make an express finding as
to which specific problem or disability prevented a defendant from being able
to meaningfully represent himself.
¶69 Our review of the record satisfies us that the medical and
psychological opinions in this case identified a number of specific problems
that could have prevented Marquardt from meaningfully presenting his own
defense and that the circuit court took these problems into account. Accordingly, we determine that the court did
not err in its decision on Marquardt's competency to represent himself.
V
¶70 In sum, we conclude that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to the March 15, 2000, search of Marquardt's
cabin. The affidavit in support of the
warrant contains indicia of probable cause sufficient to meet the Leon
test and the facts here demonstrate a significant investigation pursuant to Eason. Additionally, we conclude that the circuit
court did not err in its decision on Marquardt's competency to represent
himself in the Eau Claire County case.
¶71 Consequently, we affirm the Eau Claire County Circuit Court order
denying Marquardt's motion for post-commitment relief, and we reverse the
Chippewa County Circuit Court order suppressing evidence and order denying the
State's motion to reconsider the court's suppression order. We remand to the circuit court in each case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
By the Court.—The order of the Eau Claire County
Circuit Court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the orders of the Chippewa
County Circuit Court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶72 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
This case is best understood as illustrating the aphorism that
"hard cases make bad law."
This is a hard case because suppression of the evidence may jeopardize
prosecution of Marquardt, who is charged with first degree intentional
homicide.