2010 wi app 172
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2010AP165-CR |
|
Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for Review |
|
State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dekoria Marks, Defendant-Appellant.† |
|
|
Opinion Filed: |
November 23, 2010 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
November 2, 2010 |
Oral Argument: |
|
|
|
JUDGES: |
Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ. |
Concurred: |
|
Dissented: |
|
|
|
Appellant |
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Joel A. Mogren of |
|
|
Respondent |
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general and James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general. |
|
|
2010 WI App 172
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 23, 2010 A.
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
|
|||
STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dekoria Marks, Defendant-Appellant. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Fine, Kessler and
¶1 FINE, J. Dekoria Marks appeals the judgment
entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of attempted second-degree
intentional homicide, see Wis. Stat. §§ 940.05(1)(a) &
939.32, and from the order denying her motion for postconviction relief.[1] She claims that: (1) her trial lawyer gave her
constitutionally deficient representation; (2) the trial court erred when
it refused to let the jury hear the unredacted version of what she told a
I.
¶2 The jury found Marks
guilty of stabbing her on-again and off-again boyfriend, Edward Davis, during
an argument they had on an early January 2008 morning. Neither Marks nor
¶3 According to Walls and Gregory Marks, they were in a bedroom
of a house owned by the Marks’s grandfather, when
¶4 Both Walls and Gregory Marks testified that Davis left the house that night before he told Walls and Gregory Marks that he was stabbed, and that he left the house either once or many times to, as phrased by Walls, “score drugs.” Gregory Marks also told the jury that Davis, whom he described as “a chronic crack user,” was in trouble with some drug dealers, having “stole eight ounces of crack from a drug dealer and a Rolex.”[2] Gregory Marks also indicated that, as an apparent result, someone threw a Molotov cocktail at his grandfather’s house.
¶5 Once Gregory Marks saw that Davis was hurt, he called 911, and then both he and Walls hurried out of the house in order to avoid the police. The police arrived quickly, however, and they were ushered back into the house. Detective Chicks later interviewed both Walls and Gregory Marks separately in Chicks’s squad car, and, later, after she was arrested, Dekoria Marks.
¶6 According to Detective Chicks, Walls told him that Davis and
Dekoria Marks were “arguing loud” in the other room and that she heard
¶7 Detective Chicks also told the jury that Gregory Marks had described the incident as follows:
They continued to arguing, and Edward Davis -- he heard his voice yelling she stabbed me or you stabbed me, and Edward walks out of the room. He’s bleeding.
Dekoria walked out behind him, and he sees that she’s holding a knife in her hand; and he asked Dekoria what did -- either -- either called her by name or called her girl, said what did you do; and she responded to him by saying there you go -- taking sides again; and she said she told him that she stabbed him because he was hitting her.
¶8 As noted, Detective Chicks also interviewed Dekoria Marks
once she was in custody. Audio of the
interview was recorded and was transferred to a CD and transcribed. Portions of the CD, as redacted by the trial
court, were played for the jury concurrent with Detective Chicks’s
testimony. According to Detective
Chicks’s testimony, Dekoria Marks said that
DETECTIVE: So what exactly did he, you said he slapped you?
DETECTIVE: Where?
DETECTIVE: Okay. Why did he do that?
DETECTIVE: Okay.
DETECTIVE: And so, after he slapped you, what did you do to him?
DETECTIVE: How did you defend yourself?
DETECTIVE: Yeah, what did, what specifically did you do?
DETECTIVE: Okay. How many times?
DETECTIVE: How many times did he slap you?
DETECTIVE: When you sl-, when you uh, stabbed him, was he, was he facing you or was he facing away from you?
Earlier, Walls had testified
that Davis was “beating on” Dekoria Marks “lots of times” and that he “gets
aggressive with her” when they argue.
According to what Detective Chicks told Dekoria Marks during the
in-custody interview,
¶9 The jury also heard from a police officer who rode in the
ambulance with
II.
¶10 As we have seen, Dekoria Marks claims that: (1) her trial lawyer gave her constitutionally deficient representation; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to let the jury hear the unredacted version of what she told Detective Chicks; and (3) she is entitled to a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 752.35. We address each of these contentions in turn.
