|
Case Nos.: |
01-0724 01-1031 01-2486 |
|
|
Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for Review filed |
|
|
Opinion Filed: |
September 30, 2003 |
|
Submitted on Briefs: |
---- |
|
Oral Argument: |
July 1, 2003 |
|
|
|
|
JUDGES: |
Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Schudson, JJ. |
|
Concurred: |
Fine, J. |
|
Dissented: |
Schudson, J. |
|
|
|
|
Appellant |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant and defendant-respondent-cross-appellant Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., the cause was submitted on the briefs of Ralph A. Weber, Amelia L. McCarthy and David E. Osswald of Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., Milwaukee, Colleen D. Ball of Appellate Counsel S.C., Wauwatosa and John W. Bell and Kevin G. Owens of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. There was oral argument by Ralph A. Weber. |
|
Respondent |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., the cause was submitted on the brief of Dean P. Laing and William A. Wiseman of O’Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., Milwaukee. There was oral argument by Dean P. Laing. |
|
|
|
|
Respondent |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-respondent Neil F. Lampson, Inc., the cause was submitted on the brief of Donald H. Carlson, Jeffrey T. Nichols and Ryan G. Braithwaite of Crivello, Carlson & Mentkowski, S.C., Milwaukee. There was oral argument by Donald H. Carlson. |
|
Respondent |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiffs-intervenors-respondents and plaintiffs-respondents-cross-respondents, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Robert L. Habush, Daniel A. Rottier, Mark S. Young and Virginia M. Antoine, of Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee and David P. Lowe of Jacquart & Lowe, S.C., Milwaukee. There was oral argument by Robert L. Habush. |
|
Appellant ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant-petitioner and defendant-appellant-cross-respondent The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Brady C. Williamson, James A. Friedman and Katherine Stadler, of La Follette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison. There was oral argument by Brady C. Williamson. |
|
|
|
|
Co-appellant |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant, defendant-co-appellant and defendant-respondent-cross-appellant Federal Insurance Company, the cause was submitted on the briefs of John A. Busch and Christopher C. Mohrman of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee and Edward B. Ruff III, Michael Clarke, pro hac vice and Benjamin A. Crane, pro hoc vice of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, Illinois. There was oral argument by John A. Busch. |
|
|
|
|
Respondent |
|
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant, defendant-respondent-cross appellant The Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Jeffrey S. Fertl of Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee. There was oral argument by Jeffrey S. Fertl. |
|
|
A nonparty brief was filed by Eric Englund, Madison, for Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. |
|
|
|
|
|
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, III of Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. |
2003 WI App 202
|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 30, 2003 Cornelia G. Clark Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
|
Appeal Nos. |
01-1031 01-2486 |
|
Cir. Ct. No. 99
CV 6553 |
||
|
STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
||||
|
|
|
||||
|
|
|
||||
|
|
|
||||
|
No. 01-0724 Patricia
Wischer, individually, and as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Jeffrey
A. Wischer, deceased, Marjorie DeGrave,
individually, and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of William R. DeGrave,
deceased, and Ramona Dulde-Starr, individually,
and as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Jerome W. Starr, deceased, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Respondents, v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries America, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, The
Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, Defendant, Neil
F. Lampson, Inc., Defendant-Respondent, Lampson
International Ltd., Federal Insurance
Company, and The Tokio Marine
& Fire Insurance Company, Defendants. No. 01-1031 Patricia
Wischer, individually, and as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Jeffrey
A. Wischer, deceased, Marjorie DeGrave,
individually, and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of William R. DeGrave,
deceased, and Ramona Dulde-Starr, individually,
and as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Jerome W. Starr, deceased, Plaintiffs-Respondents- Cross-Respondents, v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries America, Inc., Defendant-Respondent- Cross-Appellant, The
Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, Neil
F. Lampson, Inc. and Lampson
International Ltd., Defendants, Federal
Insurance Company, Defendant-Co-Appellant, The
Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company, Defendant. No. 01-2486 Patricia
Wischer, individually, and as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Jeffrey
A. Wischer, deceased, Marjorie DeGrave,
individually, and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of William R. DeGrave,
deceased, and Ramona Dulde-Starr, individually,
and as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Jerome W. Starr, deceased, Plaintiffs-Respondents- Cross-Respondents, v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries America, Inc., Defendant-Respondent- Cross-Appellant, The
Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant- Cross-Respondent, Neil
F. Lampson, Inc. and Lampson
International Ltd., Defendants, Federal
Insurance Company and The
Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Respondents- Cross-Appellants. |
|||||
|
|
|
||||
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from judgments and orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: dominic s. amato, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Schudson, JJ.
