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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 26, 2013 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing.� If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.� A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.� See Wis. Stat. � 808.10 and Rule 809.62.� |
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Appeal No.� |
2013AP682-CR |
Cir. Ct. No.� 2011CF2386 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN� |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT IV |
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State of Wisconsin, ��������� Plaintiff-Appellant, ���� v. Deris D. Huley, ��������� Defendant-Respondent. |
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����������� APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County:� Ellen k. berz, Judge.� Affirmed.�
�1������� Sherman, J.[1] The State appeals an order of the circuit court denying its motion for reconsideration of the court�s denial of restitution to the victim of a hit and run accident.� I affirm.�
BACKGROUND
�2������� On November 14, 2011, Deris D. Huley and Crystal Seefeldt were involved in a motor vehicle accident.� Huley left the scene of the accident and was later charged with felony hit and run resulting in injury, contrary to Wis. Stat. � 346.67(1).� Pursuant to a plea agreement, Huley pled no contest to an amended charge of misdemeanor hit and run of an attended vehicle, as a repeater.� See Wis. Stat. � 346.74(5)(a).� Huley was sentenced to thirty days in jail and two years� probation, and the State was given an opportunity to prepare and submit a restitution order to the court.�
�3������� The State requested restitution in the amount of $4,064.83, for personal injuries Seefeldt allegedly suffered in the accident.[2]� Huley objected to restitution on the basis that the State failed to demonstrate that the injuries for which restitution was sought were factually caused by Huley�s crime.
�4������� The circuit court denied restitution, reasoning that Seefeldt�s injuries were not causally connected to Huley�s crime, which was leaving the scene of the accident.� The State moved the court for reconsideration, which the court denied.� The State appeals.�
DISCUSSION
�5������� The State challenges the circuit court�s denial of restitution.� The State argues that taking into account the entirety of Huley�s course of conduct, Huley�s criminal conduct was a �substantial factor� of the victim�s damages, and therefore, restitution should have been ordered.�
�6������� Requests for restitution are addressed to the discretion of the circuit court.� See State v. Haase, 2006 WI App 86, �5, 293 Wis. 2d 322, 716 N.W.2d 526.� We will disturb discretionary decisions only when there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion.� Id.� A circuit court �erroneously exercises its discretion when its decision is based on an error of law.�� Id.�
�7������� Wisconsin Stat. � 973.20 authorizes a circuit court to order restitution.� Subsection (1r) provides that the court �shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing � unless the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on the record.�� Section 973.20(1r). �Crime considered at sentencing� is defined as �any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.�� Section 973.20(1g)(a). ��[I]n order to allow victims to recover their losses as a result of a defendant�s criminal conduct,�� our interpretation of the restitution statute is broad and liberal.� State v. Anderson, 215 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 573 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997).� We have thus �read the statute and [] case law to say that restitution is the rule and not the exception and that restitution should be ordered whenever warranted.�� State v. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 333, 602 N.W.2d 104.
�8������� We have explained that for purposes of restitution, a nexus must exist between the crime committed and the damage to be compensated through restitution.� Id. at 333.� We explained that nexus as follows��[t]he victim need only show that �the defendant�s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury� and that it was �the natural consequence of the actions.��� Id. (quoted source omitted).� Taking into account Huley�s entire course of conduct, I cannot agree with the State�s contention that the evidence sufficiently linked Huley�s conduct to the victim�s claimed damages.
�9������� In Madlock, the defendant pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle without the owner�s consent and, based upon a presentence report requesting restitution for damages sustained to the victim�s vehicle, the circuit court ordered restitution.� Id. at 326-27. �We reversed the restitution order on appeal because the �requisite evidentiary basis for restitution� was lacking.�� Id. �at 336.� We observed that �in most cases the facts in support of the criminal conviction, coupled with the statutory presumption of restitution, will allow for a restitution order.� Id. at 334.� However, the �skeletal� record as to the actual fact of damage and the record�s failure to sufficiently show the necessary nexus between the defendant�s criminal conduct and the claimed damages resulted in the �rare� situation in which that result did not automatically follow.� Id. at 334, 336.
�10����� As in Madlock, the record in the present case is factually insufficient as to the victim�s damages.� The record is also insufficient to show the necessary nexus between Huley�s criminal conduct�leaving the scene of an accident�and the claimed damage.� In particular, the evidence is insufficient to show that Huley�s actions caused the accident and that his actions were thus the precipitating cause of the victim�s injury.� Accordingly, I affirm the circuit court�s denial of the State�s request for restitution.�
����������������������� By the Court.�Order affirmed.
����������� This opinion will not be published.� See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4.