A. Alleged ineffective trial representation.
¶11 Dekoria Marks argues that her trial lawyer gave her constitutionally deficient representation in four respects, and contends that the circuit court should have granted her an evidentiary hearing. Before we get to her arguments, we restate the applicable standards.
¶12 To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) deficient representation; and
(2) prejudice. Strickland v.
¶13 Further, courts need not address both aspects of the
1. Inconsistent defenses.
¶14 Dekoria Marks’s first contention is that her lawyer was constitutionally ineffective because he gave the jury two inconsistent theories: (1) that she stabbed Davis in self-defense, and (2) that Davis was stabbed by unknown angry drug dealers when he was out of the house that morning. In essence, Dekoria Marks argues that her trial lawyer’s strategy was fatally flawed because despite the broad berth to which we give a lawyers’ strategic decisions under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards, see State v. Westmoreland, 2008 WI App 15, ¶20, 307 Wis. 2d 429, 439, 744 N.W.2d 919, 924 (“[S]trategic decisions by a lawyer are virtually invulnerable to second-guessing.”); State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 464–465, 549 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Ct. App. 1996) (“A strategic trial decision rationally based on the facts and the law will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”), it was not within the realm of what Strickland calls the “wide range of professionally competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. We disagree.
¶15 First, “it is not uncommon for lawyers to argue inconsistent
defenses.”
¶16 Second, given Davis’s assertion to the police officer who rode with him to the hospital that he was “hit in the back” by attackers when he was outside the house, coupled with the evidence that he was at risk of being killed because he stole from drug dealers, the argument that he was stabbed by them might have persuaded one or more jurors that the State had not carried its beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden despite: (1) what Dekoria Marks told Walls, her brother, and Detective Chicks, and (2) what her brother and Walls said that Davis said at the house. Simply put, in order to get any conviction, the State had to persuade all the jurors that Dekoria Marks did what it said she did.
¶17 In light of the not uncommon practice of lawyers to argue inconsistent theories, we cannot say that the decision of Dekoria Marks’s trial lawyer to argue them here deprived her of the right to constitutionally effective assistance, irrespective of whether we or the trial court view that strategy as the best. As we noted in Westmoreland, 2008 WI App 15, ¶21, 307 Wis. 2d at 440, 744 N.W.2d at 925: “As Strickland reminds us, there is a ‘wide range of professionally competent assistance,’ id., 466 U.S. at 690, and the bar is not very high, see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (lawyer need not be a Clarence Darrow to survive an ineffectiveness contention).”
¶18 Further, although we do not have to look at the prejudice aspect of Strickland because Dekoria Marks’s trial lawyer was within the “wide range” of professional practice when he asked the jury to choose either of two inconsistent defenses, Dekoria Marks has not shown that her trial lawyer’s strategic decision to present the two defenses made the result of the trial unreliable. Dekoria Marks was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide. See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a) & 939.32. The trial court instructed the jury that it could return a guilty verdict on the lesser-included crime of attempted second-degree intentional homicide if it determined that Dekoria Marks believed that she had to act in self-defense but her belief was not reasonable.[3] As we have seen, the jury found her guilty of the lesser crime.
2. Evidence of Dekoria Marks’s fear of
¶19 Dekoria Marks’s second claim that her trial lawyer gave her constitutionally deficient representation is that he did not file a motion under McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973), which held:
When the issue of self-defense is raised in a prosecution for assault or homicide and there is a factual basis to support such defense, the defendant may, in support of the defense, establish what the defendant believed to be the turbulent and violent character of the victim by proving prior specific instances of violence within his [the defendant’s] knowledge at the time of the incident.
Clearly, the worst that could have occurred is that
[the] Trial Court could have denied the motion and [Dekoria] Marks’ [sic] would have been in the same
position of having to proceed with two theories of defense, or the best case
scenario, the Trial Court could have granted the motion, and then [Dekoria]
Marks’ [sic] could have put forth a
self-defense that had some teeth. In
either scenario, there is no rationale [sic]
reason for Trial Counsel to have not filed a McMorris motion relating
to
As we have seen, however, the
jury heard Walls’s testimony that
3. Redacted audio and transcript of Detective Chicks’s in-custody interview with Dekoria Marks.
¶20 As we have seen, the jury heard a redacted version of Detective
Chicks’s in-custody interview of Dekoria Marks.
Although it is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the Record
before us is complete, see State
Bank of Hartland v. Arndt,
129
¶21 Dekoria Marks claims that her trial lawyer was ineffective
because he did not seek to have the redacted parts admitted under Wis. Stat. Rule 901.07, the so-called
“rule of completeness.”[7] Parts of a non-testifying defendant’s
out-of-court statement are admissible under this rule if necessary to
“correct[] a distorted impression” of parts of the out-of-court statement
offered by the State, despite the fact that if otherwise offered by the
defendant they would be hearsay. State
v.
¶22 Dekoria Marks’s trial lawyer explained to the trial court those
parts of the redacted transcript that he wanted included. He did not, however, reference Wis. Stat. Rule 901.07. For the purposes of our analysis of the
prejudice aspect of
First excerpt:
DETECTIVE: How long have you known
DETECTIVE: How long have you been dating him?
DETECTIVE: Four years? Okay. Has there been any violence between the two
of you?
DETECTIVE: In
the past, has he been arrested or have you before been arrested?
DETECTIVE: Okay. So, how is it that you were together with
your ex-boyfriend [
DETECTIVE: No? Whose room is that?
DETECTIVE: What’s that?
MS. MARKS: He had peoples after him trying to kill him because he had end up stealing some drugs and some money. [Her answer continues and is not relevant to this opinion.]
Second excerpt:
DETECTIVE: Okay.
Third excerpt:
DETECTIVE: And so, after he slapped you, what did you do to him?
DETECTIVE: How did you defend yourself?[[10]]
DETECTIVE: Yeah, what did, what specifically did you do?
DETECTIVE: Okay. How many times?
Given what the jury had already
heard about Dekoria Marks’s tumultuous relationship with Davis, Dekoria Marks
has not established Strickland prejudice—that is, she has not shown that using Wis. Stat. Rule 901.07’s
rule-of-completeness was necessary to “correct[] a distorted impression”
created by the redacted version. See
4. Failure to object and move for a mistrial
because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
¶23 Dekoria Marks claims that her trial lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to what she argues was misconduct by the prosecutor and for not seeking a mistrial. The claims are wholly without merit.
(a) During the trial, the prosecutor gave to Detective Chicks a copy of the redacted transcript and asked whether it was “an accurate depiction -- or an accurate reflection of the statement by Mrs. [sic] Dekoria Marks?” Detective Chicks responded “yes.” As we have seen, the redactions did not make the transcript that was received into evidence not “an accurate depiction -- or an accurate reflection” of the whole of Dekoria Marks’s interview with Detective Chicks; even with the redactions, the transcript accurately reflected the tenor of what she told him.
(b) Later, after an audio excerpt was played for the jury, the prosecutor asked Detective Chicks whether the transcript “reflects exactly how that conversation went.” Dekoria Marks does not show how the transcript did not “exactly” reflect what the jury heard in that excerpt.
¶24 There was no prosecutorial misconduct to which to object.
¶25 Further, although Dekoria Marks’s main appellate brief does not reveal this, the trial court told the jury that the audio and the transcript had been redacted: “With regard to the defendant’s statement, I’ve ordered that certain portions of some of the defendant’s statement to be -- to the police officer to be deleted, You’re not to speculate about what the deletions may be or why I ordered them deleted.”[12] Both lawyers agreed that the instruction was “sufficient.” Additionally, the transcript received into evidence has asterisks at the place of the deletions, except in connection with the ambiguity noted in footnotes 9 through 11 of this opinion.
(c) Dekoria Marks claims on appeal that the following excerpts from the prosecutor’s closing argument were also misconduct:[13]
First excerpt:
If she had thought about it, she may have come to her senses and realized that stabbing somebody seven times in the back and in the neck in response to being slapped once is not a reasonable response. That’s not a rational reaction.
Second excerpt:
In
And, in this
That’s how the law approaches
crime. State of
Follow Detective Chicks’ [sic] example. The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Dekoria Marks tried to kill her ex-boyfriend. She had the intent to kill.
Third excerpt:
If she was in danger -- if Edward Davis was walking away from her, Edward Davis slapped her and then walked away, he was going out of that room, where was the danger?
