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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED March 18, 2014 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing.� If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.� A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.� |
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����������� APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:� MEL FLANAGAN, Judge.� Affirmed.
�1������� KESSLER, J.[1] Venceremos Crump appeals the judgment of conviction, following a guilty plea, of one count of misdemeanor battery. �Crump also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion for resentencing. �We affirm.
BACKGROUND
�2������� On July 18, 2012, Crump was charged with one count of misdemeanor battery, domestic abuse, and one count of disorderly conduct, domestic abuse.� According to the complaint, on July 16, 2012, Tumekia Armstead was picking up the son she shared with Crump from daycare, when she unexpectedly saw Crump at the daycare center.� Crump followed Armstead back to her car, climbed into the rear seat behind the driver�s seat, and demanded a ride.� Crump was seated next to his son, who was in a child car seat.� Armstead told police that as she was driving, Crump took his son out of the car seat and placed the child on his (Crump�s) lap, began �yelling and cursing,� and threatened to break Armstead�s neck.� Crump also wrapped his arm around Armstead�s neck, placing her in a chokehold, and pulled Armstead�s head backwards.� This caused Armstead�s glasses to come off as she was driving, and caused Armstead to swerve.� Crump was subsequently arrested and charged.
�3������� Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crump plead guilty to one count of misdemeanor battery and the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed and read-in.
�4������� At sentencing, the circuit court heard statements from the State, Crump�s counsel and Crump himself. �The circuit court also considered a victim impact statement submitted by Armstead, in which Armstead described a history of domestic abuse between Crump and herself.� The circuit court sentenced Crump to nine months� imprisonment, stayed, and eighteen months� probation.
�5������� Crump filed a postconviction motion for resentencing, arguing that the circuit court did not properly explain its reasoning for imposing Crump�s particular sentence. �The circuit court denied the motion. �This appeal follows. �Addition facts will be developed as relevant to the discussion.
DISCUSSION
�6������� On appeal Crump maintains his contention that the circuit court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing Crump�s particular sentence. �We disagree.
�7������� It is well-settled that a circuit court exercises discretion at sentencing, State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, �17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, and that �[t]he [circuit] court has great latitude in passing sentence[,]� State v. J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d 655, 662, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991). �Our review is limited to determining whether there was an erroneous exercise of discretion. �State v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 426, 415 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1987). �There is a �strong public policy against interference with the sentencing discretion of the [circuit] court and sentences are afforded the presumption that the [circuit] court acted reasonably.� �State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984).
�8������� The circuit court is to consider three primary factors in passing sentence: �(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the defendant�s character, and (3) the need for protection of the public. �Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980). �The weight to be attributed to each factor �is a determination which appears to be particularly within the wide discretion of the sentencing judge.� �Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975). �Thus, �[i]f the facts are fairly inferable from the record, and the reasons indicate the consideration of legally relevant factors, the sentence should ordinarily be affirmed.� �McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 281, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
�9������� Here, the circuit court did consider the primary sentencing factors in imposing Crump�s sentence. �In its order denying Crump�s postconviction motion, the circuit court described Crump�s behavior towards Armstead as �aggravated.�� See State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 915, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994) (circuit court has additional opportunity to explain sentence during postconviction proceedings). �The circuit court noted �the violent nature of [Crump�s] acts, the presence of his young child and the dangerous situation he placed himself, the victim, his son and the public in by causing the victim to swerve.�
�10����� The circuit court also considered Crump�s character, noting that based on the victim impact statement, Crump had a history of domestic abuse.� The court also acknowledged Crump�s inability to take responsibility for his actions, telling Crump at the sentencing hearing that he �[has] issues that [he] is in denial about.�� The court noted that Crump �made numerous conflicting or challenging statements about the facts in his allocution to the court,� suggesting that Crump �was not taking responsibility for his actions or that there were other issues going on � affecting his ability to understand what he had done.�� The court also acknowledged Crump�s prior convictions for marijuana possession.
�11����� As to the final factor, the court considered the need to protect both the public and Armstead by acknowledging Crump�s need for rehabilitation.� The circuit court acknowledged the danger to the public caused by Armstead�s swerving�a direct result of Crump�s behavior. �The court also stated that the sentence provides �an opportunity to address [Crump�s] rehabilitative needs on probation but also to punish him for his extremely dangerous behavior which could have had far more devastating consequences for everyone involved and innocent bystanders.�
�12����� The circuit court considered the relevant sentencing factors and properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Crump.� Accordingly, we affirm.
By the Court.�Judgment and order affirmed.
����������� This opinion will not be published.� See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. � 752.31(2) (2011-12).� All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise noted.