COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 23, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kacey G. Johnson, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
¶1 KESSLER, J.[1] Kacey G. Johnson appeals from an order denying his motion for resentencing. Johnson was charged with ten counts of bail jumping, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a) (2007-08),[2] and was sentenced to fifty-six months in the House of Correction. Johnson argues that his sentence is invalid because it was not imposed by the judge who took his pleas and heard the evidence of guilt. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Johnson was charged with one count of misdemeanor battery and one count of misdemeanor criminal damage to property in Milwaukee County Circuit Court case number 2009CM1567 on March 24, 2009. The victim on both counts was Johnson’s girlfriend, Kris Hawley. On April 27, 2009, Johnson was again charged with one count of misdemeanor battery and also with one count of misdemeanor intimidation of a victim in Milwaukee County Circuit Court case number 2009CM2102. The victim on both counts was again Kris Hawley. Johnson was placed on bond for each case with a condition not to have contact with Hawley.
¶3 On August 22, 2009, Johnson was charged with ten counts of
misdemeanor bail jumping for violating the condition of his bond by repeatedly
calling Hawley.[3]
¶4 On October 14, 2009, the case was assigned to the Honorable Judge Jeffrey A. Wagner due to a conflict in Judge Kuhnmuench’s calendar that day. Neither party objected to the reassignment. After hearing arguments from both sides and considering letters from Hawley requesting leniency, Judge Wagner sentenced Johnson to seven months in the House of Correction on counts one through eight, consecutive to each other, and seven months each on counts nine and ten, concurrent to the rest, totaling fifty-six months.
¶5 Johnson filed a motion for resentencing on the grounds that
his sentence was unduly harsh, that Judge Kuhnmuench should have issued his
sentence because she heard the evidence of Johnson’s guilt, and that no
justification was given by the trial court for the substitution of judge. Judge Wagner denied the motion, stating in
his written order that it is standard procedure in
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 “Whether a motion states a request … for
resentencing because the original sentence is invalid, is a legal
determination.” State v. Wood, 2007 WI
App 190, ¶4, 305
DISCUSSION
¶7 At issue in this appeal is whether Johnson had a right to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea and heard evidence of his guilt. Johnson argues that he only became aware of his option to object to sentencing before Judge Wagner after Judge Wagner issued the decision denying Johnson’s motion for resentencing. The decision stated in a footnote:
The defendant states that there is no reason or
explanation in the court record for the substitution of judge. There was no substitution of judge. The case was spun to this court for
sentencing purposes because Judge Kuhnmuench was in the middle of a motion
hearing and could not accommodate the parties.
Spinning cases is standard procedure in
¶8 Johnson argues that the procedure of “spinning” cases violated his expectation of fairness because no explanation was provided at the hearing, either by his trial attorney or the judge himself, as to why sentencing was before Judge Wagner, nor was Johnson given an option to object. Johnson contends that because he did not freely, knowingly, willingly and intelligently consent to a sentencing hearing before a different judge, the sentence imposed by Judge Wagner is invalid and he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. He further argues, contrary to the State’s contention, that his expectation of a fair trial overrides any claim that he forfeited his right to raise of a claim of error on appeal by not objecting at the hearing, and that the sentencing by Judge Wagner violated his expectation of fundamental fairness in criminal court. We conclude that Johnson did forfeit his right to raise a claim of error on appeal and that his expectation of fundamental fairness was not violated. We affirm.
I. Johnson’s forfeited his right
to raise a claim of error on appeal.
¶9 Johnson’s
failure to object to Judge Wagner presiding over his hearing constitutes a
forfeiture of his right to raise a claim of error on appeal. “[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right.” State
v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315
II. Fundamental fairness was not
violated.
¶10 Johnson
also contends that his right to forgo sentencing by Judge Wagner and return to
Judge Kuhnmuench was so important to his expectation of a fair trial that the
right could only be lost if he knowingly relinquished it. Johnson argues that case law’s recognition
that “[n]ormally, the judge who hears the evidence of guilt should also do the
sentencing,” along with Wis. Stat. § 971.20,
stand for the proposition that the notion of fundamental fairness allows a
criminal defendant the ability to have some control over who presides at his
trial and provides some expectations about how his case will be resolved. See
generally State v. Garner, 54
¶11 Fundamental
fairness is a general due process concept.
Oliveto v. Circuit Court for Crawford Cnty., 194
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2) (2007-08).
[2] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[3] Upon
his release, Johnson was placed in custody in
[4] Johnson states in his brief that he is not pursuing relief based on the grounds that his sentence was unduly harsh. The only issue on before us is whether Johnson had a right to be sentenced by the same judge that took his plea.
[5] Wisconsin Stat. § 971.20 controls
judicial substitution in criminal proceedings before and at trial. Johnson argues that the statute reflects “the
legislature’s intent to give criminal defendants some control over their own
judicial destiny,” and that an “element of predictability [is] grounded in
fundamental fairness.” The portion of
the statute dealing with a defendant’s right to substitute a newly assigned
judge at trial (Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5))
does not extend that right to sentencing hearings. See
generally State v. Wisth, 2009
WI App 53, 317