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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 6, 2014 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing.� If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.� A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.� |
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����������� APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Wood County:� nicholas j. brazeau, jr., Judge.� Affirmed.
�1������� LUNDSTEN, J.[1] Linda S.D. appeals an order of the circuit court extending her mental health commitment for a period of twelve months. �She challenges the circuit court�s determination that the County met its burden of proof at the hearing extending her commitment. �She contends that the County failed to produce evidence of dangerousness.� As I understand her more specific arguments, however, Linda S.D. is actually making a statutory interpretation argument pertaining to Wis. Stat. � 51.20(1).� I reject her argument, and affirm the order.
Background
�2������� Linda S.D. was the subject of an emergency detention in June 2012 and a six-month inpatient commitment order in July 2012 under Wis. Stat. ch. 51. �In November 2012, the County petitioned to extend her commitment. �
�3������� At the extension hearing, the County presented the sole expert witness, Dr. Justin Knapp.� Dr. Knapp testified that Linda S.D. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type and an anxiety disorder.� The County hoped to transition Linda S.D. to an outpatient setting, but this depended on whether she took medications as prescribed.� According to Dr. Knapp, Linda S.D. suffered from �significant delusions and gross impairment in her overall functioning� whenever she failed to fully adhere to recommended treatment.�
�4������� The court found Dr. Knapp�s testimony to be credible.� The court found that Linda S.D. suffered from a mental illness and was a proper subject for treatment, and further found that, �[w]ith regard to dangerousness, I think you do meet the standard that you would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.�� The court concluded that Linda S.D.�s commitment should be extended by twelve months.�
Discussion
�5������� As an initial matter, I address a potential question of mootness.� The appellate briefing in this case was complete approximately ten months into Linda S.D.�s twelve-month commitment.� That commitment has now expired.� Thus, the issue in this appeal has at least arguably become moot.
�6������� An appellate court generally will not consider moot issues unless certain criteria are met. �See State ex rel. Olson v. Litscher, 2000 WI App 61, �3, 233 Wis. 2d 685, 608 N.W.2d 425.� Those criteria include that the issue (1) is one of great public importance; (2) is one that has occurred frequently; (3) is likely to arise again; or (4) will likely be repeated but evade appellate review because the appellate review process cannot be completed, or even undertaken, in time to have a practical effect on the parties.� State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, �7, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349.
�7������� Neither Linda S.D. nor the County has submitted a position on the issue of mootness.� Assuming for purposes of argument that the issue here meets one or more of the criteria above, I would still affirm for the reasons that follow.
�8������� Linda S.D. argues that the County failed to produce evidence of dangerousness.� As I understand her more specific arguments, however, Linda S.D. is primarily making a statutory interpretation argument based on Wis. Stat. � 51.20(1)(a)2. and (1)(am).� Her argument goes to the statutory standard for dangerousness at an extension hearing.� The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. �See Knight v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2002 WI 27, �14, 251 Wis. 2d 10, 640 N.W.2d 773.
�9������� Wisconsin Stat. � 51.20(1)(a)2. sets forth five tests for dangerousness upon initial commitment.� Each test requires some evidence of �recent� conduct.� See � 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.�
�10����� Wisconsin Stat. � 51.20(1)(am) addresses commitment extensions.� The statute specifies that the � 51.20(1)(a)2. requirement of evidence of �recent� conduct �may be satisfied by a showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual�s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.�� Section 51.20(1)(am).
�11����� Linda S.D. argues that Wis. Stat. � 51.20(1)(am) removes only the requirement of evidence of recent conduct.� She argues that, under � 51.20(1)(am), the County still �need[s] to present some evidence of prior dangerous behavior and show that, absent commitment, such behavior is likely to arise again� (emphasis added).�
�12����� The County argues that the statute does not require any evidence of prior dangerous behavior.�� The County argues that this would be tantamount to re-litigating the issue of dangerousness from the initial commitment hearing.�
�13����� I agree with the County.� Under Wis. Stat. � 51.20(1)(am), the County may show dangerousness by showing that �there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual�s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.�� As the circuit court recognized, it makes no sense to require the County to re-prove past dangerousness at each subsequent extension hearing.�
�14����� This interpretation of the statute is consistent with its purpose: ��to allow extension of a commitment when the patient�s condition has not improved enough to warrant discharge.�� See M.J. v. Milwaukee Cnty. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 525, 530-31, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984).� �[T]he emphasis is on the attendant consequence to the patient should treatment be discontinued.�� Id. at 531.
�15����� In her reply brief, Linda S.D. appears to refine her argument. �She argues that, even if no evidence of prior dangerous conduct is required, the County must still prove dangerousness somehow.� This is true as far as it goes, but Linda S.D.�s argument does not come to grips with the fact that Wis. Stat. � 51.20(1)(am) specifies what the mode of proof may be at an extension hearing:� The county may prove dangerousness by showing that �there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual�s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.�� Implicit in � 51.20(1)(am) is that an individual who would be a �proper subject for commitment� if treatment is withdrawn is by definition an individual who would be dangerous if treatment is withdrawn.�
�16����� Linda S.D. does not develop an argument that the evidence is insufficient in light of the County�s correct interpretation of the statute.� On the contrary, she concedes that Dr. Knapp testified that Linda S.D. would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.[2]�
�17����� It may be that Linda S.D. means to argue that, even under the
County�s interpretation of the statute, Dr. Knapp�s testimony was lacking in
foundation or was otherwise too conclusory.�
If so, this argument is undeveloped.�
I therefore address it no further.�
See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.
2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (court of appeals need not
consider inadequately developed arguments).
Conclusion
�18����� For all of the reasons stated, I affirm the circuit court�s order extending Linda S.D.�s mental health commitment.
����������� By the Court.�Order affirmed.
����������� This opinion will not be published.� Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. � 752.31(2)(d) (2011-12).� All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] Linda S.D. points out in a footnote in her brief-in-chief that Dr. Knapp actually stated in his testimony that Linda S.D. would be a proper subject for �treatment� (instead of a proper subject for �commitment�) if treatment is withdrawn.� Linda S.D. does not, however, develop an alternative argument that this testimony was insufficient under the County�s interpretation of the statute.� I therefore need not address the topic.� I choose to note, however, that reading Dr. Knapp�s testimony in context suggests that, most likely, either there was a transcription error or Dr. Knapp misspoke and meant to say that Linda S.D. would be a proper subject for �commitment� if treatment were withdrawn.� Certainly this is how the circuit court understood Dr. Knapp�s testimony, given its findings.� What follows is the pertinent exchange between the County�s counsel and Dr. Knapp at the extension hearing:
Q�������� Do you have an opinion, Doctor, if in fact treatment were withdrawn for [Linda S.D.], that she would become a proper subject for commitment again?
A�������� Yes, I do.
Q�������� Okay.� And that opinion is?
A�������� That, yes, she would become a proper subject for treatment again were appropriate treatment withdrawn.�
(Emphasis added.)