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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED October 15, 2013 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing.� If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.� A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.� |
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����������� APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:� KEVIN E. MARTENS and JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judges.� Affirmed.
����������� Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
�1������� KESSLER, J. Maurice C. Hall appeals a judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of sexual assault of a child, three counts of incest, one count of intimidation of a victim, and one count of child enticement.� Hall also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. �We affirm.[1]
BACKGROUND
�2������� Hall was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child, three counts of incest, one count of intimidation of a victim, and one count of child enticement.� The charges stemmed from multiple allegations of sexual abuse made by Hall�s nine-year-old daughter.
�3������� Approximately one week after Hall�s initial appearance, Hall�s defense counsel requested a competency evaluation, stating that Hall had a prior psychiatric diagnosis.� Hall was subsequently examined by Dr. Deborah Collins.� Dr. Collins�s report indicated that Hall was competent to participate in the proceedings against him.� Specifically, the report stated:
Despite Mr. Hall�s history of psychiatric treatment, it is this examiner�s opinion that he does not presently demonstrate a substantial lack in his mental capacity to understand the pending proceedings or aid in his defense. �In support of this opinion, I would note the following factors:
1. Mr. Hall was spontaneously aware of the pending charges and able to provide approximately accurate names of each of them. �He is familiar with the contents of the criminal complaint and substance of the allegations. �Mr. Hall displayed his motivation and ability to reply to the allegations from a legally self-serving perspective and one which includes asserting his innocence of any wrongdoing.
2. Mr. Hall displayed his capacity to engage in a coherent rational exchange focused on his legal predicament�.
3. Mr. Hall displayed the capacity to maintain his composure and behavioral control throughout the entirety of the clinical interview.
4. Mr. Hall displayed the capacity to grasp with essential accuracy a range of legal concepts such as plea options available to him and the role functions of his own attorney, the prosecutor and a judge or jury in the event of trial. �I would note Mr. Hall�s knowledge accrued in part by virtue of his legal experiences.
5. Mr. Hall displayed the ability to reason vis-�-vis potential options consistent with his claims of innocence.
6. Mr. Hall displayed the capacity to grasp without significant distortion how a trial process might unfold and the plea bargaining process.
It is such factors that lead me to conclude that defendant Maurice Hall is presently competent to proceed.
�. Given his reported history, however, I would urge court officers to remain sensitive in the event of any significant changes in his overall mental status as such a factor may signal decline in his competency and warrant his reexamination.
�4������� The case proceeded to trial.� On the second day of trial, Hall�s defense counsel told the trial court that the parties had reached a plea agreement. �Hall immediately interjected, stating:
No. �No, I ain�t pleading guilty to that, man. �I can�t do that, dude. �I didn�t do anything wrong�. �I understand the precautions, I understand the outcome what would happen if I lose, but, you know, I mean I�ve come this far, waited a year to happen for this day�. �I understand, you know, I have to clear my name somehow.
�5������� Hall�s defense counsel then told the trial court that Hall had not received his antidepressant medications for two days and �suspect[ed] that it might be affecting [Hall�s] judgment at this point.�� The trial court engaged Hall in the following colloquy:
[Trial Court:] Is [not receiving your medication for two days] having any effect on your ability to understand what�s going on in court?
[Hall:] Not so much of my understanding but my, well, I don�t know �understanding,� but it helps me concentrate a little bit more. �Not so much comprehend but make decisions. �You know. �I mean this is a serious decision and if I -- usually when I have a medication I can make a better decision. �You know what I�m saying? �Doesn�t work as fast as, boom, like that or anything like that, but.
�.
[Trial Court:] Do you feel like you�re confused right now or disoriented in any way?
[Hall:] I�m very confused. �I don�t understand why this is going on. �The way it is.
[Trial Court:] That�s not a medication issue, Mr. Hall. �My question is whether or not taking your medication is causing you to be confused at all.
[Hall:] It is clouding my judgment.
[Trial Court:] You feel it�s clouding your judgment?
[Hall:] Just a little bit.
[Trial Court:] How so.� Can you explain that?
[Hall:] Well, my attorney came to me with a reasonable plea bargain, max of 22 years, and normally I probably would have thought it through and, you know, agreed to it.� But, you know, I -- I signed the papers you know, I recanted. �He walked back in there and I discussed a little bit more with him, and you know, we agreed to it, recanted again. �I just don�t know what to do. �I -- I can�t make the right call, I guess. �Racing thoughts. �Hard to explain. �I mean, you can actually get hold of the House of Correction. �They�ll even tell you I�m on medication. �Been on it for almost a year now.
�6������� Based on Hall�s statements, the trial court determined that Hall could not knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea agreement.� The trial court stated that proceeding to trial was the �default� option, absent any findings of legal incompetence.� In determining that Hall was competent to stand trial, the trial court stated:
I was looking back on [the] � report addressing competency. �That was submitted by Dr. Debra [sic] Collins. �Just to get a little more information.� The information involving Mr. Hall and his medication and whether he�s able to, I guess �concentrate� maybe in his words, and fairly assess whatever offer the [S]tate�s extended is certainly an important issue. �It�s relevant.
����������� If I were to go ahead and accept a plea, that is I have to be satisfied that if Mr. Hall pleads guilty to any charge, including whatever the negotiation was, that he can do so in a knowing manner�.
����������� I think what Mr. Hall�s describing to me is he�s just not sure if he can make that decision right now, and that his medication issue, he feels, is contributing to that. �That�s certainly relevant to the plea, but I�m not so sure I feel it�s otherwise relevant to going forward.
����������� The issue is if the circumstance is such that Mr. Hall�s not in a position to enter into, that is, any knowing plea, then the alternative is to go ahead and continue the trial. �And that�s really the other option, unless, again, there�s a basis for me to genuinely question legal competency.
����������� I don�t certainly question that. �That involves an understanding of the nature of the proceedings and an ability to assist in one�s defense, and there�s nothing that I�ve observed that would suggest to me that those things are genuine issues.
����������� �.
����������� At this point I feel it�s really the only option I have as far as how to address this. �In any circumstance where a plea can�t be entered into knowingly or voluntarily, sort of the default of the option then is you proceed with trial, and that�s what we�re prepared to do.
�7������� The trial continued and the jury found Hall guilty as charged.� Hall filed a postconviction motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court violated his right to due process when it failed to sua sponte order a competency evaluation after Hall indicated that his lack of medication may have been clouding his judgment. �The postconviction court denied the motion, finding that the trial court �observed nothing in the defendant�s responses or demeanor to suggest that he lacked the competency to proceed with the trial.�� This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
�8������� On appeal, Hall contends that the trial court erred when it found him competent to stand trial, but not competent to enter a plea. �Specifically, Hall argues that the trial court erroneously proceeded to trial as the �default� option, rather than order a competency exam after finding Hall unable to knowingly enter a plea.� The record demonstrates that Hall understood the nature of the proceedings against him and was competent to stand trial.
�9������� �We review an order denying a postconviction motion seeking a new trial under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.�� See State v. Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29, 36, 539 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1995). ��The trial court properly exercises its discretion if its determination is made according to accepted legal standards and if it is in accordance with the facts on the record.��� Id. (citation omitted).
�10����� We will not disturb a trial court�s determination as to whether there is reason to doubt a defendant�s competence unless the court exhibited an erroneous exercise of discretion. �State v. Weber, 146 Wis. 2d 817, 823, 433 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1988).� Wisconsin Stat. � 971.14(1r)(a) (2011-12)[2] requires a trial court to conduct competency proceedings if there is �reason to doubt� that the defendant is competent to proceed.� Id. �A defendant is incompetent to stand trial, plead guilty, or plead no contest if he lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in his own defense.� Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993); Wis. Stat. � 971.13(1). �More specifically, a defendant is incompetent if he �lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his � defense.�� State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, �27, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477. �A reason to doubt competency can arise from the defendant�s demeanor in the courtroom, his colloquies with the trial court judge, or by motion from either party. Id., �29.
�11����� Determining competency to stand trial is a �judicial inquiry, not a medical determination.�� Id., �31. �A history of psychiatric problems and a clinical diagnosis of mental illness do not necessarily mean that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial.� Id., ��31, 48-49. �The pertinent determination is the defendant�s mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding at the time of the proceedings.� Id., �31.
�12����� The State concedes that the trial court erroneously stated that trial was the �default� option because the standard for competence to stand trial and competence to enter a guilty plea are the same.� See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 (In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, plead guilty or no contest, the trial court is to consider whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether the defendant has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.).� See also Wis. Stat. � 971.13(1). �We conclude that nothing in the record provides a reason to doubt Hall�s competence to stand trial.� A review of the record reveals that: �Hall gave appropriate, reasoned answers during his colloquy with the trial court; Hall understood the nature of the charges against him; and Hall understood the consequences of both accepting a guilty plea and proceeding to trial. �Dr. Collins�s report indicated that Hall was: �intent on maintaining his innocence; �disgust[ed]� by the charges against him; aware of his legal options; and competent to stand trial.� The trial court considered Dr. Collins�s report in its decision.� Indeed, Hall told the trial court that he was adamant about �clear[ing his] name.�� Therefore, it stands to reason that Hall�s colloquy with the trial court reflected the difficulty of deciding whether to accept a guilty plea or continue to maintain his innocence. �The colloquy did not demonstrate that Hall lacked the capacity to understand his alternatives and their consequences. �Hall told the trial court that he was struggling to make the �serious decision� and changed his mind several times, but that his comprehension was intact.� The fact that Hall simply could not decide, even with a somewhat �cloud[ed] judgment,� does not, on the record before us, cast doubt on Hall�s competency to proceed to trial.� The trial court properly exercised its discretion and the postconviction court properly denied the motion for a new trial.
By the Court.�Judgment and order affirmed.
����������� Not recommended for publication in the official reports.