¶1 WEDEMEYER, P.J. This case involves three consolidated cases in the so-called “Miller Park” appeals.[1] Although the cases underlying this consolidated appeal present many issues of varying complexity, there is one dispositive issue: whether, based on the facts as conceded by the plaintiffs, the $94,000,000 punitive-damage award is contrary to the calls of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) (1999-2000).[2] We hold that it is. Accordingly, we reverse the punitive-damage award, and consequently do not address the other issues. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (only dispositive issues need be addressed). The judgment relative to the compensatory damage award is affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In appeal number 01-0724, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., appeals from a judgment dismissing Neil F. Lampson, Inc. (the designer and manufacturer of the crane involved), following the trial court’s decision directing a verdict in Neil F.’s favor. Patricia Wischer, Marjorie DeGrave and Ramona Dulde-Starr (the plaintiffs) filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, which was granted.[3]
¶3 In the other consolidated cases, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois and Federal Insurance Company appeal from judgments entered against them and in favor of the plaintiffs and in favor of Mitsubishi, their insured. Mitsubishi filed a cross-appeal challenging the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs following a seven-week jury trial. In addition, Travelers appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering it to pay the entire jury verdict as a consequence of its failure to plead and prove its policy limits during the trial. Federal and The Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company cross-appeal from the judgments rendered against them and in favor of the plaintiffs and Travelers, ordering the insurers to pay their policy limits of $50,000,000 and $2,000,000, respectively. In this case, Mitsubishi also maintains a cross-appeal against the plaintiffs.[4]
¶4 The dispositive issue in this appeal is governed by Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), enacted by our legislature in 1995, which provides: “The plaintiff may receive punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.”
¶5 Based upon our analysis of the statute, we hold that the phrase “intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff” in Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) can only be reasonably interpreted to require either an intent by a defendant to cause injury to the plaintiffs or knowledge that the defendant’s conduct was practically certain to cause the accident or injury to the plaintiffs. Based on this conclusion, together with the concession by both the plaintiffs and the trial court that there is no evidence demonstrating that Mitsubishi intended to cause injury or knew that its conduct was practically certain to cause injury, we reverse the award of punitive damages.[5]
¶6 Because we have reached this conclusion, it
is not necessary for us to address any of the other issues raised in this
appeal. All of the remaining issues are
moot.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶7 July 14, 1999, was to be an exciting day in the construction of Miller Park stadium, the home of the Milwaukee Brewers major league professional baseball team. On that day, a crane known as “Big Blue” was to lift a large piece of the retractable roof of the stadium so workers could bolt it into place. Unfortunately, the lift did not go as planned. Big Blue broke and its boom struck the crane holding three ironworkers who were to secure the roof. All three workers fell to their instant death.
¶8 In order to understand the events of July 14, 1999, it is important to know who the relevant parties and non-parties are and how they came to work together that fateful day.
The Parties
¶9 The construction of Miller Park stadium was a joint effort involving many individuals and business organizations. The general contractor for the construction project was a joint venture of three companies: Hunzinger Construction Company, Clark Construction Builders, Inc., and Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. (“general-contractor joint venture”). The general-contractor joint venture hired eighty contractors and those contractors hired approximately two hundred subcontractors.
¶10 One of the contractors hired by the general-contractor joint venture was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc. Mitsubishi was hired to build the stadium roof according to an architectural design, to erect the roof, and to design, build, and install the drive system that moved the roof panels. Victor Grotlisch was Mitsubishi’s site manager, and Wayne Noel was Mitsubishi’s safety superintendent.
¶11 Mitsubishi hired Lampson International Ltd., an industry leader in performing heavy lifts, to help install the roof of the stadium. Lampson International leased a crane known as “Big Blue” to Mitsubishi. On April 22, 1998, Mitsubishi and Lampson International entered into an agreement for the lease of a crane to assist in the lift of the Miller Park roof. The lease agreement stated that Lampson International would provide a TransiLift 1200 Series IIA crane; however, Lampson International actually provided a TransiLift 1500 Series IIIA crane.
¶12 A transi-lift crane is a crane that is not stationary; it can pick up and transport extremely heavy loads. Big Blue is a TransiLift crane that stands forty-five stories high and rests on a base only ten yards wide. The crane sits on two crawlers, the means by which it moves. A car body sits on each crawler, and on each body are a table and a plastic bearing. The boom is the long lattice arm extending from the plastic bearing. At the end of the boom is a joint, and extending beyond the joint is a shorter lattice called the jib. Any load carried by the crane hangs from the jib.
¶13 Lampson International also supplied a crew to assemble Big Blue on site, and provided a crew to operate the crane. Fred Flowers was the crane operator; Alan Watts was the flagger and supervisor for the Lampson crew.
¶14 Neil F. Lampson was the principal designer and manufacturer of the TransiLift crane known as Big Blue. As designer, Neil F. made changes to the design of Big Blue and a last minute addition to the assembly of the crane. Both changes and the possibility of a negligent design of the crane were raised as issues in this case.
¶15 Danny’s Construction Company, Inc. (DCCI) was hired to bolt the stadium roof into place. The deceased ironworkers employed by DCCI included Jeffrey Wischer, William DeGrave and Jerome Starr. Red Lewis was DCCI’s superintendent and Joe Edwards was the operator of the crane that lifted the ironworkers.
Insurance
¶16 The stadium’s owner, Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball Park District, purchased an Owners Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) to provide commercial general liability insurance coverage for the Miller Park construction project. The coverage was “layered” in that each insurer’s coverage attached when the underlying policy was exhausted. Thus, one insurer provided coverage up to a certain amount and, when that amount was exhausted, another insurer provided coverage up to a certain amount, and so on. The priority for coverage under the OCIP was as follows:
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois $2,000,000
Royal Insurance Company of America $5,000,000
Indemnity Insurance Company of North America $20,000,000
Federal Insurance Company $50,000,000
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois $25,000,000
The Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company $2,000,000 in
separate coverage
for MHIA, attaches
at $75,000,000.
¶17 The parties entered into three settlement agreements. The first two were entered into before trial and involved the payment of $2,000,000 (Travelers) and $5,000,000 (Royal) to the plaintiffs. The third settlement is known as the IINA agreement, which was entered into during trial on November 7, 2000. Under the IINA settlement, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Mitsubishi, its parent company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries LTD, and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (IINA). The agreement provided for an immediate payment of $12,375,000, which would be credited against any compensatory damages awarded by the jury. The IINA agreement then capped punitive damages at $84,626,000 if it was later determined that Mitsubishi had insurance coverage, and $10,000,000 if Mitsubishi did not have insurance coverage.
¶18 The IINA agreement was not disclosed to the trial court or any other party until one month after the jury reached its verdict. The jury returned a compensatory damage verdict of $5,250,000 and a punitive damage award of $94,000,000 against Mitsubishi.
The Day of the Lift
¶19 At 7:30 a.m. on July 14, 1999, several people participated in a pre-lift meeting at Miller Park. At that meeting, Victor Grotlisch, Mitsubishi’s site manager, discussed the weather report, Allen Watts, the Lampson supervisor, discussed how the lift would occur, and Wayne Noel, Mitsubishi’s safety supervisor, discussed safety issues involved in the lift, including rescue, radio communication, and responsibilities. At this meeting, Noel told the workers that anyone could stop the lift for any reason at any time if it was unsafe to continue.
¶20 While Mitsubishi stresses the importance of this statement because the lift requires people at different locations watching the lift from different angles, the plaintiffs claim that the workers are in no position to tell supervisors to stop a lift because the workers, having families to support, do not want to risk their jobs.
¶21 At about 10 a.m., Big Blue picked the roof piece off of the ground and crews checked the load stabilization and center of gravity. By 11:00 or 11:30 a.m., Grotlisch, Watts, and a DCCI representative agreed that the lift could proceed. Watts, Lampson’s supervisor, was then in charge of the lift.
¶22 Later in the afternoon, Grotlisch checked the wind speeds and was informed by Watts that the lift was going fine. Wischer, DeGrave and Starr entered the man basket and were lifted so that they could bolt the roof into place. As the roof was being lifted, there was a squeal of brakes and a loud snap. Big Blue toppled and struck the boom of the crane holding the ironworkers. Wischer, DeGrave and Starr fell to an instant death.[6]
Procedural History
¶23 On August 12, 1999, plaintiffs, the wives of the decedents, filed a lawsuit charging the general-contractor joint venture, Mitsubishi, Lampson International, and Neil F. Lampson with negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. On September 15, 2000, based on a settlement, the court dismissed the general-contractor joint venture from the lawsuit. On October 16, 2000, the case went to trial. During trial, the parties disagreed on the interpretation of Wisconsin’s punitive damages statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). As noted, the statute states:
The plaintiff may receive punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.
Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3).
¶24 During the trial, the court directed a verdict in favor of Neil F., leaving Mitsubishi and Lampson as the only defendants in the lawsuit. On November 7, 2000, the IINA agreement was executed, limiting Mitsubishi’s liability, and on December 1, 2000, the jury returned a verdict attributing 97% liability to Mitsubishi and 3% liability to Lampson International. As noted, the jury awarded $5,250,000 million in compensatory damages and $94,000,000 in punitive damages against Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi filed several post-verdict motions, all of which were denied by the trial court.
¶25 After the jury verdict was returned, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to seek recovery of punitive damages from Federal Insurance Company, claiming that Federal was liable to the plaintiffs for the damages. The plaintiffs also amended the complaint to seek recovery of punitive damages from Tokio Marine, seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy provided coverage for punitive damages. After motions and hearings, the trial court entered summary judgment against Federal and Tokio Marine in their direct actions.
¶26 Separate from Federal and Tokio Marine’s liability to the plaintiffs is their liability to Travelers. The trial court entered judgment against Travelers Insurance Company for $84,625,000 for Travelers’s failure to plead and prove its policy limits as part of the OCIP. As a result, Travelers filed cross-claims against Federal and Tokio Marine for equitable subrogation, equitable contribution, and unjust enrichment. The trial court concluded that Travelers was entitled to judgment against Federal and Tokio Marine on a theory of equitable subrogation. The trial court concluded that the $77,000,000 judgment against Mitsubishi was payable as follows:
With respect to the plaintiffs’ judgment against [Mitsubishi], the remaining amount of which is $77 million plus taxable costs and interest, the first $50 million plus corresponding taxable costs and interest is insured by Federal … the next $25 million plus corresponding taxable costs and interest is insured by Travelers … and the last $2 million plus corresponding taxable costs and interest is insured by Tokio Marine …. For the benefit of [Mitsubishi] only, the entire $77 million plus corresponding taxable costs and interest, as previously adjudged, is insured by Travelers ….
¶27 Based on the above judgments, Mitsubishi appeals the punitive damage award as excessive and not warranted by the evidence contending that there is no evidence of either intent to injure the decedents or knowledge that such injury was practically certain to occur. Mitsubishi also appeals the trial court order dismissing Neil F. from the action, the trial court’s refusal to include DCCI on the verdict, and the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of Mitsubishi’s wealth. The plaintiffs intervened in this appeal because they believed resolution of this matter might affect the punitive damage judgment.
¶28 Travelers Insurance appeals the $77,000,000 judgment against it for failing to plead and prove its policy limits in the trial court. Travelers argues that its policy limit was $25,000,000, and its policy attaches at the $77,000,000 mark; therefore, it should not be liable for $77,000,000 because Travelers cannot be liable for more than its policy limits. Travelers also argues that if the judgment against it is affirmed, the cross-claims against Federal and Tokio Marine should also be affirmed because the judgments do “no more than enforce those two insurance contracts, preventing both an injustice to Travelers and an outrageous windfall for Federal and Tokio.”
¶29 Federal Insurance appeals the direct action judgment against it in favor of the plaintiffs and the judgment against it in favor of Travelers on the cross-claim. Federal claims that the Wisconsin direct action statute does not provide the plaintiffs with a cause of action against it and, even if the statute does, the insurance policy does not cover punitive damages because such an award is against public policy and in excess of Mitsubishi’s liability under the IINA agreement.
¶30 Tokio Marine appeals the direct action judgment against it in favor of the plaintiffs and the portion of the judgment against it in favor of Travelers on its cross-claim. Tokio Marine claims that Travelers must be liable for the amount of damages because it failed to prove its policy limits. In addition, Tokio Marine claims that its policy does not cover punitive damages because such an award is in excess of Mitsubishi’s liability under the IINA agreement.
III. DISCUSSION
¶31 Indeed, there is no dispute that this case involved a horrible tragedy. The three men who died gave their lives in the process of erecting a state-of-the-art structure. The wives and families of the decedents suffered an immeasurable loss. In compensation for the loss, the three plaintiffs have received a total of $27,000,000. Regardless of our decision on this appeal, that compensation stands.[7]
¶32 The dispositive issue in this case involves the interpretation of a statute. Accordingly, our review is independent from that of the trial court. Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶26, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158. As a part of our interpretation, we strive to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature; our first consideration is the plain language of the statute. Id., ¶27. The language of the statute provides: “The plaintiff may receive punitive damage if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.” Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). We conclude that the statute is not ambiguous. See State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶14, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171. When the language of a statute is clear, we need only apply “the statutory text to determine the statute’s meaning.” Id. (citation omitted). If the language of the statute “unambiguously expresses the intent of the legislature, we apply that meaning without resorting to extrinsic sources of legislative intent.” Id. (citation omitted). “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning.” Id. (citation omitted). “Rules of statutory construction are inapplicable if the language of the statute has a plain and reasonable meaning on its face.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “[w]hether there is sufficient evidence to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury is a question of law which this court independently reviews.” Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis. 2d 150, 187-88, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991).
¶33 Here, the plain language of the statute sets forth two standards under which punitive damages may be appropriate. The first category indicates punitive damages may be appropriate if the conduct is malicious. The second category allows a punitive damage award when there is an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.
¶34 All parties concede that the record here is devoid of malicious conduct. Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Robert L. Habush, stated:
We concede that there was no malicious act here, we concede it is not necessary for them to intend to have harmed these people.… [T]he hazard, the wind, and doing a lift in the face of this wind without any engineering calculations whatsoever, once that’s known, they affirmatively decided to go ahead with this lift, and that is the intentional disregard.
The dispute then specifically entails the interpretation of the phrase “intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.” The plaintiffs argue that this standard simply requires evidence demonstrating that Mitsubishi acted volitionally to do something that resulted in the rights of the decedents to a safe work environment being disregarded, and that this part of the statute does not require that any of Mitsubishi’s employees either intended that harm result or have either subjective or objective knowledge that such harm was practically certain to occur. They contend that Grotlisch’s decision to proceed with the lift on such a windy day under hazardous conditions demonstrated his disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs, thus satisfying the statutory standard and justifying the jury’s punitive damage award.[8] The plaintiffs thus argue that punitive damages are appropriate when the defendant intentionally disregards the injured party’s right to safety, but that intent to injure is not required. In his closing argument, plaintiffs’ counsel stated:
I believe the evidence has shown to you that there was intentional disregard of the rights of the three deceased ironworkers. The intentional part is easy. They intended to do the lift. They made the decision to do the lift. It was an intentional decision. They didn’t stumble into it. It was an intentional decision in the face of hazards and obvious wind conditions, and in doing so, they ignored, they disregarded the rights of those three men.
And what were those rights? The right to a safe workplace. The right to life. And in so doing, they intentionally disregarded those rights of the three deceased ironworkers.
We don’t have to prove that Victor Grotlisch intended to kill these guys. This is not a criminal case. We don’t have to prove that they knew for sure that crane was going to go down.
Let me give you an example. A person decides to run the stop sign, I’m going to run that stop sign, and in running that stop sign crashes into a crossing vehicle, killing the occupants. Would we hear that driver be able to say, I didn’t intend to kill those occupants, I didn’t know Sally, I didn’t know Bill, I didn’t intend to kill them?
But that person intended to run that stop sign and, in so doing, must bear the consequences of an intentional disregard of the rights of any other vehicle or pedestrian that might have come into harm’s way by that intentional act.
….
There can’t be any question, members of the jury, that this was an intentional decision on the part of Grotlisch, concurred in by Noel, that the hazards were obvious and ignored, that the rights of these three men, the right to life, the right to limb, the right to a safe workplace, were ignored and disregarded, as the law calls.
¶35 On the other hand, the defendants argue that punitive damages would be appropriate only if Mitsubishi either: (1) intended to cause the accident or injury; or (2) was aware that its conduct was practically certain to cause the accident or injury. Based on this standard, Mitsubishi claims that this case is not appropriate for a punitive damages award because, as the plaintiffs concede, Mitsubishi did not intend to cause injury or believe with substantial certainty that injury would occur. In their brief in opposition to Federal’s summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs concede the following:
The fact that Grotlisch was in the zone of danger indicates that he could not have believed that there was a substantial certainty that injury would occur.
….
[T]here is no evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the [Mitsubishi] employees intended to cause bodily injury to the decedents or that they knew or should have known that bodily injury was substantially certain to follow from their acts.
Mitsubishi argues that because the defendants did not act with malice, and because the plaintiffs concede that the defendants did not intend to injure the plaintiffs, there was no punitive damages issue for the jury.[9]
¶36 Mitsubishi contends that its interpretation of the new statutory standard is supported by the legislature’s intent to narrow the types of cases in which a punitive damage award would be appropriate. Mitsubishi points to the guidance offered by the jury instruction committee in interpreting the new statute and suggests that the proper interpretation of the statutory standard requires either intent to cause the accident or injury or knowledge that its conduct was practically certain to cause the accident or injury.
¶37 When faced with this disputed issue during the trial, the trial court agreed with the statutory interpretation proffered by the plaintiffs. Adopting the plaintiffs’ interpretation, the trial court determined that there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The court ruled:
There is absolutely no evidence in this record to show that it was the intent of anyone, let alone Mitsubishi, there was never any evidence to indicate that Mitsubishi or anyone intended to cause an injury. There was a finding by the jury on the punitive damage questions that there was an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs and others.
….