The threat was over. The threat was over. There is no need to stab him, maybe she could pick up the knife, maybe she could harm [sic—“arm”?] herself with it in case he did turn around. He didn’t turn around. Remember, he didn’t turn around. He had his back to her. She got him in the back as he is leaving. There was no threat anymore.
Fourth excerpt:
[Dekoria Marks’s lawyer] wants you to believe that Dekoria Marks was being beaten that night. She made the statement, “I was stabbed because he beat me.”
“Well, what exactly did he do?”
“Well, he slapped me.”
“How many times?”
“Just that one time. Just that one time. So I stabbed him because he slapped me that one time. I stabbed him seven times including in the neck and along the spine because he slapped me one time.”
Now, we heard [Dekoria Marks’s lawyer] say, “How many times does it take for a woman to be beaten before it’s okay to stab somebody?
Well, if a man slaps his girlfriend one time, that is one time too many.
These were fair comments on the
evidence that the jury heard, see State v. Amundson, 69
¶26 In sum, the Record shows conclusively that Dekoria Marks’s
contentions that her trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective are without
merit. Thus, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in
not holding an evidentiary hearing. See Love, 2005
WI 116, ¶26, 284
B. Alleged trial-court error in not letting the
jury hear the unredacted version of Detective Chicks’s custodial interview of Dekoria
Marks.
¶27 As we have seen, Dekoria
Marks complains that certain matters should not have been redacted from her
custodial interview with Detective Chicks. Assuming but not deciding that the
trial court should not have redacted the interview, under the applicable
factors any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given: (1) the evidence of Davis’s interactions
with Dekoria Marks that the jury did hear,
(2) the strength of the evidence against Dekoria Marks, and (3) the fact that the jury
accepted her lawyer’s contention that she stabbed Davis in what she believed
was self-defense, although that belief was unreasonable. See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78,
¶48, 301
C. Discretionary reversal.
¶28 Dekoria Marks asks us to
exercise our discretion pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 752.35, under which we may order a new trial if it appears from
the Record that: (1) “the real
controversy has not been fully tried” or; (2) “it is probable that justice
has for any reason miscarried.” Vollmer
v. Luety, 156
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
[1] The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen presided over the trial. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner denied Dekoria Marks’s motion for postconviction relief.
[2] Gregory
Marks later told the jury: “The word on
the street is that Ed [
[3] As material, Wis. Stat. § 940.01 provides:
(1) Offenses. (a) Except as provided in sub. (2), whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony.
…
(2) Mitigating circumstances. The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under s. 940.05:
…
(b) Unnecessary defensive force. Death was caused because the actor believed he or she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable.
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.05(1) provides, as material: “Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if: (a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist.”
[4] Wisconsin Stat. Rule 904.05(2) provides: “In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct.”
[5]
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
[6] We discuss the redactions below in part A.3.
[7] Wisconsin Stat. Rule 901.07 reads: “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”
[8] The redactions objected to by Dekoria Marks were put on the Record in an oral presentation by her trial lawyer. Where there are non-material diversions from what he read of the redacted transcript and that transcript, we adopt the transcript’s rendering.
[9] The
transcript given to the jury has: “Tried to tell
myself, because he had a, a problem cornering me.” It is not clear from the Record or the
parties’ briefs whether the change from “tried to tell myself” to “trying to
defend myself” was an actual redaction or a faulty transcription or a
misspeaking by Dekoria Marks’s trial lawyer.
We give Dekoria Marks the benefit of the doubt, however, and assume that
it was a redaction.
[10] Dekoria Marks’s trial lawyer read it as: “Detective: So you defended yourself?”
[11] Dekoria
Marks’s trial lawyer read it as: “
[12] We
caution Dekoria Marks’s appellate lawyer, Joel A. Mogren, Esq., that SCR 20:3.3
“requires candor toward tribunals,” see Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Gabe’s
Constr. Co., Inc., 220
[13] We
only address the matters for which Dekoria Marks gives Record references. See Grothe v. Valley Coatings, Inc., 2000 WI App 240, ¶6, 239
[14] Wis. Stat. § 752.35 provides:
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court for entry of the proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.