PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-0880
Complete Title
of Case:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JIMMY LEE BRIDGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument: ----
COURT COURT
OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: June 13, 1995
Opinion Filed: June 13, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal
from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Milwaukee
(If "Special", JUDGE: PATRICIA D. McMAHON
so indicate)
JUDGES: WEDEMEYER,
P.J., SULLIVAN and SCHUDSON, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor
the defendant-appellant the cause was submitted on the memorandum of Virginia
A. Pomeroy, director, appellate division, state public defender.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor
the plaintiff-respondent the cause was submitted on the memorandum of Mary
E. Burke, assistant attorney general.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JUNE 13, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-0880
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JIMMY LEE BRIDGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
PATRICIA D. McMAHON, Judge. Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Jimmy Bridges, pro se, filed a
notice of appeal seeking review of a February 22, 1994, order of the trial
court extending, for one year, the confinement portion of his sentence to the
intensive sanctions program. See
§ 973.032(4)(b), Stats. This court ordered the parties to submit
memoranda on the issue of this court's jurisdiction over the appeal. Among other things, this court asked the
parties to address whether an order extending a convicted criminal offender's
period of confinement under the intensive sanctions program is reviewable under
Rule 809.30, Stats., the statute for appeals in
felony cases, or under some other common law or statutory authority. After reviewing the memoranda and
the statutes, we conclude that an order extending the period of
confinement under the intensive sanctions program is reviewable pursuant to the
principles of common law writ of certiorari.
Because Bridges filed a notice of appeal on April 8, 1994, from a
February 22, 1994, order of the trial court, this appeal is timely under §
808.04(1), Stats. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction over
this appeal.
Bridges was convicted of
burglary, as party to a crime, on November 24, 1992, and sentenced to
intensive sanctions for four years with a one-year period of
confinement. On February 22, 1994,
the trial court extended Bridges' period of confinement for an additional
year. Bridges filed a notice of appeal
from the order extending the period of confinement.
The statutory provisions
governing sentences to the intensive sanctions program are §§ 301.048 and
973.032, Stats. The trial court may sentence a convicted
criminal offender to intensive sanctions.
Section 973.032(1), Stats. A trial court sentencing a convicted
criminal offender to intensive sanctions must specify a maximum period for
confinement in a prison or other Type 1 facility. Section 973.032(3)(a), Stats. The confinement period may not exceed one
year, unless waived by the offender.
Section 973.032(3)(b), Stats. The department of corrections may request
that the trial court extend the designated maximum confinement
period. Section 973.032(4)(b), Stats.
The trial court may not extend the maximum confinement period beyond a
total of two years or two-thirds of the maximum period of imprisonment that
could have been imposed, whichever is less.
Id.
The statutes do not
specify how a convicted criminal offender may appeal an order extending the
maximum confinement period when a sentence to intensive sanctions has been
imposed. The statute for appeals
in felony cases provides that the defendant shall file a notice of intent
to pursue postconviction relief "[w]ithin 20 days of the date of
sentencing." (Emphasis
added.) Rule 809.30(2)(b), Stats. In cases where the department of corrections
requests an extension of the maximum confinement period, the trial court's
order would not be made until nearly a year after the sentence had been imposed
and a substantial period of the confinement had been served. A trial court's order extending the maximum
period of confinement is not, in itself, a "sentence." Such an order simply changes the location
where a portion of the previously-imposed sentence is served by extending the
time spent in confinement in a prison or other Type 1 facility. We therefore conclude that Rule 809.30 does not provide authority
for an appeal from an order extending the maximum period of confinement.
A decision may be
reviewed by common law certiorari when no legislative provision establishes how
review may be had. See State ex
rel. Smits v. City of DePere, 104 Wis.2d 26, 31, 310 N.W.2d 607, 609
(1981). Common law certiorari may be
used to review judicial decisions. See
State ex rel. DHSS v. Circuit Court, 84 Wis.2d 707, 711-12, 267
N.W.2d 373, 375 (1978). Although the
statutes governing the intensive sanctions program do not specify how a trial
court's order extending the maximum period of confinement may be appealed, the
statutes do provide that other decisions made when a person is sentenced to
intensive sanctions, such sanction, discipline, and probation revocation
proceedings, may be reviewed by common law writ of certiorari. See § 301.048(3)(d), Stats.
Parole decisions and probation revocation proceedings which, like orders
extending the maximum period of confinement, are made after the time for direct
appeal from the judgment and sentence has elapsed, are reviewable by common law
certiorari. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Rodriguez v. DHSS, 133 Wis.2d 47, 393 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App.
1986). Because parole decisions,
probation revocation proceedings, and other decisions made when a person is
sentenced to intensive sanctions are reviewable by writ of certiorari, we
conclude that certiorari is the proper method of challenging a trial court's
order extending the period of confinement.
Section 808.04(1), Stats., provides that an appeal must be
initiated within ninety days of entry of the judgment or order appealed from
unless written notice of entry is given, which shortens the deadline. Bridges appealed the trial court's order
forty-five days after it was entered.
Because this appeal was timely filed pursuant to § 808.04(1), Stats., the court has jurisdiction.
By the Court.—Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal.