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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
February 8, 2011
A.
John Voelker
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing.� If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.�
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.�
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Appeal No.�
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STATE OF WISCONSIN���
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT III
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State of Wisconsin,
���������
Plaintiff-Respondent,
���� v.
Arthur J. Anderson,
���������
Defendant-Appellant.
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����������� APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Forest County:� THOMAS
G. GROVER, Judge.� Affirmed.�
�1������� BRUNNER, J. Arthur
Anderson appeals a judgment of conviction for criminal damage to property and
an order denying postconviction relief.� Anderson asserts he should
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it lacked a factual
basis.� We affirm.
BACKGROUND
�2������� Heidi Smith lent her car to Anderson with the understanding that he would
return it the following morning.� When Anderson failed to return
the vehicle, Smith reported the vehicle stolen.�
A couple days later, police found the vehicle abandoned and rolled over
in a ditch.� Police determined that the
vehicle had hit a deer.� The vehicle was
totaled.�
�3������� Anderson
was charged with operating a motor vehicle without owner�s consent and two
counts of bail jumping.� Pursuant to a
plea agreement, the State amended the operating a motor vehicle without owner�s
consent charge to criminal damage to property and moved to dismiss one of the
bail jumping charges.� Anderson pled guilty.� The circuit court, after reviewing the
elements of criminal damage to property and bail jumping with Anderson and finding a factual basis in the
criminal complaint, accepted his pleas.
�4������� After sentencing, Anderson
filed a postconviction motion, asserting there was no factual basis upon which
the circuit court could find he intentionally damaged property.� The court denied Anderson�s motion.�
DISCUSSION
�5������� In order to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, Anderson must establish a
manifest injustice.� See State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996).� Manifest injustice occurs if the trial court
fails �to establish a sufficient factual basis that the defendant committed the
offense to which he or she pleads.�� Id.� However, when a guilty plea is entered pursuant
to a plea agreement, the circuit court is not required to go �to the same
length to determine whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would
where there is no negotiated plea.�� Broadie
v. State, 68 Wis.
2d 420, 423-24, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975).� On
a motion to withdraw, the court may look at the totality of the circumstances,
including the plea hearing, the sentencing hearing, and statements made by the
defendant�s counsel, to determine whether a defendant has agreed to the factual
basis underlying the guilty plea.� State
v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, �18, 232 Wis. 2d
714, 605 N.W.2d 836.� �The determination
of the existence of a sufficient factual basis lies within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be overturned unless it is clearly
erroneous.�� Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 25.
�6������� To be found guilty of criminal damage to property, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant caused damage to physical
property.� 2. The defendant intentionally
caused the damage.� 3. The property
belonged to another person.�
4. The defendant caused the damage without the consent of
[the owner].� 5. The defendant knew
the property belonged to another person and knew that the other person did not
consent to the damage.
Wis JI�Criminal 1400 (2002); see also Wis. Stat. � 943.01.� Anderson
asserts that there was no factual basis to support a determination he
intentionally damaged the vehicle.�
Specifically, he contends the police report, which was incorporated into
the criminal complaint, refers to his vehicle as having been in an
accident.� Anderson argues an accident is not
intentional.
�7������� However, the record supports the circuit court�s
determination that Anderson
intentionally damaged the property.� During
the plea colloquy, the circuit court explained to Anderson that an element of criminal damage
to property is that the damage was intentional and not accidental.� The court stated: �[T]he District Attorney
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that � you did intentionally, on
purpose, not by accident, cause damage to somebody�s property.�� The court asked Anderson
if he understood the charge and Anderson
indicated he did.� Anderson then pled guilty.� Here, the intent element was shown through Anderson�s voluntary
guilty plea.� See N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 97, 450
N.W.2d 445 (1990) (holding intent to act is shown by a voluntary plea of guilty);
see also Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ��18, 20-21 (noting a court may look
at statements made during the plea hearing to establish a factual basis).� We conclude the record provides an adequate
factual basis to support Anderson�s
conviction for criminal damage to property.
����������� By the Court.�Judgment and order
affirmed.
����������� This
opinion will not be published.� See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.